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Abstract 
One way that the Cold War benefited the international environment of security mighl 
well be that it allowed more attention to be paid to conflicts of a smaller scale. The 
persisting large number, however, of hot and cold conflicts scattered around the globc 
keep fuelling reasonable concerns about security. The defence of a country requires a 
military sector, the effectiveness of which mainly depends on the quality and quantity ol 
its arsenal. Large countries are usually self-sufficient, producing domestically the 
majority of their needs, whereas the arms trade is the main source of procurement for the 
bulk of smaller states. This thesis attempts a combined empirical and theoretical 
exploration of the international arms market, from a purely quantitative scope. It beginss 
with an examination of the existing literature and the available data and introduces a 
method to calculate the as yet unavailable prices of imported arms. It tests the validity ol 
the existing theoretical predictions, first in a cross-sectional study and then in a more 
detailed study of global panel data showing that the existing theory can only partly 
explain the facts. The data support a standard responsiveness of countries' demand for 
arms to the military budget and the price of arms, together with an evident need for a 
deeper theoretical foundation. Following the empirical indications, this thesis first 
introduces substitution between imported and domestically produced arms in a small- 
country, partial-equilibrium model of national defence. The applicability of this 
framework gets further support by an included econometric study. The optional entry ol 
countries to domestic production of arms is finally introduced in a quasi-general 
equilibrium model of the international arms market, keeping all aspects of previ=sq 
works. This generalised theory of the contemporary international arms market suggestq 
that policy recommendations that neglect the domestic alternative to imported arms car 
be misleading. 
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1. Introduction 
At a time when the majority of policies is being intensively analysed by economists, 
national defence and especially the economic determinants of the international trade in 
arms appear to have relatively escaped their attention. One of the major activities behind 
the national provision of defence, the international arms trade is a topic that can be 
distinguished by its near absence in the economic literature. Still covered by secrecy and 
political mysticism, the arms trade has always been, and still is, an area of great 
economic and social significance. After the end of the Cold War the aggregate for the 
whole world volume of the trade in arms has been steadily falling. According to ACDA 
[1995], within a decade, from 1985 to 1995, the value of the international arms trade 
decreased by about three-quarters. Despite this impressive decline, the overall volume of 
arms transfers still remains at considerably high levels and it could well rise again at any 
time in the future. The international trade in arms, therefore,, needs to be carefully 
analysed_ and understood. In other words, the economic determinants of countries' 
defence activities need to be taken out of the dark ages of secrecy and political 
despotism and brought under the light of science. 
The primarily stated purpose of the procurement of arms is to serve the needs of a 
country I) s national defence industry, protecting its citizens from a possible aggressive 
military offence of another country. Along with this primary and well justified purpose, 
the procurement of arms for national security is an activity that also implies several 
negative externalities. In practice, the arms stated to be imported for defensive reasons 
are often used for purposes of nationalistic aggression and abuse of human rights, inside 
and outside of the possessing country's national borders. A large number of conflicts are 
currently active around the world, all of them including at least two sides: usually one 
more aggressive and one more defensive. It is not always easy, unfortunately, to 
distinguish between the aggressive and the defensive sides of a conflict and the causes 
are often hidden a long way back in history. Taking this one step further, it is hard even 
to reach an agreement about the very definition of aggression per se and the rational 
basis of popular (and hence political) perceptions of aggressive actions has consistently 
been very weak. This of course applies in he case of military actions. Borrowing from 
the views of social psychology 'an act of aggression is a behaviour aimed at causing 
harm or pain (Aronson [1980] p. 161). Taking as an example the case of 1999 Balkan 
I 
Wars shows that it can be hard to distinguish between defenders and aggressive 
offenders since all parties involved, including the intervening NATO alliesl deliberately 
took actions that caused harm and pain, i. e. death of thousands and economic 
suffocation of millions of civilians. ' 
The trade in arms differs from any other trade in a number of ways. While the 
procurement of arms is supposed to create feelings of security for the citizens of a 
country, the citizens of other countries often perceive it as a potentially offensive 
capacity. In turn, other countries usually respond to this threat with corresponding 
increases in their military expenditure and procurement. This feedback process can often 
lead to an arms race, wasting valuable economic resources and -causing a variety of 
economic and welfare repercussions to the participating countries. Several examples of 
arms races can be drawn from the recent history, starting from the Cold War, that 
involved the most powerful states, and cover all the range of sizes down to local 
conflicts between countries or sub-country groups. The Cold War race of both 
conventional and arms of mass destruction appears to be in a phase of relaxation, 
whereas this is not the case for conflicts of a smaller scale. In fact, that large countries 
have always had the capacity to produce their own arms and the arms trade usually has 
been the main source of procurement for smaller states, often involved in regional arms 
races. Well-known examples of arms recipient countries involved in arms races are these 
between Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq and North and South 
Korea. 
Along with the motivation that originates from the demand side of the market, the 
commercial interest and the expansionism of arms-producing firms and their 
governments can often encourage the arms trade. The fixed-cost requirements for the 
establishment of an industry of major arms are enormous and only the largest of 
industrialised countries have been in a position to be near to self-sufficiency in their 
procurement. This together with the possible existence of positive economies of scale in 
the production of technologically advanced weapon systems push arms-producing firms 
to maintain the best possible sales abroad so they can recoup sunk costs. Intensified by 
the turn down of procurements that followed the end of the Cold War, the need to 
maintain production levels led arms-producing firms to search for ways to compensate 
the created demand gap. Furthermore, new supplier countries are at the stage of the 
realisation of their proclaimed intention to export arms, within politically determined 
1 The 11 week bombarding of Kosovo by NATO allies caused more civilian than military death 
casualties (The Observer, 21/6/1991 p. 1). 
2 
limits. For example Israel and South Aftica are establishing themselves as sellers, having 
consistently maintained their market shares in the post-Cold War years (ACDA [1995]). 
At political level, there is a raising interest in monitor and control of international 
transfers of arms. Multinational economic agencies such as the RýJf, the World Bank 
and the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD include reductions of military 
expenditure and procurement in the list of conditional ities related to the provision of 
economic aid (Levine and Smith [1997]). In 1993 the United Nations established the 
Arms Transfer Register and the European Union is making significant effort towards the 
harmonisation of the defence policies of member nations including the reduction of the 
transfers of arms and dual use technology. Even the government of the US, the leading 
supplying agent of this market, ýas recently expressed interest in conversion programs 
that will reduce the dependency of its arms industry on exports. 
Despite the importance of the issue and the need for rational implementation of 
policies related to the transfers of arms, the economic theory has relatively little to 
contribute to the understanding of the underlying mechanism behind the international 
arms market. Recent developments have attempted to reduce this gap in the literature 
and approach the arms trade from the modem economic perspective of new trade theory 
(Anderton [1995,1996]). Adding to this gap, the empirical economic literature is near to 
non-existing. Most of the existing works are limited to case studies either of a single 
country or of a, small group of countries, with relatively little to contribute in practical 
terms. An apparent cause, often blamed for the scarcity of thorough empirical studies in 
this area is the unavailability and the limitations in the quality of the available data 
(Katrina [1994]). 
The unwillingness of many governments to release correct measurements of their 
defence sector is not the only source of problems in the data on the international arms 
trade. The literature is rich in references to a range of data problems, regarding issues of 
measurement and definition. 2 The commonly used offset ways of payment, production 
under licence and co-production tend to hide the actual value and the net quantity of the 
international transfers. Furthermore, complementary parts of the bilateral agreements 
such as technology transfer and counter trade agreements, tied aid, technology transfer, 
credit arrangements, insurance regarding repayment risks, political concessions etc, 
contribute in the difficulty of isolating the net value of the arms transfers. The 
aggregation of the variety of weapon systems into a single homogeneous category may 
2 Among many other works data problems of the arms trade are discussed in Krausse [1992 p. 217- 
19], Levine, Mouzakis and Smith [19961 and in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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blur the measurements, especially with the inclusion of dual use equipment, adding to 
the large fluctuations at annual basis related to the timing of deliveries. All these 
problems create uncertainty about the usefulness of the available data series and require 
special consideration in the development of an empirical study. 
It is the twin gap, mainly in the empirical but also in the theoretical literature 
motivated this study. Based on the hope that there might be as yet unexplained 
information within the available data, thiý study first attempted to obtain an important 
prerequisite in an examination of the demand side: the missing information about prices 
of imported arms. The provision of this critical input enabled the econometric study of 
the demand for traded arms, first using a cross-sectional data set with wide country 
coverage. The outcome of this simple but complete parametric approach of countries 
defence industries gave encouraging results and provided the motivation for a more 
detailed examination of panel data. In line with the previous one, this study revealed 
further empirical facts about the behavioural characteristics of countries demand for 
imported anus, such as the variability of the demand patterns across the globe and the 
evolutionary characteristics of defence sector in time. Building up on the empirical 
evidence the thesis continues with first a small-country partial equilibrium model, and 
then a more complete quasi-general equilibrium world model of the arms trade. 
This thesis essentially binds together five strongly linked but self-contained papers. 
Each chapter can be read more or less independently, but the. natural development of our 
work follows the order of the chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of the contemporary 
theoretical and empirical economic literature on the arms trade. Chapter 3 examines the 
nature of the data and the calculation of a price index. Chapter 4 presents the preliminary 
analytical approach together with the results from the cross-sectional study. Chapter 5 
provides an econometric examination based on panel data. Chapter 6 reports the attempt 
to introduce differentiated arm products into a partial equilibrium model of defence and 
appendix B isolates the related technical discussion about the production function 
employed. Chapter 7 presents the attempt to introduce the optional entry of countries 
into domestic production as part of a quasi-general equilibrium model of the 
international market of arms. 
In more detailed description, the material included in this thesis is organised as 
follows. As mentioned above, chapter 3 isolates the discussion about empirical 
information directly related to the cross-sectional econometric examination of chapter 4. 
This separation is made for the purposes of presentation and because of the importance 
of the data sources as a stand-alone issue. It includes a review of the data sources, a 
description of the available data, a brief review of the general trends implicit in the data, 
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the suggested method to calculate a price index for imported arms and examples of 
calculated prices for a number of cases. 
Chapter 4 presents results from an empirical study of the demand for imported arms 
based on cross-sectional data, including the development of a suitable theoretical model 
and other technical and data related issues. The main result of this study is the estimation 
of a well-behaved demand function of arms, which is supported by considerable 
statistical evidence. The response of the demand for arms to the estimated implicit price 
index is negative and the response to military expenditure is positive. The responses to 
military expenditure and to per capita GDP were found to be non-linear. The last part of 
the chapter examines the impact of measurement errors, and introduces a method that 
addresses this problem. 
Chapter 5 develops an empirical examination of the demand for imported arms, using 
panel data with near-to-global coverage. It continues the work of the previous chapter 
introducing the dimension of time into the empirical study of the arms trade with the 
expansion of the data set from a cross-sectional series to a panel. The data are 
aggregated in large geographical regions and organizations and cover most of the world. 
After the preliminary tests for the variability of demand patterns over both regions and 
time, follows the estimation of a demand function, which allows for structural variation 
of the demand patterns over both time and region. The results show that demand patterns 
vary across different regions of the world and there is an evident double-trended effect' in 
time, all well supported by the data. 
Chapter 6 introduces a neo-classical small country model for the arms trade, which 
focuses on the properties of substitution between inputs of the defence industry. In this 
model countries have the option to produce an-ns domestically instead of merely relying 
on imports. This chapter attempts to reconcile economic together with the results of the 
previously mentioned empirical studies. The model employs an extension of the Stone- 
Geary function, which allows an input to be either included or completely substituted in 
the production, with adequate analytical clarity. Finally, the model is estimated with the 
use of available data, giving a means of comparison of the implied theoretical 
predictions with the empirical reality. A wide range of production or utility functions can 
be used to capture a variety of different types of substitution among the inputs of a 
transformation process. Most of the known utility or production functions, however, 
would not allow the complete substitution of an input by the others. Appendix B 
examines an extension of the Stone-Geary production function that provides this 
characteristic, also allowing for fixed costs in the use of any positive quantity of the 
substitutable input. Apart from serving the needs of chapter 6, this analysis is applicable 
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more generally for the purposes of modelling a discontinuous entry of inputs in a 
transformation process. In the context of industrial theory, for example, it can provide a 
means of analysing the decision of industries for vertical expansion. 
The existing economic theory of the arms trade has considered the balance between 
importers and suppliers in the international market of arms, but has not yet considered 
the option of less developed countries to establish a domestic industry of arms and 
become self-sufficient in procurement. According to Levine and Smith [1997,1998], a 
small number of industrialized countries offer arms to the world market, with a large 
number of recipient countries on the demand side, all involved in local conflicts. In the 
model we develop in chapter 7, however, less developed countries are not limited to be 
identical but the size of their economies is allowed to vary, determining their status 
either as importers or as producers of arms. Referring to the post-Cold War status of 
international security Levine & Smith [1997] concluded that the cooperation of large 
arms producing countries could benefit the welfare of both producing and importing 
countries. This work shows that the alternative of domestically produced arms implies 
limitations on the applicability of this policy and provides a more powerful tool for the 
analysis of the international arms trade. 
The scope of this study regarding issues of methodology should rather be 
characterised as inclined towards formal methods. The continuing debate about the 
method in economics includes the very definition of formalism itself. Here we consider 
formalism as a systematic and rigorous analytical process, which allows us to identify 
what can and what cannot be proved (Dow [1998] pp. 1826-27). It implies the use of 
deductive mathematical techniques, but only when necessary. In our examination, we 
attempt a balanced development of the empirical and modelling aspects, being 
convinced that looking at each one of these two sides alone one can easily get 
disorientated. According to Krugman [1998], the strong opposition to formalistic 
arguments in economics has contributed little to the recent developments. It is important, 
however, that independent of the method we use in the development of our ideas they 
should finally be expressed simply in words. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The importance of national defence, which can be successfully indicated by the large 
amounts of economic resources dedicated to this activity, outlines the need for thorough 
examination and rational implepientation of the related policies, at national and 
international level. According to ACDA [1995 p. 43] the aggregated for the whole world 
share of military expenditure to the total central government expenditure has decreased 
from an estimated 19% in 1993 to a non negligible 11.5% in 1993. The existing 
economic literature, however, appears to focus more on the examination of topics such 
as the theory of alliances, the deten-ninants of military expenditure or the issue of the 
arms races, relatively neglecting the economic determinants of the arms trade. There are 
a number of possible reasons that could be responsible for this absence. These include 
restrictions in the availability of defence related data and the popular belief that the 
general means of the economic analysis are inappropriate for defence related issues, 
supported by the generally authoritative nature of military structures. Another general 
reason may well be dominance of the Cold War in the arena of international security, 
during which the large scale of the bipolar conflict of alliances overshadowed the 
importance of individual countries' decisions. The generalised threat from weapons of 
mass destruction and the widespread and strong presence of military superpowers often 
covered local conflicts, inside and outside national borders, reducing their importance at 
local or global level. This situation seems to have changed after the end of the Cold War, 
when the reduction of inter-alliance tensions left an increased national responsibility for 
regional security. As Anderton [1995] puts it 'with the end of Cold War there has been 
an increase in the relative importance of economic causes and consequences of arms 
transfers. ' 
This review discusses recent developments of the economic literature, mainly 
focusing on quantitative aspects of the international arms trade: analytical and empirical. 
Despite that it is not always easy to separated these two aspects in a particular work the 
literature is discussed in two separate sections depending on which one of the two is the 
dominant aspect. The perspective of this thesis, which is thought to follow what is 
perceived as mainstream methodology used in contemporary economics, has had an 
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influence on the selection of the works we discuss in this chapter. On these lines the 
recent advances in (new) trade theory create a fertile ground for developments in the 
theory of the arms trade. This review does not refer to technical issues, such as those 
concerning general economic or econometric techniques, which are left for reference 
inside the relevant chapters. Also, it does not extensively refer to issues related with data 
and their sources, which are discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
2.2 Economic theory and the arms trade 
The approach from an economic perspective seems to characterise only a small 
minority of the generally extensive literature on defence and military issues. Two 
concise and well-implemented general readings on defence economics are Hartley and 
Sandler [1995] and a collection of papers called 'The Handbook of Defence Economics', 
edited by the same authors. Directly related to our topic is chapter 10 'The arms trade' 
from the former edition and Anderton [1995] from the latter. Both of these chapters 
provide updated and informative reviews of theoretical and applied developments in the 
area. Krause [1992] provides an extensive discussion of a variety of economic aspects, 
the historical and the political nature of international arms trade. 
A careful historical approach perhaps provides the safest foundation for the study of a 
social topic. Extending over three chapters Krause [1992] reviews about two and half 
millennia of history of the arms trade, beginning from the first recorded arms transfers 
between Greek city-states. As most essential motive forces behind the arms trade Krause 
suggests the pursuit of wealth, power and victory in war, providing a well-implemented 
link of the issue with the general methodology of contemporary economics. Regarding 
the contemporary dominance of the international arms trade of what he calls 1S, tier 
(largest) producers he argues that arms exports are increasingly maintained by the 
economic interest of arms producing firms rather than the political willingness of the 
central decision making instruments. Together with purely strategic advantages of 
running a domestic arms sector, he suggests economic interest as a central motive in the 
case of small arms producers, which also generates a strong incentive for exports. He 
then attributes a generally subordinate role to arms recipient countries in a strongly 
hierarchical international environment, although he suggests a positive learning curve. 
Kraus isolates technological innovation as the main driving force of the arms transfers' 
life cycle, according to which he divides the world market in three tires of arms 
producers. He finally outlines the need to link the study of the international arms trade to 
an understanding of the motives and prospects for arms production. 
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Anderton [1995] analyses the structure of the international market of arms using 
ACDA [1995] data. He classifies the existing economic theories of the arms trade into a 
number of categories, beginning with the supply and demand type of models, 
represented by Alexander et al [1981]. Another category is this of a neo-classical trade 
model, based on the homonymous theory of comparative advantage (Ricardo). The 
models in this category highlight the general equilibrium nature of the arms trade and 
that it is motivated by countries' differences in terms of tastes and of technology. He 
continues with a category of models with scale and learning economies. A final category 
in this classification includes models of imperfect competition and trade, which apply 
the Krugman and Obstfeld [1994] monopolistic competition model of trade to the 
international market of arms. In -a more recent review, Anderton [19961 links the arms 
trade with new developments on trade theory. In this extension of his previous 
classification Anderton adds the category of integrated economy approach of Krugman 
[1995], which looks into intra- and inter-industry trade and the North-South trade 
approach of Markusen [1986] for explanations of the heterogeneity in the trade of 
differentiated types of arms. This review extends the classification of imperfectly 
competitive models of the arms trade to a number of sub-categories, putting emphasis on 
models of bilateral oligopoly. Furthermore, Anderton [1996] suggests the product cycle 
type of model, introduced by Vernon [1966], for linking the arms trade with issues of 
diff-usion of defence technology. Catrina [1994], suggests that theoretical research on the 
arms trade should 'bring the arms transfers under the national and international control. ' 
A recent contribution in the theory of the international arms trade, Levine, Sen and 
Smith [1994], initiated a new line of developments in the area. This model introduces 
both demand and supply sides of the international market of arms, motivated by 
countries' need for security from potential military threat from other countries. It then 
examines the resulting equilibrium, including a number of dynamic issues regarding 
different types of expectations and of co-operation on the oligopolistic supply side. In a 
natural continuation of this work Levine and Smith [1995] introduced international 
intervention of a cartel of large supplier countries, which try to stabilise arms races by 
appropriate adjustment of the international price of arms. This bring us to the more 
recent development, Levine and Smith [1997] (LS). This model assumes full 
depreciation of stocks in each time period, ignores dynamics, solves for the complete 
quasi-general equilibrium of the world market and improves the formulation of security 
of the previous models. The latest entrant in this sequence of models on the arms trade is 
Levine and Smith [1998], a paper that provides a better analytical presentation of the LS 
model, with the addition of a more realistic organisation of the oligopolistic supply side. 
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Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of chapter 7 provide a more detailed review of this paper, referring 
to strengths and weaknesses. In conclusion, LS appears to be an important step towards a 
quantitative theory of the arms trade with a considerable dose of realism, and is regarded 
as a benchmark throughout this thesis. 
Two areas of defence economics that are closely connected with the arms trade are 
the determination of military expenditure and the competitive accumulation of arms 
between nations, often called 'arms race'. Berhelemy et al [1995] look into domestic 
growth aspects of allocating resources between defence and domestic growth, evaluating 
the impact of military expenditure on the economic development of countries. They then 
calibrate their model using the arms race between India and Pakistan as an example. 
Levine and Smith [1997b] discuss dynamic issues of regional arms races, using a 
modelling environment closely linked with that of LS. They examine outcomes of the 
arms races in time; the stability of non-cooperative equilibria and ways that changes in 
the price of traded arms affect the behaviour of countries. For the foundations of the 
modern economic theory on the arms races can be found back in Richardson [1950] and 
Intriligator [1975]. Among more recent developments Garfingel [1990] examines the 
allocation of resources in defence and the strategic interaction of a pair of countries 
involved in an arms race. A static representation of this set-up appears to be the 
formulation of the demand side of LS model. Van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw [1990] 
examine a similar environment of dynamic interactions of a pair of conflicting alliances 
(east-west), rather than countries. Although these works provide useful examinations of 
particular issues that determine the demand for arms, they do not provide a quantitative 
theory for the equilibrium of the contemporary international market of arms. 
Defence economics and the theory of the arms trade find an attractive application in 
the implementation of policies that could lead to the establishment of a prospective new 
superpower: the European Defence Union. Fontanel and Smith [1991] provide an 
informative and early introduction to this issue, which is later discussed again in LS. 
Dunne [1995] provides a concise description of the industrial structure of major arms 
producing and supplying countries and looks into problems arising from the post-Cold 
War decline of this industry and the need for conversion to civilian applications. Brozka 
[1994] discusses the issue of financing the arms trade. There is a long history of 
development of alternative or radical approaches to issues related to the arms trade. 
Marxist approaches tend to focus on issues of class struggle whereas under- 
consumptionist approaches look into military expenditure as providing a way out of 
realisation crises. Dunne [1990] and Smith and Dunne [1994] refer more extensively to 
alternative approaches. 
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2.3 Empirical literature 
A well-documented contemporary review of empirical work, closely related to our 
area of interest is provided in Smith [1995], who provides a discussion of theoretical and 
empirical issues related to the study of the demand for military expenditure, the total 
amount of resources dedicated to defence industry. Since imported arms are usually one 
of the largest participants of countries' defence budget the two issues are closely linked, 
essentially analyse the same issue, the production of defence, from two different 
perspectives. Furthermore, Smitb summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing empirical work and makes specific suggestions for farther developments, 
mainly pointing towards a standard parametric approach of the international trade based 
on appropriate model and data set. 
The econometric study of Smith, Humm and Fontanel [1985] has been a cornerstone 
in the foundation of the empirical part of this thesis. This paper examines the demand for 
military expenditure using a simple but complete theoretical model and looking in depth 
into the availability of related data. Particularly useful, especially for the calculation of a 
price index for imported arms and also for the empirical examinations of chapters 4,5 
and 6 is the review of the available data sources for the arms trade. The authors then 
conclude that as a result of serious data problems the empirical results should be looked 
as indications rather than as final measurements and also outline the need for using of a 
more sophisticated model. 
Continuing their previous work, Smith, Humm. and Fontanel [1987], take a closer 
look into the issue of the theoretical implementation of an econometric study of defence 
industry. They also examine issues of substitution between inputs using a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. They outline the importance of the 
provision of an appropriate modelling foundation to empirical studies. The applied part 
of that paper employs a similar model and data to this work, providing interesting 
empirical results and revealing useful information about the use of the employed 
theoretical framework and about the general direction of the estimated relationship. On 
the other hand, the authors conclude that the specification of the particular framework is 
rather unsatisfactory, given the availability and the quality of data, and outlines a 
number of specific econometric issues regarding the use of the particular data. This work 
provides a clear illustrations of the potential of qualitative econometric study of this 
industry on one hand, but also of the limitations that the restrictions of the data impose 
on the results. 
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The estimation based on a flexible functional framework by Okamura [1991] 
presenting an alternative approach to model specification. Despite the fact that this paper 
deals with the impact of threat to alliances at Cold War level, it focuses on the 
importance of conducting econometric studies in defence based on an appropriate 
theoretical foundation. In order to avoid limitations of previous works, which could well 
give results subject to specification bias, it employs the Generalised Indirect Translog 
utility function as a social welfare function. Assuming that the US-Japan alliance 
perceived a threat from the arms of Soviet Union, Okamura models the demand for 
procurement, solves for the Logarithmic Linear Expenditure- System and finally 
estimates it. This work provides some interesting results, showing evidence that the 
allies generally respond to the thread created by the military capability of Soviet Union. 
In a similar way as Smith et al [1997] he sees benefits from the use of a firm theoretical 
background in the empirical study of military expenditure. One limitation of this 
otherwise interesting effort is that it is very demanding in terms of data, which is a 
serious restriction in this particular topic. Another, directly related with the first, is the 
small country coverage (limited to Japan and the NATO alliance). 
Small country coverage is a common limitation in the majority of recent empirical 
approaches to the production of military capability. McGuire [1987] used a Linear 
Expenditure System to estimate the demand for military expenditure in Israel. According 
to Smith [1995] the most widely applied demand function is the one introduced by 
Murdoch and Sandler [1984] who used a general functional form in their theoretical 
work, deriving linear or logarithmic-linear demand functions for military expenditure. 
Applying this demand system to a small number of industrialised countries they 
estimated it allowing for cross-equation covariances. Again, this framework assumed a 
limited formulation of security, making it appropriate for special cases of countries that 
belong to the same side of an alliance. 
Pearson [1989] used econometric analysis to explain arms imports, with some 
interesting results regarding the use of available explanatory variables. Focusing on 
developing countries, McKinlay [1989] supported a strong relationship between arms 
imports and military expenditure. Kinsella [1994] examined the dynamic properties of 
arms transfers to the Middle East using a Vector Auto-Regression model and Granger 
causality tests. Anayiotos and Happe [1997] review the recent data and trends in their 
discussion about financing the arms trade. A recent study, CAAT [1996], provides an 
updated description of the supply side of the arms trade, well implemented on empirical 
facts. It argues that the industry of arms generally receives excessive governmental 
support, which needs to be shifted away from this industry. It also provides estimates for 
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the subsidies of this industry for the case of the U. K., reported as more than I billion 
worth a year or as a wage subsidy of about E12.500 per worker per year. 
Empirical studies on military expenditure are not as scarce as studies on the arms 
trade. Smith [1994] discusses alternative empirical approaches to the study of countries 
military expenditure, as time series, cross-sectional or panel data. There are several a- 
theoretical empirical approaches to military expenditure mainly exploring time series 
with the use of Vector Autoregressive Regressions and Granger causality tests. 
Examples of the former category could be Chowdhury [1991] who used time series for 
55 less developed countries and of the latter Dunne and Smith [1990] and Payne and 
Ross [1992], who did not find any clear Granger causality patterns in military 
expenditure. Atheoretical approaches, however, have long now been the target of 
criticism for the plausibility of their results and their usefulness in the confrontation of 
theoretical hypothesis. In a parametric approach, with better theoretical properties, 
Hilton and Vu [ 199 1] estimated a demand of equations for a group of NATO allies. 
There seems to be an agreement in the literature that data on defence and especially 
on the arms trade are limited in quantity and quality. Anderton [ 199 5] and Smith [ 199 5] 
and Sandler and Hartley [1995] refer to the available data sources. These mainly include 
SIPRI Yearbooks (e. g. [1992,1993,1995]), ACDA [1995] and the IIISS [1991]. All these 
are annual publications that except the data tables provide analyses and reports on their 
evolution. Happe and Linn [1994] provide a comparison between SIPRI and ACDA 
data. ST-PRI yearbooks provide reports with extensive coverage of all kinds of issues 
related to defence. The IISS systematically provide analytical tables with countries' 
procurement. This thesis finally used data only from SIPRI and ACDA, which are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
2.4 Conclusions 
The literature on the arms trade could be characterised as well developed in historical 
and descriptive approaches, developing in theoretical explanations and least developed 
in empirical implementation. Most of the recent works on the arms trade seem to suggest 
that there are considerable opportunities for further construction of theoretical and 
empirical work in the area. Anderton [1995] concludes that 'almost the whole body of 
the arms theory remains untapped'. Similar to this is the result of the literature review 
conducted in the context of this thesis. The recent advances in the theory of the arms 
trade give incentive for constructive mobility in this literature, as several important 
aspects of the issue remain as yet uncovered. On the positive side we refer to the 
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analytical attempts for a positive quantitative theory of the arms trade and, more 
generally, the determinants of military expenditure. The existing theories, however, only 
provide a rather simplistic formulation of the demand side of the market ignoring 
important factors of the demand and the supply sides of the international arms market. 
The main strength of recent advances in theoretical modelling appears to be the 
development of analytical formulations for the demand and the supply side of the arms 
market and the equilibrium of the world market. The particular way that the 
characteristics of the two sides have been captured in the LS seems a successful step in 
the light of the contemporary developments. Despite the importance of this first step in 
the development of a coherent theory there is an important weakness: The assumption 
that only few large countries can . produce arms and all other countries are net importers, 
which is apparently contradicted by the reality. In technical terms, the existing theory 
completely neglects any differentiation between the produced and traded categories of 
arms, as well as the possibility of substitution between the inputs of defence industry. 
These important simplifications do not only impose unrealistic simplifications to the 
description of the demand side of the market but also affect seriously the policy 
conclusions drawn from the examination of co-operative behaviour of supply side and 
the results of international regulation of the arms market. In other words, taking account 
of the alternative of a domestic arms sector may show that the suggested in LS 
imposition of a tax on imported arms could be ineffective as a means of controlling the 
arms races. Instead, it could have the opposite result of encouraging the governments to 
cross from the demand to the supply side of the market. The primary theoretical task, 
therefore, of this thesis is the introduction of substitution between different categories of 
arms and labour in the production of military capability and the introduction of a rational 
decision mechanism for the establishment of domestic arms industries. 
Many economists would agree that the quality of the outcome of an empirical study 
heavily relies on the provision of a coherent and realistic analytical framework and of an 
appropriate for the needs of the study data set. The message that comes almost 
unanimously from the literature is that in the case of the international arms trade both 
these areas seem problematic, with the unavailability or even non-availability of data be 
the most restrictive in practical terms. While traditionally governments have restricted 
the release of this information for strategic purposes the recently increasing 
establishment of international defence databases signals an improvement and opens a 
new era for the development of empirical studies. The need of more detailed empirical 
study is also an essential requirement for the development of theoretical work. As 
Catrina [ 1994 p. 204] puts it 'researchers should show more detachment, devoting their 
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efforts more to establishing facts than to presenting opinions'. Since arms imports 
usually absorb the lions share from countries' military budget (see e. g. ACDA 1995) an 
important obstacle in the development of a parametric empirical approach of defence 
technology is the unavailability of information about the prices of imported arms. The 
importance of this critical issue is outlined in the majority of recent studies. 
Summarising, we have outlined the problems of the approaches of the international 
trade in arms found in the economic literature, separated in two different categories: 
theoretical and empirical. Following the view that the best way to further examine the 
international arms trade involves a harmonic development of theoretical and empirical 
work, the rest of this thesis deals with both of these aspects. First we examine the 
existing data and attempt to calculate a price index of domestic arms, using a relatively 
simple analytical pattern of for defence industry we proceed to the econometric study of 
the international arms trade, using cross-sectional and panel data. Based on these results 
we further develop the analytical approach by introducing differentiated arms and the 
option of domestic production and re-examine the outcome in an empirical study. 
Finally we incorporate the experience gained from the combined theoretical empirical 
attempts in a world market model. 
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3. Data, trends and prices of the international 
arms trade 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the stylised facts regarding the arms trade and develops a 
method for the calculation of a price index for imported arms. Since data on defence are 
generally known to suffer from qualitative problems, this review looks in detail at the 
methods employed by the sources. It also makes an effort to extract as much information 
about the final quality of the data as possible. Series of prices and other data that we 
discuss in this chapter are finally used in the econometric studies of the following 
chapters 4 and 5. The following section 3.2 looks carefully into the alternative sources 
and the availability of data on the arms trade. Section 3.3 proceeds into a preliminary 
examination of the available data, their general characteristics and underlining trends. 
Section 3.4 explains a suggested method for the calculation of a price index for imported 
arms. Section 3.5 gives examples of the evolution of this price index for a number of 
country aggregates. Appendix A. 3 provides the cross-sectional data set used in the 
empirical study of the following chapter 4. 
3.2 Sources and availability of data 
A cross-sectional examination of the demand for arms imports requires defence- 
related information, such as data series on arms imports, prices of arms and military 
expenditure. It also requires general economic data such as measurements of per-capita 
income of countries, population, exchange rates, price levels, purchasing power parities 
(PPP) etc. The selected sources of military information are the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA). The source of general economic data is version 5.6 of Summers and Heston 
database known as Penn World Tables (PWT). SIPRI appears as a reliable source, since 
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it provides clear information about the methodology employed in the preparation of their 
data series. Although Sweden is a net exporter of arms, Swedish governments have 
established a reputation for avoiding aggressive related policies and SIPRI has 
established a reputation as a reliable and independent organisation. This is not exactly 
the case with ACDA, which is closely linked with the government of the larger exporter 
of arms USA, a country with a rich background in military activities and manipulation of 
related information. ACDA, however, has access to information sources such as CIA 
records, which is not directly available to SIPRI and appears a reliable source. 
The numbers of years and countries in our sample, as well as the quality of this 
information, have largely been determined by the availability of quantitative 
information. The basic constraint appears to be the availability of data on the arms trade 
from SIPRI. Data on defence are generally known to suffer from qualitative problems. 
For that reason, in choosing between the quality and quantity of data, a higher priority is 
given to quality. Briefly, some of the guidelines in the selection of our data sample are: 
" Examine in detail of the quality of data series in use. 
" Avoid using data with known problems in their quality. 
" Avoid using the most recent observations. 
" Avoid putting together data of different quality, ie prefer to loose some observations 
rather than increase the uncertainty about the final quality of the data set. 
As a result of these criteria the final data set includes 38 countries out of about 180. 
The calculation of a price index for imported arms, we discuss later in this study, 
requires observations of arms imports from both SIPRI and ACDA. The coverage of 
SIPRI tables on the arms trade appears more restricted than the respective of ACDA. 
According to the conclusions drawn from the evaluation of the data, most appropriate 
are the two tables that provide annual figures on arms trade, in constant dollars, for 50 
countries. The first table originates from SIEPRI Yearbook 1992 (SIPBJ [1992]) and 
covers observations from 1987 to 1991 and the second from Yearbook 1995 and covers 
years from 1990 to 1994 inclusive. 
A comparison of the alternative observations for the two years that appear in both of 
the tables, those of 1990 and 1991, shows considerable discrepancies between the two 
tables, not only in absolute values, but in relative magnitudes between countries as well. 
Most likely, these differences originate from revisions made by SIPRI in the later 
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release. For these reasons, we only use data from Yearbook 1995 (SIPRI [1995]). and, 
eventually, avoided combination of the two tables. Table I gives examples of 
observations for the same country and year from the two tables. These cases ware 
selected for their significant changes, illustrating the extent that newly released data can 
be altered by forthcoming revisions. 
Table 1. Revisions in measurements of arms imports 
1990 Observations Ratios 
Egypt Greece 
I 
Israel 
I 
Norway Turkey Greece/ 
Turkey 
Israel/ 
Norway 
Yearbook 1993 1203 929 228 313 1067 87.07 72.84 
Yearbook 1995 755 1221 29 376 804 151.87 7.71 
Change % -37.24% 31.43% -87.28% 20.13% -24.65% 74.42% -89.42% 
Note: Annual figures in current million U. S. dollars. 
The second series of data on arms imports and series of military forces originate from 
the annual publication of ACDA 'World Militwy Expenditures and Anns Transfers'. 
Although, ACDA and SIPRI figures on military expenditure appear to follow similar 
qualitative standards the latter series were eventually chosen for their better performance 
in practice. SIPRI data on military expenditure are extracted directly from the original 
database, which was made available to us during the autumn 1995. According to the 
descriptions of the methods employed by the two sources (ACDA [1995] pp. and SIPRI 
[1995b]), they attempt to measure amounts that are actually spent in purely military 
activities, excluding expenditure finally directed to civilian purposes. 
After dropping countries and years for which one or some of the tables of military 
expenditure by SIPRI, arms imports by ACDA, arms imports by STRI and per-capita 
GDP by PWT do not provide observations, the result is series of 38 counties and two 
years, 1990 and 1991. Given the preference to avoid the use of recently released 
observations, the years 1990 and 1991 appear as those that best satisfy these two 
requirements. Another practical reason for the choice of these years is that the currently 
released (November 1995) Penn World Tables do not provide observations more recent 
than 1992, and for some countries not even for 1990 and 1991. These countries are 
dropped from the sample. Since the low number (two) of time observations is inadequate 
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to consider a time series or panel data study, the average of the two annual observations 
can be used in a cross-sectional study. 
Series of per-capita GDP from PWT are available in a variety of conversions, such as 
deflated either with Chain or with Laspeyer indices, corrected for the terms of Trade or 
for the working force rather than the population etc. Variables that measure values can 
be transformed in U. S. dollars either with the use of PPP ratios or with exchange rates. 
Having the possibility to chose between these methods is clearly in the interest of our 
study. Providing the availability of PPP ratios it is possible to transform the series back 
to exchange rate equivalents. On the contrary, both S1__PRI and ACDA use exchange rates 
for the transformation of the data (; kCDA [ 199 5]p. 17 1). For the deflation of figures on 
military expenditure SIPRI use Consumers Price Index and for the figures on the arms 
trade use Producer Price Index for machinery industry of the larger Western exporter 
countries. A single price index is used for all countries, as there is no evidence that 
producer prices vary across weapon categories. ACDA deflates figures on the arms trade 
and military expenditure using implicit GNP deflator for the U. S. 
There is a minor modification of one of the observations in the data set. It is the case 
of Hungary that ACDA gives zero observations of imports for 1990 and 1991. In order 
to allow the transformation of levels to logarithms the two-year average is interpolated 
with the average of the neighbouringo, observations of 1989 and 1991, which are close to 
zero whatsoever. If SIPRI and ACDA were to be characterised whether as primary or 
secondary sources for the figures on military expenditure and the arms trade they 
produce, the former characterisation appears closer to reality. Despite the fact that the 
governments release their own figures, these organisations collect all available 
information and produce their own estimates, using the official releases merely as means 
for comparison. Taking the average of the two annual observations contributes to the 
reduction of noise in the data, especially by smoothing variations caused by short-term 
fluctuations or discontinuities of the measured flow. At the same time, the range of 
averaged years is not too long to blur the contemporaneous relationships of the variables, 
which is the target of the static nature of a cross-sectional study. 
Among the reasons that make years 1990 and '91 attractive for a cross-sectional 
examination is the generally high volatility of the related variables during these years, 
apparently a result of the transition to the post-Cold War era. During this period we can 
expect the stimulated adjustment mechanisms to be reflected in the variations we attempt 
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to analyse and explain. Furthermore, another positive aspect of this historical time is that 
countries have moved towards higher independence in their decisions on defence, having 
reduced their commitments to related alliances from previous years. In practice, this 
means that countries' imports reflect more clearly their own requirements for security. 
3.3 General trends 
The first chapter of ACDA [1995], called 'Highlights' provides brief descriptions of 
the general trends in the data. The, most impressive characteristic of the series is the 
sharp decline of international arms trade within the last decade. In the related diagram 
ACDA unsuccessfully used a logarithmic scale to plot the aggregate series of the arms 
trade giving a misleading impression about the actual scale of the changes. The verbal 
description, however, is quite clear: "At the world level the average annual growth rate 
of imports was -11.4% for the decade 1983-93 and accelerated to -23.3% during the 
second haýf 1989-93. " As ACDA notes, but we can also observe from the diagrams, the 
speed of the decline appears to decrease at the end of the covered time period. This slow 
down of the decline is rather expected since if 1990-91 rates had continued the 
international arms trade would have reached zero levels before 1994. 
Figure 3.1 World aggregates of arms imports by ACDA and SIPRI 
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SIPRI measurements have almost systematically been lower than those of ACDA 
during most of the covered time period, following a decreasing but clearly less steep 
trend. At about the end of the time period SIPRI imports eventually become higher than 
ACDA. We can observe the evolution of these two variables at world level of 
aggregation in Figure 3.1. SIPPJ data were spliced, observations 1983 -1989 from [ 1992] 
Yearbook and observations 1990-1993 from Yearbook [1995]. 
Figure 3.2 Arms imports of large geographic regions and organisations 
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At the world level of aggregation, from IY87 the plot shows a relatively stationary 
and close to linear downward sloping trend, which accelerates in 1991 and finally 
declines. Since it would be unrealistic to expect zero levels of arms trade, the sharp 
decline followed by stabilisation appears consistent with dynamic aspects of countries' 
procurement. Since the arsenal of a country is a stock that increases with the purchase of 
new arms, either imported or domestically produced and decreases with the use of arms 
and with their depreciation of the arms in time. Because of the forward-looking 
component of planning new orders and the delays associated with their delivery, country 
might face unexpected changes to its desired stock. 
In the case that a country attempts to reduce its procurement levels the adjustment of 
their stocks to the new requirements implies that it has stopped placing new orders but 
still continues receiving the orders that have already been placed. In time, depreciation 
of arms reduces the accumulated stock and, when this reaches some critical level the 
country starts placing new orders again to maintain at the desirable level. It is Possible 
that during the period of de-accumulation a country could consider exporting part of the 
excessively procured arms. Indeed, from the tables some countries appear to have 
exported arms only for a single or a couple of years, during the period 1989-91, without 
having a record for exports before or after this period. Such examples are Ethiopia, I-ran, 
Ireland, Kuwait, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nigeria. Since it is highly unlikely that 
these countries produced these arms for such a short time period, it is reasonable to 
assume that they exporte d the excessive part of their stocks. 
The diagrams of figure 3.2 illustrate the evolution of the arms trade over a decade, 
aggregated by wide geographical regions and organisations. The data series originate 
from ACDA [ 1995]. An examination of the series, aggregated at the level of continents, 
or large groups of countries, shows that the trends followed by most of the groups are 
generally in line with the overall trend. Most of the country groups seem to have more or 
less followed the declining trend, during the covered decade and, in particular, after the 
withdrawal of the Cold War. NATO countries appear to be an exception to this rule, 
showing an increasing trend during the first half of the time period, followed by a 
decline. In the case of Eastern Europe, the turning point from rise to decline (i. e. the 
peak) precedes three to four years to that of NATO allies. 
From the included country groups, those with the earliest turning point are Africa, 
Middle East, OPEC and South America at about 1984. Central America follows in 1985, 
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Eastern Europe and Warsaw Pact in 1986 and East Asia in 1997. Last to reduce their 
levels of imports are the bulk of Western countries, mainly expressed in NATO, OECD, 
W. Europe and N. America aggregations, having their turning point at about 1988-89. 
Countries appear to have reduced Cold War levels of procurement following the ranking 
of economic development. It appears that richer countries preferred to maintain high 
procurement levels for longer, possibly ensuring higher security, whereas poorer 
countries seemed to have sought a quicker relief from this burden. 
3.4 An implicit price index for imported arms 
The price of a good usually plays a critical role in the determination of the demand 
for that good. Therefore the availability of information on prices is an important 
prerequisite in an examination of the demand. In practice, we can expect considerable 
differences in the real prices of imported arms different countries face. A possible cause 
of this variability is positive or negative externalities of this trade between recipient and 
supplier countries. When the two parties are involved in an alliance, their procurement 
implies positive spillover effects to the joint security. Such positive externalities, as well 
as other possible common national interests of wider nature (eg promotion of bilateral 
trade), may push prices downwards. A typical case is that a country can face higher 
prices as a result of negative externalities for security reasons. This is the case of a 
country that imports arms from a military opponent in bilateral or multilateral terms, for 
instance during an international ban. 
The attempt to acquire a price index for imported arms, at individual country level is 
based on the comparison of the aggregate figures of arms imports from two different 
organisations. This calculation is Possible because the contents of SIPRI and ACDA 
measurements are different (Happe and Linn [1994]). The former organisation attempts 
to measure the aggregate production cost of the imported arms whereas the latter 
measures the actual value of the transaction. The explanations about the method 
provided by the organisations support this hypothesis. According to the documentation 
provided by SIPRI: 
"(SIPRI measurement of the arms trade) ... is designed as a trend-measuring 
device to 
permit measurement of changes in the totalflow ... (that) reflects in monetary terms 
both the quantity and the quality of the weapons transferred.. the monetary values 
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chosen do not correspond to the actual prices paid, which vary considerably 
depending on different pricing methods [Yearbook 1995, p. 555]. It must be 
emphasised that the SIPRI values are not the actual prices of weapons paid in any 
particular deal /p. 5]. ne SIPRI values are therefore based on average production 
costs [Yearbook 1992, p. 355]. Ae results may also be modified according to two 
other criteria - whether equipment is new, second hand of refurbished in some way; 
or whether it is transferred direct or produced under licence [SIPRI Fact Sheet 1995 
p. 4]. lf 
Unlike STRI, ACDA measurements use a standard pricing method by utilising available 
information on the actual payments of the transaction. In this transformation 
"the statistics... are estimates of the value of goods actually derived during the 
reference year" and there is a warning that 'ftequently, -weapon prices do not reflect 
production costs, " [A CDA 1994 pp. 169- 70]. 
The explanations about the employed methodology, provided by two sources suggest 
that SIPRI measure production cost and ACDA measure values of the aggregate 
arms imports. The calculation of the production cost takes in account the specific quality 
of the arms and corrects for depreciation when the arms are previously used. Estimation 
of the production cost also allows the aggregation of different kinds of arms in a 
homogeneous volume, with the estimated production cost of each category used as the 
'weight' of each weapon system. In this context, SIPRI aggregate figure is a 
measurement of the total volume of imported arms. On the other hand, ACDA 
measurements measure the actual amounts paid when the transactions took place, giving 
the overall value of the imported arms. As value measurements ACDA figures contain 
information about the actual price of arms, which might differ from the production cost 
of the imported arms. It should be clear that the suggested divergence between the two 
methods is relative, rather than absolute, in the sense that each method dominates in the 
calculation of each organisation in the majority of cases. 
The following description ignores possible measurement errors. If Si is SIPRI 
measurement of the aggregate volume of arms Mi imported by country i in a year, qj is 
the quantity of category j weapon system imported and cj is the estimated cost of this 
category we have 
(1) =M cjq, j 
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Summarising, SIPRI)s volumetric measurement aggregates heterogeneous weapon 
systems by adding up their production cost, net of depreciation when they are previously 
used. ACDA measurement Ai adds up the value of each category of arms, where qij is 
quantity imported and pij is the actual price of j-th category of arms paid by country i. 
We can then express ACDA value measurement of total imports as 
(2) A piM pilq, 
Based on these assumptions, an implicit price index pi of the aggregate anns imports of 
each county is simply given by the ratio of the two measurements 
A. - j pj qij Pi (3) AS Yýj zi 
V 
i c,, q j, C ii 
The weights wij, by which the price-cost ratio of each weapon system contributes to the 
overall price, are the real cost shares of systemj to the total imported volume, i. e. 
(4) c,, q,, 
J: 
j cii qij 
3.5 Prices of imported arms 
The diagrams of figure 3.3 display the evolution of the implicit price index for a 
number of country groups, i. e. organisations such as OPEC and regions. The aggregates 
included in these diagrams are these for which both ACDA [1995] and SIPR1 [1995] 
provide data, so that the calculation of the price index is possible. From a rough 
observation, in the majority of cases plotted in the diagrams the price index appears to 
have followed a general trend associated with that of the volume of the international 
arms trade: i. e. an increase followed by a decrease. This pattern in the case of prices, 
however, is not as clear as in the case of the volume or the value of the arms trade. 
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Figure 3.3 Evolution of the price of arms imports aggregated in large 
geographic regions and organisations 
World 
1.80 
1.60 
1.40 
CO Zt 1.20 
1.00 
0.80 
Year 
12.00 
Americas & Europe 
10.00 
8.00 
6.00 
4.00 
2.00 
0.00 
0 
40D 
aoD 
20D 
cn 1. OD 
QOD 
4.00 
3.00 
2.00 
1.00 
0.00 
r%- -! Uw"Safials 
1 
Year 
N4,10 
CECD 
-------------- CPM 
Africa, Asia, M. East & Oceania 
-- 
P'. 
--. 
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Yea r 
N. America -------------- S. America 
C. America ----Europe 
3.6 Conclusions 
Year 
--------------- Africa - Asia 
M. East ----Oceania 
According to the evidence provided in this chapter, SIPR1 and ACDA appear to 
measure the volume and the value of the arms trade respectively. At country level, the 
data on the arms trade from the two sources cover 38 countries and two years. 
Aggregated in large geographical regions, the available data cover most of the world and 
eleven annual observations. Using these data, we can calculate the implicit price index 
of imported arms. The same sources also provide data on military expenditure. As a 
measurement of countries income, ACDA provides figures of per-capita GNP and also 
figures of population, so it can be transformed to aggregate level. The widely used Penn 
World Tables provide series of per-capita GDP, transformed in a variety of ways. Based 
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on these data, we may consider an econometric examination of the demand for imported 
arms. Since at country level the available observations are not enough for a study of time 
series chapter 4 develops a cross-sectional examination of these data. In a separate study, 
chapter 5 examines the panel of regional aggregated time series. 
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4. The demand for imported arms: A cross- 
sectional study' 
4.1 Introduction 
A well-implemented empirical- study of the demand for imported arms requires 
information about the prices that countries face in this market. The unavailability of 
information about prices possibly has prevented the development of empirical studies, 
within the context of mainstream quantitative economic techniques. In order to 
overcome this problem this study uses series of the implicit price index of imported 
arms, discussed in chapter 3. Using the implicit price index, data for the arms trade, 
military expenditure and national per-capita income and a simple theoretical model we 
proceed to a standard cross-sectional econometric examination of countries' demand for 
imported arms. Along with useful information about the structure of this demand per se, 
this examination provides a means of evaluating the quality of the implicit price index of 
imported arms. 
Based on the theoretical foundation of the arms trade in this chapter we first specify 
an analytical model for the needs of our empirical study. Based on that framework we 
estimate and test alternative functional forms of demand functions, with the use of 
standard econometric techniques. Finally, we examine the possibility of bias in the 
estimates,, because of measurement errors in the data, and ways to improve our results 
with respect to this particular problem. The effort to develop an analytical model of the 
arms trade appropriate for the needs of empirical studies continues in chapter 6. The 
cross-sectional study of the demand for imported arms in this chapter uses country level 
data but ignores the dimension of time. The study of a panel of regionally aggregated 
data in chapter 5 overcomes this problem at the expense of using aggregated data. 
1 Results from this study were presented in the fifth World Peace Science Congress in Amsterdam, in June 
1996 and were included in Levine, Mouzakis and Smith [19961 and [1998]. 
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Therefore, the studies of this and the following chapters are complementary, looking at 
the same issue from different perspectives. 
For a theoretical approach of the arms trade two important recent developments are 
Levine, Sen and Smith [1994] and Levine and Smith [1995]. These two approaches 
however, do not include in the formulation of the defence industry any internal 
mechanism of domestic production of arms, as a differentiated input from imported 
arms. This is also the case of the more recent work Levine & Smith [1997]. Because of 
the combination of generality, content and analytical tractability,, this model is treated as 
the benchmark for the alternative specifications we examine in the analytical section of 
this chapter. 
Following to the discussion of chapter 2, Smith, Humm. and Fontanel [1987 p. 71] 
provide a valid approach to the applied study of the closely related topic of military 
expenditure, especially in terms of employed methodology. This paper outlines the 
importance of a close link between an empirical study and a theoretical framework and 
uses similar model and data with this work. In an alternative approach, Okamura [1991] 
used a Translog functional framework. The initial attempt to apply a similar approach in 
this study was eventually abandoned both because of insufficiency of necessary data and 
because of low theoretical suitability. Instead, this study uses an explicitly developed 
analytical set-up. 
For general reference on econometric issues this study is mainly based on Greene 
[1993], Maddala [1977], Kmenta [1990] and Judge et al [1985]. A criticism by Delong 
[1988] to the results of Baumol [1986] on economic convergence provides an 
application of the standard analysis of the impact of measurement errors to estimations 
with one latent explanatory variable. Extending the analysis for the impact of 
measurement errors from one to two latent variables the analysis by Theil and an 
addition by Levi [1973] was found particularly useful and applicable. Breuer and Wohar 
[1996] discuss the impacts of data quality to empirical studies and of the importance of 
careful selection of quantitative information. 
The material in this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 develops an 
analytical approach of countries' decision mechanism for the allocation of resources in 
defence, focusing on a theoretical implementation of the empirical study of the demand 
for imported arms. Section 4.3 presents and discusses econometric results and estimates 
of countries' demand for arms imports. Last, section 4.4 analyses the impact of 
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measurement errors to the econometric results) attempting to improve the estimates and 
reduce the related bias. The appendix of this chapter AA provides technical information 
from the econometric study. 
4.2 Analytical approach 
4.2.1 Preface 
The primary purpose of this att9mpt to model the demand of countries for imported 
arms Is to provide a demand function for use in a cross-sectional econometric study. A 
secondary but not less important purpose is an evaluation of the quality of data and the 
methods involved in their preparation. For this we need to examine the agreement of an 
appropriate analytical framework with the available empirical information, using 
appropriate econometric techniques. Using the experience from this examination may 
further attempt to improve of the analytical model as well as assess the quality of our 
data. As a main concern, however, the following paragraphs try to keep correspondence 
between model and empirical findings. 
In this examination we assume that one of the inputs of defence, the domestically 
produced arms, are treated as differentiated from the imported ones. Furthermore, we 
assume that countries' domestic industries of arms are natural monopolies, Producing 
arms of lower technology than the imported but more essential for the existence of 
countries' defence. In reality, national defence industries are not always but often under 
public ownership or heavily regulated. A major concern of government when it comes to 
their domestic industry of arms is security of supply, since in case of conflict the 
provision of imported arms might be interrupted. On the other hand, the domestic 
alternative to imported arms is the generally large set-up costs of this production. 
For purposes of simplicity, in the following set-up we assume that military budget of 
countries is pre-fixed by the central government, reflecting public preferences for the 
security. With the military budget G predefined, our analysis addresses the problem of 
policy makers to maximise national security by allocating their budget between the 
available inputs to the production of national defence. Any dynamic aspects are ignored 
and the static setting is assumed to be structurally stable, at least over some period of 
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time. We also assume that decision-makers are rational and that countries are not 
explicitly aggressive. 
4.2.2 Production under fixed factor costs 
Assume that the private sector of our typical country produces Y units of uniform 
composite output, which is either used in consumption or as an input on the national 
defence sector. The total amount of resources G allocated to defence industry is spent in 
the three inputs. These are quantity M of imported arms, quantity D of domestically 
I produced arms and quantity LKof labour. The public sector makes decisions about the 
allocation of G to the alternative inputs. Here we can allow for bureaucratic inefficiency 
of the public sector. This means that some part of the budget does not reach the 
production but gets wasted in the administrative mechanism. We can write this as 
(1) 0 ao 
where G* is the budget finally utilised in the Production and 1-co measures the degree of 
bureaucratic inefficiency of the military sector. 
Assume that labour is available at the cost of wage w, which remains unaffected by 
the demand. For a set-up with flexible substitution between inputs assume that the 
production of military capability K follows a CES function 
DP + icmMp + (I - ic 'D 
G (- 00) 0) U 
(0,1) 
(2) K 
[CD 
D- KM 
)'- PIC 
Y 
-KM) CDVICDMVKMTV(1-KD P=0 
AaK 
The non-negative quantity a= (1 - p)-1 is the elasticity of substitution, v is a positive 
coefficient that measures the returns to scale and rD and Km are positive coefficients that 
ICD, + xm- < 1. Values of v>I and v<1 indicate increasing and decreasing returns to scale 
respectively. Government spending in defence consists of the value of the labour cost (of 
the armed forces) and the values of the two stocks of arms. If the price of imported arms 
is pm and the price of the domestically produced arms is pD, the budget constraint that 
the planner of defence faces is 
(3) GOj = WLK + PAN + PLD 
We also assume that government is a price takerfor all three inputs and that the three 
factor prices remain unaffected by the demand for the factors. This does not seem to be a 
strong assumption for pm, an international price and not too strong for w, since 
31 
employment in the military sector is usually small enough not to affect significantly the 
national wage. But it is relatively a stronger assumption for the domestic industry of 
arms, which is often heavily regulated and controlled by the state. We relax this 
assumption later. The Lagrangian for the maximisation of the objective function (2) 
under constraint (3) and the non-negativity constraints for the three inputs is 
(4) 1= K(D, M, LK) - A(wLK+pmM+pDD - G) 
The four first order conditions (FOC) are (3) and 
(5) 
Solving from the three FOC in (5) the shares of the three inputs are 
(6) LK = IKM; M=dD; D=gLK 
where the three share coefficients are 
'K = 
P, 
(1 
- KD - KM) 
or 
; d= 
D 
[PMKM]or; 
g=[ 
WK 
-KM)ja WKM PMKD PD(l-K 
11D 
Under these definitions with the use of the fourth first order condition (3) we can 
I aK I aK 1 aK 
w aLK p,, aM p, aD 
solve for the demand function of imported arms 
(8) M= Gm 
as well as for the demands of the two other inputs 
(9) LK = G' 
1KW + 41PM + 9PD 
lKw + pm + d-'PD 
and 
(10) Gm 
-1 )9 9 W+a M +PD 
Notice that the conditions for equilibrium are not independent from the returns to scale 
v. This is an expected result since CES is a homothetic production function which gives 
linear expansion paths for given proportions of the inputs. Then, for any given set of 
factor prices the optimum input shares are independent of the level of output. 
An important consideration when we analyse either consumer of producer behaviour 
is the degree of substitution between the inputs of the transformation. In the case of CES 
when a>I inputs are substitutes in production, the isoquant spaces of this 
transformation with three inputs are expected to intersect with the axes. In practice, this 
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means that zero quantities of some of the inputs can be included in the set of optimal 
solutions. In the case of CES, however, the solutions are not defined (valid) when any of 
the inputs is zero, since it is not differentiable at zero, so the intersection takes place only 
asymptotically. In that respect CES family framework fails to capture the complete 
substitution of an input, a weakness that makes its use less attractive. We return to this 
issue in chapter 6. 
Expanding the demand function for imported arms in (8), using the definitions in (7), 
it becomes 
1-K -K DM WI 
KM 
(_KD 
m 
7 PD +p47 G°p 
Notice that when price pm increases, this demand asymptotically tends to zero. The 
income elasticity of this demand is 
(12) aM G EG =--=O 
ÖG M 
which shows that this elasticity is independent of the level of G but it depends on the 
extend of bureaucratic inefficiency. The two other elasticities take more complicated 
expressions. 
4.2.3 Domestic production of arms 
In the previous section the planner of defence faces a fixed price of domestic arms, 
which could be the result of a competitive domestic arms industry. Equilibrium under 
competition requires that set-up costs are small enough compared to the demand, so that 
the entry of a relatively large number of firms is possible. If cost and demand factors 
only allow the entry of a small number of firms, the market structure moves away from 
that of perfect competition towards some form of oligopoly. In the case of arms industry 
the competitive structure appears rather unrealistic since this sector is usually either 
state-owned or heavily regulated. Furthermore, this industry is known to require large 
set-up costs. In other words the arms industry has an evidently monopolistic character in 
most of the cases. The majority of arms production takes place in few large states, rather 
than being evenly distributed around the world. This clearly suggests positive economies 
of scale, since the defence industry tends to get integrated inside national borders. 
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According to ACDA [1995] USA held 47% of the world exports in 1993, U. K. 20%, 
Russia 12% and no other country has more than 5%. 
We can combine these requirements in a production function, preserving simplicity in 
the solutions, if we use a Leontief production function with two inputs, capital YDand 
labour LD. Assume that a part F of YDis set up costs and the variable capital YD -F is 
always employed at a constant proportion b with labour, i. e. YD-F= bLD or 
(13) YD= bLD+F 
If the units of the domestic product are adjusted to be equal to the average product 
output (per unit of labour), this function can be written as 
(14) D=L 
where 8>0 is the returns to scale. The overall cost CDof this production is CD = wLD + 
YD= (w + b)LD+ F and, after substituting from (14) it becomes 
(15) CD =(w + b)Dl"5 +F 
Furthermore, assume that the government taxes all profits or subsidises all losses so 
that the arms industry has zero profits and the price of domestic arms equals the average 
cost CDID, i. e. 
(16) 
1-8 
PD (w + b)D --5 + FD 
If the returns to scale are constant (S = 1) the decrease OfPD tends to vanish when the D 
increases but, if 9>I, the decreasing effect remains. The case of increasing returns to 
scale is the one we mainly consider here. 
4.2.4 Defence planning with internal domestic arms sector 
Either increasing returns to scale or positive set-up costs result in diminishing unitary 
cost of the output. In order to maintain simplicity in the solutions we can use the Cobb- 
Douglas (CD) form of (2) with a unitary elasticity of substitution. Then the budget 
constraint for the production of defence becomes 
(17) G' = wLK + PMM + (w + b)D""5 +F 
and the share functions for optimal allocation 
L 
1-KD _KM PM M; Ds =S 
KD w- D8 =S _ýD 
PM M 
K KM w 1-KD _KM w+b K, w+b 
Using the share functions we can solve from (17) for the demand for imported arms 
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Km G'-F 
(45 - 1)K-D +1 PM 
and the demand for military forces 
(20) LK = 
'-'CD-Km G-F 
(15 
-1)7CD +1w 
In a similar way, solving for the steady state value of the domestic production of arms D 
and substituting from (14) we can solve for the output of the domestic sector 
1 JKD G-F LD=D, 1 = (45-1)KD +l w+b 
The system of equations (19), (20) and (21) provides a fairly simple solution with 
some interesting characteristics. The demand function for imported arms (19) is 
independent of the labour cost w, inversely related with the price and the returns to scale 
and has a linear relationship with the effective budget and setup costs. The income, price 
and cross-price (w characterises both the prices of the alternative inputs LKand pD) 
elasticities of this demand are respectively 
16 =WG= 
coG"' 
=. 
aM p,, aM w=0 (22) Gp 
aG M G' -F, a-pm m 
The unitary price elasticity and zero coross-price elasticity (i. e. the inelastic response of 
imported arms to wage) are two basic properties of a CD production function with 
unitary elasticity of substitution. The latter characteristic is a result of symmetric income 
and substitution effects that cancel each other out. The income elasticity of this demand 
is independent of the returns to scale 8 and converges asymptotically to cv when G 
increases. 
4.2.5 Overview of the modelling framework 
This analytical approach is an attempt to illustrate the structural difference in the 
behaviour of the countries when the decision for the establishment of a domestic 
production of arms is internal to the decision mechanism of defence. When a country 
produces arms, the labour cost has a double effect on the demand for inputs in defence, 
one through the price of armed forces and another through the price of domestically 
produced arms. When, for instance, the wage increases the (increasing) substitution 
effect on the demand for arms imports gets strong enough to offset the decreasing 
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income effect, giving the result of an inelastic demand. An important limitation of this 
examination is that the domestic arms industry must always be established, providing 
that the budget is higher than the set-up costs. Another limitation is that this analysis 
does not apply when countries cannot afford a domestic sector (G(O <- F). This limitation 
originates from the unitary elasticity of substitution of the CD function', which does not 
allow any of the inputs to be left out from the production. 
A production function with higher elasticity of substitution could possibly provide 
the flexibility of an optional entry of the domestic industry of arms. In the case of CES, 
the solutions are defined only for positive levels of inputs, excluding zero. When qK >I 
the derived demand functions for the inputs e. g. in (9), (10) and M), asymptotically IA 
converge to zero when their prices rise. The standard bibliography, eg. Heathfield & 
Wide [1987], does not seem to provide a straightforward description of the behaviour of 
CES at the margins of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Using CES instead of CD as a 
production function for K the demand function for arms imports becomes a complicated 
and non-linear inverse function 2 of M, which does not take a general algebraic solution 
and demonstrates the inappropriateness of CES for our specific modelling requirements. 
4.3 Empirical study of the demand 
4.3.1 A Simple log-linear demand function 
Following our theoretical approach in the previous section and the availability of data 
we may first consider a simple unrestricted log-linear demand function 
(23) InM, =a+. 6GInGi + . 6,,, Inwi + eplnpi + u, 
as a log-linear approximation to (19). Data on military expenditure provide 
measurements of the military budget Gi and the price of imported arms can be 
' It can be expressed as 
1 
Dr (W+1)1+p45 jK 
M+ 
Km 
-1 
-i DM 
mý-p +P'-P KM 
r 
Xf 
G2' 
1 
(1-K 
-K i-p pDMP, +PM 
KM 
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approximated with the implicit price index, as in chapter 4. Following the conclusions of 
previous section, the variations of average wage wi cause a twin substitution effect In the 
demand for imported arms, one through the demand for military forces and one through 
the demand for domestically produced arms. This combined effect is expressed by the 
associated elasticity of arms imports with average labour costs 6". A reasonable 
approximation of the average labour cost of the country is a per-capita measurement of 
GDP. The coefficients cG, and -Ep are the elasticities of arms imports to military 
expenditure and to the price of imported arms respectively and ui is a stochastic term. 
Along with estimates for the elasticities, this preliminary estimation of an unrestricted 
demand ftinction can also provide informatio. n. about the ni lafity of the dan used the 11 - 
-j --I. - --I- --, A .ý 
validity of the method employed for their calculation and the appropriateness of the 
adopted modelling framework. For wi we use the corrected-for-tenns-of-trade series of 
per-capita GDP by PWT and for Gi we use the series by SIPRI. Under definitions (1) 
and (2) of SIPR1 and ACDA measurements in the previous chapter, which ignore 
measurement errors, we can estimate (23) using the cross-sectional data set we 
described in chapter 3. The estimation of (23) by OLS, which implies the assumption of 
a well-behaved and normal error term ui, yields 
InM, = 4.65 + 0.44 InGi - 0.285 Inwi - 0.51 Inpi 
(1.32) (0.11) (0. 176) (0.17) 
[0.001] [0.000] [0. 114] [0.005] 
Rý = 0.35 R2=0.29 F=6.17 [. 002] FF = [0.614] N= [0.144] H= [0.865] 
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are in brackets and the p-values of 
the two tail tests for the significance of the coefficients from zero are in square brackets. 
Rý is the coefficient of determination of the regression, ký is R-bar squared, F gives the 
F-test of the regression and the p-value in square brackets. FF, N and H give p-values 
from LM tests for the functional form (Ramsey), normality and heteroscedasticity 
(White) respectively. There is no indication of heteroscedasticity or functional miss- 
specification of the linear equation. The Bera-Jarque test, however, moderately indicates 
non-normality of the residuals, although the hypothesis of normality fails to be rejected 
at 5% level of significance. 
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Despite the moderate goodness of fit of this equation there are several encouraging 
indications in the results. The signs of the estimates of ep and eG are theoretically correct 
and the absolute magnitudes appear reasonable. The price elasticity is estimated at -5 1% 
and the 'income elasticity' is 44%, both with high statistical significance from zero. If 
we interpret eG as a measure of bureaucratic inefficiency CO, the estimate is rather low. 
Seen as a cross-price elasticity of arms imports to the price of labour wi the estimate of 
ew indicates that the two goods are complements in the production. According to the 
model in Section 4.2, which is based on a CD production function of military capability, 
we expect this elasticity to be near zero, but this changes if we consider a production 
orocess with a non-unitary elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, this elasticity may also L .1 .1 --- 
contain substitution effects between imported and domestic arms. For these reasons, the 
lower statistical significance of this coefficient from zero is not a major nuisance. 
The medium level of the coefficient of determination is an expected result, rather than 
an indication of a poor estimation, mainly for two reasons. One is that the random 
component of the estimated relationship can be expected to be high, as a result of the 
specific nature of the arms trade. This may be caused by variations created by the 
discontinuity of the flow of large deliveries in time, the unpredictability of political 
factors etc. Apart from purely stochastic variations, the random term of our equation is 
expected to contain deterministic but unexplained variations of the dependent variable. 
Examples of such omitted systematic processes are dynamics, simultaneity, endogenous 
growth effects, the state of domestic production, open economy effects, market structure 
effects etc. All these systematic but unexplained effects are left to be included in the 
error term, unavoidably creating expectations of some under- specification bias in the 
results. 
The variables included in the estimated function are those that performed better 
among the alternatives. The non-nested tests for the use of alternative measurements of 
the explanatory variables showed that PPP-measurement of GDP performed 
significantly better than the transformation with exchange rates, a result also reported in 
Smith et al [1997b]. SIEPRI figures of military expenditure performed significantly better 
than ACDA. This result was similar for all the attempted functional forms and supported 
with high statistical significance from both sides of the non-nested tests. These tests 
weakly indicated in favour of the corrected for the terms of trade version instead of other 
versions of GDP available in PWT. The alternatives we examined included 
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transformations by Laspeyer and Chain indices and a measurement corrected per 
equivalent adult (i. e. approximated correction for working force). 
The leverage values of the regression ,I. e. the elements of the main diagonal of the 
hut matrix of the regression (X[XX]-'X) show that only two observations can be 
characterised as influential. For this result we use the criterion of twice the average 
leverage value (Kmenta [1990] p. 425 or Greene [1993] p. 288). They are the cases of 
USA and Syria that give values 0.35 and 0.29 respectively, which are well above the 
critical value 2k1n = 0,21. Because, however, the values of the respective residuals are 
small compared to the rest, we concluded that the estimation benefits, rather than gets 
biased, from the inclusion of these two observations. Thus, the observations are not 
characterised as outliers and they are retained in the sample, instead of being removed. 
In practice their removal resulted in an apparent deterioration of the statistics of the 
estimation. 
4.3.2 Examination of the functional form 
If ACDA values are used instead of S11PRI as left hand side variable in terms of true 
(unobserved) magnitudes the equation to estimate becomes 
(24) lnpM =a+ cGInGi + &Jnw, + (cp + 1)lnp, + ui 
The estimation of this equation, with the use of data, yields identical estimates and 
almost identical t-ratios with the estimation of (23). The rest of statistical tests, however 
differ. Interesting is the change of Ramsey LM test (X21 = 3.998, p-value = 0.046), which 
indicated in favour of a quadratic functional form at 5% level of significance since there 
are theoretical reasons to support non-linearity in the equation. 
From a closer examination, the estimation of the expanded quadratic form does not 
provide a clear message about the exact nature of non-linearity. Most significant among 
the quadratic terns turn out to be the two cross-products rather than squares of the 
regressors, which directly determine concavity or convexity. Looking for a theoretical 
explanation of this result, a standard framework that provides a clear connection with a 
quadratic logarithmic form is the 'translog' model (e. g. Greene [1993] p. 209). An 
interesting application of this methodology in defence economics can be found in 
Okamura [1991]. This method, however, is not appropriate for our case since the 
identification of translog model requires measurements of the output and of all inputs 
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and their prices. In our case, data on quantities and prices of the inputs are limited and of 
questionable quality and, most important, the output of defence industry is unobservable. 
The establishment of a domestic industry of major arms can be expected to require 
considerable set-up costs, mainly due to R&D requirements of the related technology. 
High set-up costs in the domestic production tend to increase the price of domestically 
produced arms, more when the produced quantity reduces towards zero. This effect is 
illustrated by the analysis in section 4.2, i. e. equation (16). Countries, however, may 
choose not to establish a domestic production at all and use only imported arms. Such a 
discontinuous entry could not possibly be captured by a production function with a 
unitary elasticity of substitution. 
Providing that the set-up costs required for a production of arms are generally high 
the size of the production becomes the critical factor for the establishment of a domestic 
industry. This draws the attention on the association between the size of defence 
industry and the economic size of the countries. A simple observation of the shares of 
military expenditure to GDP, e. g. from ACDA [1995], shows that it is near to 2.5% in 
the majority of the countries. Using the available data, the correlation coefficient 
between GDP and military expenditure is 90% using SIPRI and 93% using ACDA data, 
which shows that these two magnitudes tend to move together. The correlation 
coefficient of GDP with the share of military expenditure to GDP it is -62% and -53% 
using SIPRI and ACDA data respectively, showing that this share tends to decrease with 
the size of the economy. 
Countries' demand for domestically produced arms depends on the size of the 
defence industry (economy), which is reflected in the size of the military budget. The 
decision of countries for the establishment of a costly large-scale domestic industry 
depends on the size of their military budget and their demand for the product and, 
possibly, on the level of economic development. Providing that the set-up costs are high, 
when the military budget is generally small it is unlikely that countries find this 
establishment beneficial or affordable and they rely upon imports for their procurement. 
When the demand increases, the impact of set-up costs to the price of the output 
decreases and the option of entry to the domestic production becomes realistic. If the 
entry takes place domestic arms substitute for part of imported arms. If the demand 
becomes very large., with the possible advantage of positive economies of scale and the 
possibility of benefits from exports, the domestic industry can further substitute 
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imported arms with domestic. Large and developed economies are likely to enjoy 
positive externalities in the establishment of a domestic arms sector. Such externalities 
that essentially reduce production costs may originate from double use of an existing 
industrial infrastructure (eg nuclear plants) and of investment in R&D, advantages in 
human capital stocks etc. 
Figure 4.1 Share of arms imports to military expenditure against GDP 
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A comparison of the share of the expenditure in imported arms with the economic 
size of countries provides support to the estimated concave relationship between the 
demand for imported arms and level of development. Figure 4.1 plots the logarithm of 
the ratio of arms imports to military expenditure against the logarithm of total GDP, 
using both SIPRI and ACDA figures. It also includes quadratic trends fitted for the two 
cases. The two trends are supported by high statistical significance, especially the 
quadratic component. As a result of the high correlation of GDP with military 
expenditure we can expect a similar concave relationship between the logarithms of 
arms imports and GDP. Since the share of arms imports to military expenditure, as it is 
plotted in figure 4.1, is also in logarithms the non-linear nature of the relationship of this 
share with the military expenditure is maintained [i. e. d2ln(M/G)/d(InG)2 = d2lnMIdInG 
2 
since In(MIG) = InM - InG]. Taking in account the high positive correlation between 
GDP with military expenditure we could attribute the concavity between MIG and GDP 
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to concavity between arms imports and military expenditure. This, however, does not 
imply that the component of GDP not correlated with military expenditure can not 
introduce some Irrelevant and diversified type of association. 
The model in Section 4.2 predicts the demand for arms imports as being inelastic to 
labour costs. A possible explanation is that the prices of two from the three inputs (of D 
and LK) depend on labour costs w and the substitution effect of this price is strong 
enough to fully offset the opposite in direction income effect. This, for instance, happens 
when we have unitary elasticity of substitution. In the case of a higher elasticity of 
substitution,, which actually appears more realistic, the substitution effect becomes 
stronger and dominates the I income effect. Then, the cross-price elasticity e, can be 
expected to take positive values compared with the result predicted by (19). This 
relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the sign of the cross-price 
elasticity is illustrated in Figure 4.2. In the case of CD production function (0- = 1) the 
cross-price income effect AB and the substitution effect BC completely offset each 
other, whereas in the elastic case (a> 1) and in the inelastic case (a< 1) substitution and 
income effects dominate respectively. 
Figure 4.2. Different types of substitution between inputs 
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Summarising, we have shown that the final effect of w on arms imports is determined 
by the combination of a (possibly) increasing effect from substitution with the 
decreasing effect of the entry of countries to domestic production. If the order of the 
second effect is higher than that of the first, the result of the combination of these two 
effects is a relationship of a concave shape, with an increasing part, a maximum and a 
decreasing part. It is possible that in reality not all these three parts of this pure 
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concavity will exist, but only the increasing or the decreasing. We come back to this in 
the following section. 
4.3.3 A qua dra tic-logarithmic demand function 
The hypothesis that the arms imports have concave responses to military expenditure 
and the domestic wage can be tested with the estimation of an equation that includes the 
squares of these variables. 
(25) InM, = ao + alInGi + a2lnwi + a3lnpi + a4ln 
2 Gi + a5ln 
2Wi + U, 
" 
where aj, j-- 5 are coefficients. Estimating this equation with OLS and the same data 
set we obtain 
InMi = -21.64 + 1.52 InGi + 4.74 Inwi - 0.56 Inpi - 0.06 In 
2 Gi - 0.29 In 
2Wi 
(18.44) (0.71) (4.20) (0.17) (0.04) (0.24) 
[0.251 [0.04] [0.27] [0.003] [0.16] [0.24] 
R2=0.42 R2=0.33 F=4.66 [0.003] FF = 0.18 N =. 081 H=0.49 
These results appear to be in line with the theoretical expectations, as they were 
exposed above, including the signs and magnitudes of the estimates. The goodness of fit 
has improved and the overall appearance of the t-ratios is satisfactory. The leverage tests 
are similar as in the previous estimation except that of the U. S. is about seven times 
higher than the average value. Since the corresponding residual is very small the 
observation is maintained in the sample. The non-nality of the residuals appears to have 
deteriorated, compared with the previous estimation, but the test still fails to reject 
normality at 5% level of significance. The distribution of the residuals appears to be 
skewed to the right. 
The response of arms imports to changes of the average labour costs is concave and 
the slope now depends on wi. This is in agreement with the theoretical expectations 
presented in the previous section. Similarly, the estimated income elast1city of the 
demand function now depends on G. The estimates of these two functions are 
6,, =L9lnM/L91nw=4.74-0.581nw and 6G=alnM1L9lnG=1.52-0.12lnG 
and evaluated at the sample means of the two variables in logarithms, W- = Ilnwj/n = 
8.898 and 6= IiInGiln = 8.356 it is 
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- 0.47 and 65 = 0.57 
(0.23) (0.13) 
[0.049] [0.000] 
We can test the significance of these point-estimates of the elasticities from zero with the 
use of t-tests, imposing the linear functions in a2 + 2a5 =0 and a, + 2a4 =0 as 
restrictions on the estimation of (25). The two estimated standard errors of the 
restrictions are in brackets and the p-values from the tests of the significance of the 
elasticities from zero are in square brackets. The estimate ofe., evaluated at the mean, 
has a high significance from zero 
' 
and a higher value, compared with the estimation of 
(23). The price elasticity is at the same level but lower in statistical significance. The 
estimate ofg,, has changed more than the other elasticities, increased in value and now 
passes a 5% test. 
The signs of all three estimates of the elasticities are similar as in the estimation of 
(23) and the estimates are higher in absolute value. The largest increase is that of the 
estimate of the cross price elasticity 6,,. The estimate of 6,, has changed more that the 
other elasticities and now passes a 5% test of significance but the significance, of price 
elasticity has somewhat deteriorated. The change in the estimates can be the result of 
reducing the under-specification bias, compared with the estimation of (25). The 
coefficients of the two quadratic terms are negative showing that arms imports are 
expected to have a concave relationship with both w and G. 
Taking in account the actual range of the explanatory variables we may look in more 
detail into the shape of the estimated responses. The two diagrams in Figure 4.3 present 
the predicted demand for arms imports as well as the estimated elasticities, as functions 
of G and w. The fitted values of InM are calculated at the means of the variables. In the 
diagram provides the minima lnwmM and InGnin, maxima (Inwnax and InG, -,, ax)and means 
(bar) from the samples of the two variables, as well as the predicted values of the two 
variables that maximise these functions Inw* and InG*. To solve for the last two values 
we can solve from the first order conditions for the maximisation of (27). The estimated 
maximising values of w and G are 
Inw* = 8.17 and InG* = 12.66 
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Figure 4.3 Predicted demand for arms and estimated elasticities 
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Following to our results, the response of arms imports to per-capita GDP is purely 
concave with an increasing and a decreasing section and a maximum in between. This 
peak is included in the actual range of values in the sample. The two sections are 
relatively balanced having the peak near to the sample mean. This sample, however, is 
not representative of the entire population of countries, since it contains more countries 
with high income than with low and almost excludes countries at the lowest levels of 
income. This biasedness in the sample happens because economic data are less available 
for LDCs and if they exist, the quality would probably be poor. This could be the reason 
why the elasticity evaluated at the mean is on the side of the negative slope. Generally, 
the estimated relationship appears in agreement with the theoretical pattern presented in 
the previous section. 
According to the analysis of the previous section, development has a twin effect on 
the arms imports, one through labour costs and another through the capacity to establish 
the industry. The assumption that, apart from increasing the labour costs, development 
facilitates the establishment of a domestic industry and tends to push arms imports 
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downwards seems relatively safe. As section 4.2 illustrated, a unitary elasticity of 
substitution in the production of defence implies inelastic responses of arms imports to 
labour costs. If this were the case, because of the negative impact of development to the 
arms imports through set-up costs, the slope of this function should be negative. Only 
with a higher than unit elasticity of substitution the positive substitution effect of w to M 
can dominate the negative income effect and yield a positive elasticity. Since e" is 
estimated to be first positive and then negative when w increases, this could be an 
indication of a higher than unit elasticity of substitution in the production of K. 
4.3.4 Further empirical results 
The previous section examines a specification mainly selected for its clear theoretical 
interpretation, rather than for having the best fit. Looking for further empirical 
information about the functional form of the underlining demand function, we might 
also examine alternative functional forms mainly selected for their acceptance by the 
data. Applying a standard specification method the quadratic form with improved fit is 
(26) InM, = ho + hjlnGj + h2lnWi + h3lrTi+ h4ln2wi + 
b-5lnGiInwi + b6lnwilnpi + b7lnGiInpi + ui 
where b's are coefficients. The estimation of (26) yielded 
Coefficient bo b, b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 
Estimate -37.08 2.37 7.39 -3.81 -0.35 -0.19 0.59 -0.24 
Standard error 21.0 1.34 4.3 2.3 0.24 0.15 0.31 0.12 
p-value 0.09 0.09 0.096 0.11 0.16 0,19 0.06 0.05 
W=0.5 Oý R' = 0.3 8) F=4.3 [0.002], FF = 0.5 0, N =0 . 
062, H=0.43 
The overall appearance of the statistics from the estimation of this form has 
improved, compared with the estimation of (25). The exception is the normality of the 
residuals, the distribution of which now appears to be skewed to the right. Wilst the 
normality of the error term does not affect the properties of OLS estimates it mainly 
affects the statistical tests and confidence intervals, which rely upon the assumption of a 
normal error term. We may overcome this problem by the examining empirical 
distributions of the estimates using Bootstrap methods. The leverage tests indicated the 
same influential observations as in the previous estimation, again with small 
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corresponding residuals that indicate the inclusion of two observations in the sample 
does not bias but improves the estimation. In a similar way as in the estimation of the 
previous section the three elasticities now become 
ew = a1nU/d31nw = 7.3 9-0.71nw - 0.191nG + 0.591np 
c9lnM/aInG = 2.37 - 0.191nw - 0.241np 
cp = c9inM/aInG = -3.81 + 0.591nw - 0.241nG 
and the elasticities evaluated at the sample means 
0.52 and 6ý = -0.57 
The estimate of Ec, from (26) is little chan ed from the estimation of (23), whereas the 9 
two other elasticities are higher in absolute value. From the statistics of this estimation 
some coefficients have low statistical significance and the deterioration of k2 indicates 
an over-specified equation. 
An alternative form we examined in the contents of our search for additional 
information included countries' population in levels along with a quadratic logarithmic 
specification. After eliminating the terms with insignificant statistical tests we arrived at 
the hybrid model 
(27) InM, = bo + biInG, + b2lnwi + b3lnpi + b4ln 2 G, + 
h5lnGiInwi + b6lnwilnpi + b7lnGiIiipi + b87ri + Ui 
where b's are coefficients. The estimation of (29) yielded 
Coefficient bo b, b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 
Estimate -30.22 3.84 4.61 -3.71 -0.15 -0.64 0.69 -0.36 -0.002 
Standard Error 12.69 1.37 1.80 2.11 0.08 0.22 0.30 0.15 0.00075 
p-value 0.024 0.009 0.016 0.089 0.074 0.008 0.029 0.021 0.013 
W=0.58 RI=0.47 F=5.07 [0.001] FF = 0.20 N=0.001 H=0.97 
The goodness-of-fit k2 of this specification is high, just one percent lower from that 
of the an unrestricted quadratic form, where Rý takes the highest value from all the 
specifications tested. The normality of the residuals safely fails the tests, the distribution 
of which is clearly skewed to the right. The tests for hetero scedasti city and functional 
form give satisfactory results. The overall appearance of the t-ratios of the coefficients 
seems satisfactory with all the coefficients passing a 10% level of significance test and 
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only two of them fail a 5% test. There are seven observations indicated as influential 
from the leverage tests, but all of them with clearly small corresponding residuals, so 
they were all retained in the sample. 
The three elasticities now become 
-w= al nUlal nw = 4.61 - 0.641nG + 0.6 91 np 6 
EG == (31nUlaInG = 3.84 + 0.3 1 InG - 0.641nw - 0.3 61np 
cp = c9InM/21nG = -3.71 + 0.691nw - 0,361nG 
and evaluated at the sample means of logarithmic variables W- = 8.898 and G=8.3 56 
1.15 0.78 0.61 
(0.31) (0.14) (0.15) 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
All three estimates of the elasticities evaluated at the sample means and their 
significance from zero rose in absolute value compared to the previous estimations. In a 
similar way as before we can solve for the maximum of the only non-linear response 
between M and G, using the FOC from (27). This is 
-bilb4 - (b5lb4)ln-w - (b7lb4)lnp= 25.6 - 4.271nw - 2.41np 
The second order condition confirms that this is a maximum. According to this set-up 
the response of M to the other two variables is linear. This form appears to suggest that 
the the higher the size of countries' military industry (extent of militarisation) the less 
they tend to rely on imports. According to this functional form, population and per- 
capita GDP provide separately the two ingredients of GDP. military expenditure 
includes information about the product of these two variables (total GDP), as it is highly 
correlated with it. Furthermore, it contains information orthogonal to GDP (the non- 
correlated part), which is the intensity of militarisation of the country. It appears 
reasonable that all these three factors, the militarisation, the size and the level of 
development of the country affect the decision for an establishment of a domestic 
industry of arms. Then, the character of the countries tends to change from being mainly 
importers of arms towards higher self-sufficiency of procurement, and towards the 
exports of arms. 
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4.4 The impact of measurement errors 
4.4.1 The problem of latent variables 
This section examines the relaxation of one of the working assumptions, that there are 
no measurement errors in the data used in the estimations. On the contrary, we expect 
considerable errors in defence related data. The impact of these errors would be possible 
bias in the estimation of the coefficients and the calculation of statistical tests, which 
may influence the course of development of this analysis and the correctness of the 
conclusions. Among general textbooks on econometrics a helpful reference to this issue 
is Maddala [19771. Greene [1993] discusses the problem of identification of the 
unobserved magnitudes, for the case of a two-variable regression and mentions the 
existence of implications for the multivariable case, but does not cover the case of two 
explanatory variables measured with error. A more extensive presentation of this issue 
can be found in Judge et al [1985]. 
The aim of this examination is to obtain information about the direction and the 
magnitude of bias in the estimates. The rather good overall appearance of the estimated 
demand functions and the high statistical significance of the estimate of price elasticity 
can be used as a confirmation that the adopted method to calculate prices has been 
successful. This conclusion gets further support if the direction of bias in the estimated 
elasticities is downwards in absolute value. This implies evidence for even more 
responsive relationships than those estimated. Furthermore, the indication of downwards 
bias implies stronger statistical significance of the coefficients from zero. And vice- 
versa: the closer the true elasticities are to zero the weaker the statistical support for the 
estimated relationship gets. 
In a similar way as in Baumol [1986] and De Long [1988], any measurement error in 
SIPRI values would appear in both sides of the estimated function making the error term 
correlated with this regressor. As Levi has shown and Maddala illustrates [1977 pp. 292- 
4], in the case of-two variable regression the estimation bias can be bounded by 
estimating the inverse function. The direction of bias is always downwards in absolute 
terms. Similarly, when the regressors are more than one, and only one variable is 
measured with error, the bias of this variablecs estimated coefficient is downwards and a 
boundary can be calculated. The bias to the other error-free variables, nevertheless, can 
be either upwards or downwards, and it can be estimated. The same method does not 
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directly apply when more than one explanatory variables are measured with error. For 
the case of two variables, ' 
however, Theil has proposed an approximate calculation of the 
bias. In the following sections the impact of measurement errors on the estimations will 
be examined using alternative approaches. 
4.4.2 One variable measured with error 
4.4.2.1 The inverse equation approach 
Starting this examination from-a simple case the definition of SIPRI and ACDA 
measurements, shown in forms (1) and (2) of chapter 3, we can include multiplicative 
lognormal error terms with unit means and constant variances. If esi and eAj are the 
logarithms of these terms, the definition of SIPRI measurement can be written as 
(28) InSi = InM, + esi, esi - N(O, as 2) 
and of ACDA 
(29) InAi = Inpi + InMi + eAj eAj - N(O, oA- 
2) 
Then, the estimated price index becomes 
(30) pi = InAi - InSi Inp, + ep, 
where 
(31) ep, = eAj - esi 
Under this definition ofpi we can re-write (25) as 
(32) InS, =a+ cGInGj + s,, Inw, +. 6plnp, + v, 
where the composite, but still normal, error term vi is 
(33) vi = ui - e. Ai + 
(i - 6p)esi 
In the case that the error terms esi, eAj and ui distribute independently from each other 
and from pi and Mi we have 
(34) cov(lnpi, vi) = (6 - I)o-s2 ,p 
Always assuming only ^i is measured with error, the bias in the estimation of cp can p 
be bounded by estimating the function that the LHS and the explanatory variable with 
the error has been inverted. It is interesting that when cp =I the bias does not exist, or it 
becomes negligible, since in this case cov(lnpi, vi)=O and the error terms is 
uncorrelated with p. Indeed, the estimates of Ep are not far from zero, especially in the 
estimations of the extensive forms, i. e. (26) and (27). 
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Although the method of inverse function is exact only in the case of two variable 
regression, an approximate estimation can be obtained from 
(35) Irygi = ao + alInGi + a21n-wi + 
(11,6p')InS, + vi 
where a's are coefficients and 6,, ' the other estimated boundary. The interval in which 
the real price elasticity is expected to lie can be defined by the estimations of (23) and 
(36), after we solve for 6p'. This is 
- 0.51 > Ep >-2.24 
This is a rather wide bound but it can be used to support the argument of elastic response 
of the arms imports to prices and the good performance of the estimated price index. The 
: -: 1-- 4-- 4-1- ýr_ 1- MLIOLlký, 3 U1 L1113 LIMaLlUll arC SHIMal LO HIOSe. 1101-11 tile estimation of (22". 3") including the 
statistical significance of the estimate (0.5% two tail). If this method is applied to the 
more extensive form (25), the obtained bounded region is similar and, also, lies within 
this interval. 
4.4.2.2 One unobservable regressor in multiple regression 
The method of inverse function can provide indications about the direction and the 
magnitude of bias on the estimated coefficient of the variable with the error. The 
application of this asymptotic method is exact only in the case of two variable 
regression, in which the bias is always downwards in absolute value. Levi [ 197' )] has 
examined the impacts in the case of one (only) regressor measured with error in a 
multiple regression. Levi shows that the direction of the bias of the coefficient. of the 
variable with the error is similar as in the two variable case: With only one variable 
measured with error, in multiple regression, the coefficient of the variable is 
underestimated in ahsolute terms. 
Levi's analysis, however, shows clearly that there could be bias in the estimates of 
the coefficients of the other regressors, which are assumed to be correctly measured. The 
direction of this bias for a regressor depends on the direction of correlation between the 
regressor with the unobserved variables. If a regressor is positively correlated with the 
unobserved regressor, the direction of bias is downwards in absolute value. If it is 
negatively correlated the bias is upwards. This result becomes particularly interesting 
since the predictions it provide can be totally inverted, if a second variable is assumed to 
be measured with error. In the present case, the estimated correlation coefficient of the 
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price index pi with measurements of military expenditure Gi is negative, with a 
statistically significant sign (see sub-section 4.4.3). Thus, if Gi (and always -W, ) are 
correctly measured ýP is expected to be upwards biased because of the errors in pi. In 
the analysis that follows we also relax the assumption that Gi is correctly measured. The 
outcome outlines the risk from a simplistic statistical approach since the relaxation of an 
additional assumption inverts the direction (sign) of the estimated bias of 6G. 
4.4.3 Two variables measured with error 
Mov, J6 on. A tj fu, Lhe-i from the assumption 
4 
1. f, LIL ill Lil LLi IC 16 lat onally one explanatoi-y -var: ab'- is 
measured with error we now assume two such variables. A good candidate is SIPRI 
measurement of military expenditure, first because of the high significance of the 
estimated coefficient and secondly the expectation that measurement errors can be 
correlated with this ofpi. Using the usual assumptions this can be written as 
(37) In Gi = InGi + eGi, eGi - 11N(O, qG 
Any possible errors in PWT data on per-capita income are ignored. 
For the case of two explanatory variable regression Theil has calculated approximate 
expressions for the biases when both of them are measured with errors. A possible way 
to overcome this difficulty could be to examine the case of removing one of the 
explanatory variables in (23) and obtain estimates of the bias for the remaining variables, 
hoping that the removal of this variable will not affect largely the results of Theil's 
analysis. An estimate of the bias from the omission of a regressor in the estimation of the 
restricted form can be observed and the variance-covariance matrix of the regression is 
not affected [Stuart p. 64]. Then, we may apply results of Theil's analysis to the original 
estimates. Indeed, with the use of the statistics of the estimation of (23) one could drop 
the per capita income from the regression, even using a 10% level of significance. 
The restricted version of (23) then is 
(38) InSi =a+ cG'InGi + Ep'lnpi + u, * 
and OLS yields 
InQ = 2.93 + 0.34 InGi - 0.47 Inpi 
(0.094) 
[0.001] 
(0.17) 
[0.010] 
=0.30 F=7.6 FF=0.8 N=0.228 H=0.947 
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The change of the statistics is minor and the bias from the omission of the variable is 
small and towards zero for both the estimates of the elasticities. Taking this as an 
encouraging indication one can proceed to Theil's analysis assuming that the bias from 
under- sp eci ficatio n does not affect significantly the calculation of bias from 
measurement errors for the remaining regressors. A closer examination of this 
methodology has not been detected in the literature, and might be worthy of a closer 
examination. If this assumption holds the two results can be combined. 
Theil's asymptotic approximation for a correction of bias from measurement errors 
are 
ý2)4(0 
ý00 (39) 5c EG - CC' c6 ,p 
(40) 9- p "cp = -(1 - p) p -cp -P 
OG 9G) 
where p= cov(InGi, Inpj)[var(InG, )var(Inpj)]-1/2 is the correlation coefficient between the 
true values of the two variables and Ob, Op are the ratios of the error variances to the 
variances of the respective true values. Since the estimated signs of the two elasticities, 
i. e. cG> 0 and, 6 
ý, 
< 0, are strongly supported both by the obtained empirical evidence and 
the underlying theory the direction of bias solely depends on o. Whatever the value of 
the unobserved but always positive ratios OGand Op and given the necessary for OLS 
assumption that IpI = 1, the only condition that the bias is downwards in absolute value 
for both estimates is 
p> max 
OG6G 0 
p6p 
0p Ep OG-CC, 
In this case (39) is negatively and (40) positively valued. Since both quantities in the 
RHS of (41) are non-positive one can notice that if p is positive the direction of bias is 
always towards zero for both variables. The power of this desirable for the support of 
the explanatory power of the estimated equation result, has a feed-back effect, since the 
indications about the bias adds to the statistic significance of the elasticities from zero 
and so on. 
The step that naturally follows is to obtain information about the value, or at least the 
sign of p. From the data, the estimated value is p^ = 0.398 and, if possible errors are 
ignored, a hypothesis thato:! ý 0 can safely be rejected at 1% level of significance using a 
t-test (one tail p-value is 0.7%). Furthermore, if measurement errors are taken in 
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account, p is most likely underestimated, along with the significance of the test. This 
becomes apparent if we expand the numerator and denominator of the calculation of p, 
using covariance and variance rules. In terms of sample measurements (denoted with an 
S) it is 
(42) p^ = 
sco4lnG,, Inpi) + sco4lnGi, ep, 
)+s 
C04eGi. Inpi)+ SC04eGi, ep, 
) 
svaýln Gi) +svaýepj+ 2sco4lnGi, eGi)VSvaýlnpj) +s vaýej+ 2sco4ln p, epi 
Looking into the large sample properties of p they depend on the assumptions about 
the errors. If the two errors distribute independently from each other and from the true 
magnitudes Gi and pi, it is plim scov(eGi, epi) = cov(eGi, epi) = 0, plim scov(InGi, epi) =0 
and plim scov(eGi, P) = 0. Then we can write 
co4inGi, inpi) (43) plim )0-- 
072 +2072 Aývaýln6j+-2uG vaýlnpj , Gp 
If the two error terms are not independent this result does not necessarily hold. In this 
case a non-zero term cov(ecj, epi) appears in the numerator of (43) reducing the 
underestimation of p. From an algebraic observation of (42) we may notice that only 
with very weakly correlated true magnitudes (small p near zero) and strongly correlated 
errors the increase in the numerator could possibly offset the increase of the 
denominator. A similar result holds if the error terms are also correlated with the true 
magnitudes where all the terms in (42) remain, after taking probability limits. In general, 
over-estimation of p is quite unlikely and might only take place under very strong state 
of correlation between the variables. Putting this result together with the relatively high 
value of the estimate p and its high statistical significance from zero we may conclude 
that a negative value of p and, therefore, overestimation of the two elasticities (in 
absolute value) is most unlikely. 
For a calculation of the bias of the two estimates, except a value for p, we need 
estimates for coefficients Ob and Op. This information is not directly obtainable, since 
neither the sources provide it nor a method of calculation is directly apparent. Having 
examined the direction of the bias and calculated a bound for it we could examine the 
sensitivity of bias dependent on various values of the parameters. The diagrams in 
Figure 4.5 present corrected estimates of price elasticity, noted WP, for different values 
of p, OG and Op. Similar corrections in absolute value apply to the estimate of eG. 
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Figure 4.4 Price elasticity of arms corrected for bias 
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The calculation of corrected-for-bias point estimates of the two elasticities requires 
specific values for all the parameters involved (p, OG and 0. ). The available data are not 
adequate for an estimation of these parameters. In other words we have clear indications 
for the direction of bias but not for its absolute value for both parameters. In the general 
case that the three coefficients take intermediate values the corrected estimates for both 
elasticities are close to unity. This result is consistent with the calculations of the inverse 
equation approach, which bounded ep between -0.51 and -2.24. Thus, assuming 
moderate values p=0.5 and OG = Op = 0.35 and the initial estimates of the two 
elasticities from (25) the two corrected estimates take values near unity, i. e. 
W= -0.95 and 
WG 
--0.97 
4.5 Conclusions 
The econometric results of this chapter appear to provide some considerable evidence 
that the demand of countries for internationally traded arms generally follows patterns 
predicted by the theory. It is interesting that the analysis of measurement errors enforces 
the argument of a responsive relationship of the demand to the price and the military 
budget, instead of blurring the clarity of the results. This responsiveness on its own turn 
provides support to - the underling theoretical assumptions about the production 
technology of military capability, with substitution between imported, domestic arms 
and armed forces and the near-to-rational behaviour of the governments. 
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-------------- 
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The good overall appearance of the estimated demand functions and in particular the 
strong statistical support for the inclusion of the calculated price index, in all estimated 
forms, indicates for the usefulness of the index per se. In other words, the assumption 
about the two pricing methods SIPRI and ACDA used to produce aggregate figures of 
arms imports, seems to be confirmed since the implied price index has been well 
accepted by the data. This information can be utilised in other quantitative studies on 
arms trade, possibly more sophisticated than this one, which has been designed as a 
general first approach. In this study, the selection of data is carefully based on the 
quality and the exact identity of the included information and contributed to the quality 
of the estimates. Thus, an interesting qualitative conclusion regarding the data can be 
drawn ex-post from the performance or the combined econometric and modelling work 
that was based on them. In other words, the rather encouraging econometric results also 
signals information about the quality of data. 
There are several ways that this study can continue. One is to estimate a demand 
system of equations for the three inputs to defence based on the presented model and 
providing that information on domestic production becomes available. Another is to 
introduce time, if adequate observations are available and proceed with panel data 
estimations on a static framework or an investigation the dynamic properties of the arms 
trade, and a possible combination of the two concepts. The examination of the impact of 
measurement errors can be developed further; first by examining the implications of 
under- sp ecifi cation to the calculation of bias and second by developing bootstrap 
analysis. From a modelling point of view, the issue of the entry of domestic producers 
needs more attention. This issue is further discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
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5. Regional variations of the demand for arms: a 
study of panel data' 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4 we examine the demand for imported arms using a cross-sectional data set 
of a relatively wide sample of 3 8. tountries. This cross-sectional study, however, ignores 
possible evolution of the demand patterns over time and limits the structure of the 
demand to be the same for all countnes. These restrictions open the way for 
heterogeneity bias in the results. Furthermore, the sample of countries in the cross-section 
data set does not represent countries from different areas of the world evenly, but 
includes relatively more developed than developing countries. This uneven representation 
of countries makes possible the existence of sampling bias in the results. This chapter 
attempts to overcome these limitations by time and longitudinal dimensions in the 
examination. In terrns of theoretical background, this study follows closely the theoretical 
implementation of the previous chapter. 
Since the necessary data for a world-wide examination at country level are not 
available, this study is based on data aggregated into large geographic regions, at 
continental or sub-continental level. A practical advantage of this aggregation is that the 
groups generally include countries with several similarities regarding the important 
characteristics of national defence, such as regional threat levels, economic development 
political status etc. Thus, the outcome of this study refers to the representative or average 
country of each group, ignoring any differences of the countries within the groups. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 looks at the specifications 
and the nature of the data set, in addition to the general examination of chapter 3. Section 
5.3 examines for heterogeneity of the demand structure across the two dimensions of the 
panel and reports selected results from statistical tests. Section 5.4 raises issues about 
model selection and the method of estimation. Section 5.5 presents estimates of the 
' Early results of this work have been presented in the conference 'Globalisation of European Military 
industry and the Arms Trade' at Nfiddlesex University in September 1997 bu the author and in ASSA 
meetings, Chicago, January 1998 by Professor Ron Smith in a review. Later these results were released in 
more detail in Mouzakis [19991. 
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demand and its regional variation. Finally, section 5.6 focuses on the characteristics of the 
evolution of the arms trade over time and presents the estimated time trends. The 
appendix of this chapter A. 5 provides statistical results, tables with the data and other 
related technical information, 
5.2 The data 
The data set we use in this study consists of aggregate measurements of arms imports 
from both SIPRI and ACDA and measurements of total and per capita GNP and NElitary 
Expenditure by ACDA. The panel-covers II annual observations, from 1983 to 1993 and 
8 regions. For purposes of comparison we also collected data for 3 international 
organisations as well as the world aggregate. The 8 regions are Africa, North America, 
South America, Central America, Asia (aggregate of Southern and Eastern), M. East, 
Europe and Oceania. The three organisations are NATO, OECD and OPEC. Series from 
ACDA originate from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (VýMFAT) 
(ACDA [1995]). Series from SIPRI on arms imports originate from SIPRI Yearbooks- 
years 1981-1984 from Yearbook 1992 (SIPRI [1992]) and years 1985-1993 from 
Yearbook 1995 (SIPRI [1995]). Per capita GNP is measured in constant 1990 thousands 
US dollars, where all other values are expressed in million US dollars. 
From a careful examination of the origin of the data it comes up that the measurements 
of per-capita GNP and population series provided by ACDA originate from the World 
Bank tables. Measurements of arms imports by ACDA and SIPRI are calculated by the 
two organisations using various sources of information, in an attempt to provide the best 
possible qualitative improvements. The two organisations, moreover, use different 
methods to calculate the aggregate figure of imported arms they report. It is this 
divergence of contents that allowed the calculation of a price index for imported arms, 
discussed in chapter 3, which provides a more detailed discussion of the definition of the 
variables. Further discussion of this issue can be found in Levine, Mouzakis & Smith 
[1996] , in 
Levine, Mouzakis & Smith [1998] and, of course, in the technical appendices 
of ACDA and S11PPJ publications (especially in SIPRI [1995b]). 
The grouping of counties in regions and organisations we use is this of ACDA. With 
the two orgamsations using similar methods to measure military expenditure, it is more 
convenient to use ACDA measurement since the coverage corresponds with the 
observations on arms imports. For similar reasons we used GNP transformed to US 
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dollars with RVEF exchange rates instead of Purchasing Power Panties measurements used 
in chapter 4. This series is provided by ACDA, in the same tables. According to chapter 4 
the alternative use of the two variables made little difference in the estimations. Since the 
use of SI[PBJ measurements of the arms trade is unavoidable, however, it is fortunate that 
both organisations use similar country groups. The only exception that the contents of a 
group slightly differ is the case of 'Asia' that ACDA provides the sub-aggregates 'East 
Asia' and 'South Asia, ' which we added up to match the aggregate by SIPRI in the best 
possible way. The unavailable observation by SIPRI for Central America for 1992 has 
been replaced by linear interpolation of years 1991 and 1993. Last, constant values of 
ACDA of 1993 were transformed to base year1990 using the RVIF deflator of US dollar 
The diagrams in figure 3.2 in chapter 3 present the evolution of the value of imported 
arms for a number of aggregates, using data from the panel we examine in this chapter. 
From a simple observation of the data series the volume of the arms trade and military 
expenditure generally follow a double trended pattern, with an evident declining tendency 
after the end of the Cold War. Figure 3.3 presents the evolution of the estimated prices. A 
general pattern of increases before the end of Cold War, and decreases after, appears to 
dominate the evolutions of all three magnitudes. 
5.3 Examination for structural heterogeneity 
A standard way to begin a study of panel data is to examine for structural homogeneity 
of a theoretically suggested model across the two dimensions of the panel, i. e. across time 
and longitudinal dimensions. In the case that the tests indicate against structural 
homogeneity the model is finally estimated on pooled data, otherwise the estimation must 
take account of the type of variation suggested by the data. Structural variation can either 
be captured by a variable intercept or by a more general variable coefficient model. 
Heterogeneity of any of these two types may occur across time or longitudinal 
dimensions or both. About the kind of structural variation we need to choose between 
fixed and random kinds of variation. All these combinations of different types of 
heterogeneity add up to several different cases and require a careful selection of the 
method of estimation, based on the results of appropriate statistical tests. 
In the case of total homogeneity over both time and regions the standard log-linear 
demand function for imported arms has the form 
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(1) qj, =a+ bimi, + b2g, + b3Ptt + eit 
where qj, is the logarithm of SIPRI volume of imported arms of region i for year t, mit is 
the logarithm of ACDA military expenditure, pit is the logarithm of the implicit price 
index for imported arms and gi, is the logarithm of per-capita GNP by ACDA. Coefficient 
a is an intercept term, b's are slope coefficients and e is an error component. The implicit 
price index is the ratio of SIPRI to ACDA measurement of arms imports for every 
observation. The preliminary examination for variation of the model structure over 
regions and time includes examination for variability of either intercept term, or all 
coefficients (variability of slopes with invariable intercept is rarely a meaningful 
assumption). If there is evidence, for variability, the question that naturally follows is 
about the kind ofvanability, i. e. ifthe nature ofthe variation is fixed or random. 
We may begin testing for variability of the intercept term. First, we assume 
homogeneity over time and test the hypothesis of variable intercepts over regions H2 
(2) qj, =a+ ai + bimi, + b2g, + b3Pit + eit where 1i ai =0 
against the hypothesis of overall homogeneity H1, using a fixed effects model estimated 
by OLS. Continuing, we can examine for variability of the intercept over time H3 
(3) qj, =a+ yt + bim, + b2g, + b3Pit + eit where 1'i 'Vt =0 
Finally, we may test for the hypothesis of both variations in a two-factor fixed effects 
model 1-14 
" 7t =0 (4) qjt =a+ aj + rt + bimi, + b2g, + b3Pit + eit where Ji ai =I 
If the statistical tests indicate for variation we may then investigate the kind of variation 
by testing for fixed against random effects models. Notice that the previous models are 
nested into each other in succession, i. e. H, is nested into both H2 and H3, all these are 
nested into I-L whereas H2and H3 are not nested into each other. 
Similarly, we may test for variability of all coefficients, either over regions as in H5 
(5) qi, = ai + blimi, t b2igit+ b3i Pit+ eit 
or over time as in 
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(6) qi, = at + bitmit + b2tgit+ b3t Pit + eit 
Next, we may consider a model that allows for variation of all coefficients over region 
and, also, of intercept only over time H7 
(7) qj, = ai + y, + blimi, + b2i git+ b31Pit + eit where It yt =0 
Last in the queue is an unrestricted model that allows for variations of all coefficients 
over both time and region 
H8 
(8) qi, = ai, + blit mit + b2itgit + b3it Pit + eit 
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H8 is the most general (unrestricted) model in the rank, with all other models nested in it. 
Apart from H8, model H2 is nested into H5 and H7 but not into H. 6 and model H5 is nested 
into H7. Model H3 is nested into 
H6 and H7 but not into H5. Models H5 and 11ý are not 
nested. Since the results from standard (nested) F-tests between nested models provide 
adequate evidence for model selection, there is no further need for non-nested tests. 
Table 5.1 Results from estimated Fixed Effects models 
Model Type of coefficient variation RSS DoF 
H, Overall homogeneity (pooled estimation) 62.36 84 0.68 
H2 Intercept over regions (one factor) 20.44 77 0.88 
intercept over time (one factor) 41.71 74 0.75 
Intercept over both regions and time (two factors) 10.12 67 0.93 
H5 All coefficients over regions (variable coefficients) 4.18 56 0.97 
11ý All coefficients over time (variable coefficients) 31.96 44 0.68 
H7 All coefficients over regions & intercept only over time 1.66 46 0.98 
H8 All coefficients over both regions and time 0.40 16 0.99 
Table 5.2 Nested tests between alternative Fixed Effects models 
Test F-value D. o. F. 
Numerator 
D. o. F 
Denomin. 
p- value Conclusion 
H2against H, 22.56 7 77 0.00% Reject H, 
H3 against H, 3.66 10 74 0.05% Reject H, 
H4against H2 6.83 10 67 0.00% Reject H2 
H5 against H2 10.37 21 56 0.00% Reject 
H2 
H6against H3 0.45 30 44 98.82% Fail to reject H3 
H, 7 against 
H5 6.98 10 46 0.00% Reject H5 
H8 against 
H7 1.68 30 16 13.75% Fail to reject H7 
Table 1 presents the results from the estimation of the models by OLS and table 2 
presents the statistical tests between combinations of these models. The results of the F- 
tests from the attempted OLS regressions indicate clearly in favour of variable 
coefficients over regions and of variable intercepts (only) over time, with considerable 
statistical confidence. Variation of coefficients over region gets strongly supported by the 
tests of H5 against H2and the variation of intercepts over time gets supported by the tests 
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of H3 against H, and of H7agalnst H5. The tests of H6versus H3 and of H8versus H6 lead 
conveniently to the conclusion that there are not significant variations of the slope 
coefficients over time. In other words, the tests unanimously promote model H7 as the 
one that captures more successfully the variations across the two dimensions of the panel. 
As an alternative to fixed effects we may consider random effects models. The time 
invariant random effects model H9 can be written as 
(9) qj, =a+ bimi, + b2g, + b3Pit + ui + eit 
and the respective region invariant model Hio as 
(10) qj, =a+ bimit + b2git + b3Pit + wt + eit 
where ui and w, are the random effects of the two cases, also assumed to follow the 
standard assumptions. Comlbining the two effects, we have the Two Factor Random 
Effects model HI, 
(11) qj, =a+ bimi, + b2gi, + b3Pit + Ui + w, + ej, 
Estimating random effects models H9, Hio and Hil by Feasible Generalised Least Squares 
we may test against fixed effects models H2, H3 and H4respectively using Hausman tests. 
Table 5.3 Hausman tests between Fixed and Random Effects models 
Test J value DoF p- value Conclusion 
H9 against H2 36.92 3 0.0000% Re . ect H9 IJ 
Hlo against H3 7.84 3 4.9329% Reject Hio at 5% 
H1, against H4 15.49 3 0.1441% Reject Hi I 
Table 5.3 presents the results of Hausman tests. Both hypotheses of random effects 
over regions and time get clearly rejected: individually from the tests of H9 versus H2and 
of H10 versus H3 respectively and jointly from the more general test of Hil against I-L. 
Note that Hausman test tests a null hypothesis of identity of OLS and Generalised Least 
Squares (GLS) against the alternative of biased GLS estimation. Since both estimations 
are used in the calculation of the test statistic this test has undesirable large sample 
properties under the alternative hypothesis (GLS is inconsistent, see e. g. Greene [1993 
p. 479]). The strong statistical confidence of the tests of table 5.3, which apparently fall 
into this case, can be used to compensate any doubts about their validity adding 
confidence to the result of fixed effects variations. 
Along with the statistical evidence, the fixed type of variations appears more suitable 
to the theoretical expectations. Our examination of large regional aggregates implies the 
assumption that regional groups consist of countries with relatively homogeneous 
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characteristics. Indeed, the large majority of countries in most of the regional groups 
appear to have similar levels of development, security problems, political regime profiles 
etc. On the other hand, these parameters generally differ from one region to another, 
which implies deviations for defence policies of countries that belong to different regions. 
Therefore, any divergence in the behaviour of each group from the others is not a result 
of a random sampling process but an expected event. 
Choosing between fixed and random effects,, Hslao [1986 p. 43] concludes the 
following: 'When inferences are going to be confined to the effects in the model, the 
effects are more appropriately consideredfixed When inferences will be made about a 
population of effects ftom whicý those in the data are considered to be a random 
sample, then ine ejjects shouta be considered random. ' in our case the regions in the 
data cover almost the entire population, which is the whole world. In that sense, the case 
of random sampling is unsuitable, since we do expect significant divergences in the 
pattern of demand across regions. Thus, both theoretical and empirical evidence 
apparently point in the direction of fixed rather than random effects. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the process of grouping countries into regional aggregates may possibly 
create some randomness in the structural variation across the regions. 
In the previous paragraphs we based the selection between fixed and random effects 
models on tests from a variable intercept model. If we consider the more general case of 
variable coefficient model statistical testing for the kind of variations becomes even more 
complicated and statistical inferences more unclear. Hsiao [ 1996, p. 13 6] repeats for this 
case that the choice between fixed and random coefficients depends on whether we are 
making inferences conditional on the individual sample or unconditional on the population 
characteristics. Here, we make conditional inferences from regions, which (nearly) cover 
the entire population rather than a sample and are a-priori expected by the theory to 
differ. Providing that the data clearly indicate for the variation of coefficients the question 
is whether we use a fixed coefficients model or a Swamy type Random Coefficients 
Model. According to Judge et al [1985] '... the important consideration is likely to be 
whether the variable coefficients are correlated with the explanatory variables. If they 
are... the fixed coefficients model can he used [p. 544]. ' If coefficients are known to be 
correlated with the regressors fixed variations are more appropriate, other-wise we can 
gain in efficiency using the Random Coefficients Model. 
In our case, any regional effects of the coefficients are indeed expected to correlate 
with the regressors, a fact that gets eventually supported by the results. For instance, 
more industrialised countries (high per capita income) enjoy advantages in the 
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establishment of a domestic industries of arms. This alternative to the complete reliance 
on imports enhances substitution between inputs in the production of defence and, finally, 
is likely to affect the estimated elasticities. Also, poorer countries happen to be more 
often involved in internal or external conflicts, possibly making their responses to income 
and prices more inelastic. Once again, the choice of fixed type of variations appears as 
more suitable, but we return to this issue in the following section. 
5.4 Selection of model and estimation method 
One of the results of the cross-sectional study of chapter 4 is that the aggregate 
measurement of GDP has a better fit to the data than the per-capita measurement. 
According to the proposed explanation an aggregate measurement of the economic size 
of countries indicates their ability to establish a domestic arms industry. The per-capita 
measurement measures the level of development of the country, factor that possibly 
affects the establishment of a domestic industry of arms. The difference between the two 
measurements is population, a basic indicator of countries' size. Thus, per-capita 
measurement purely measures development but ignores size whereas the aggregate 
measurement contains a mix both effects. 
There are three mainly reasons for choosing to use per-capita , instead of total 
GNP in 
this study. First, the differences between the estimations with the two variables are rather 
small, both in terms of estimates and statistical tests. Second, per-head income provides 
an approximation of the average labour cost of the country and the estimated coefficient 
reflects the impact of development on the demand for arms. Since armed forces and 
imported arms are the two main inputs in the production of mi'litary capability this 
coefficient partly measures the cross-price elasticity of the demand for arms to the price 
of labour. Furthermore, this coefficient may include other effects of development on the 
demand for the arms trade, such as development related changes of public preferences for 
security, technological or human capital factors, the ability to produce domestic arms etc. 
Third and most important, estimating over aggregated groups of countries the total GNP 
does not provide the required information about the economic size of countries but only 
about the size of the regional group. In other words, it is not possible to distinguish if a 
large figure shows many small countries or few large. For these reasons the use of per- 
capita GNP appears more appropriate for this study. 
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About the estimation method of a fixed effects variable coefficients model Judge et al 
[1985 p. 539] clearly suggest that 'when the response coefficients... are fixed 
parameters... (the system) can be viewed as the Seemingly Unrelated Regressi . on (SUR) 
model. ' A similar suggestion is made by Hsiao [ 1996 p. 13 41. The appropriate method to 
estimate SUR model depends on the state of correlation between the error terms of 
different regions. If the disturbances of the equations of different regions are correlated, a 
GLS estimation of SUR gives more efficient estimates from the separate OLS estimates 
of each region (Greene [1993 p. 489]). If the errors between different regions are 
uncorrelated, i. e. the variance- covariance (V-C) matrix is diagonal, SUR reduces to the 
case of 'Group Heteroskedastic Model' and GLS estimation has no efficiency gains over 
separate OLS regressions (Greene [1993 p. 488D. 
Separate OLS estimates for each region have good large sample properties and 
provide consistent estimates of the V-C matrix (Greene [1993 p. 453]), independent of the 
state of correlation between the errors of different regions. A SUR model can either be 
estimated by a two step Feasible Generalised Least Squares estimator (FGLS) or by a 
Maximum Likelihood estimator (NIL). Using these estimates we can then test for the 
significance of the covariances, in order to evaluate the benefits from estimating as a 
system, rather than as independent equations. In our case, the number of available 
observations is small and favours an estimation method with good small sample 
properties. 
Prior to the selection of an appropriate estimation method the it is important to chose 
the final functional form of the estimated model. The tests of the previous section make 
clear the need to allow for variation of all coefficients across regions and, also, for 
variation of intercept term (only) over time. The selected model 1-16, however, allows for 
fixed effects over time but restricts them to be equalfor all regions, since the number of 
observations is not adequate for the estimation of separate fixed effects for each region. 
Looking closer at the estimated fixed effects, which are presented later in Section 5.5, we 
can easily distinguish the familiar double trended pattern: first increasing and then 
decreasing, approximately following the developments of the Cold War. 
The estimation of a SUR model by FGLS requires the inclusion of global dummy 
variables for the time effects, as in model H-7, is practically difficult and not directly 
available in standard econometric packages. An alternative method to account for time 
effects, within the limits posed by the sample size, is to include independent quadratic 
trend for each region, as an approximation of the estimated double trended pattern. This 
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solution restricts the form of the estimated trend to a parabola but relaxes the restriction 
of equal effects between regions. Using a quadratic time trend, the equation to estimate is 
(12) qj, = ai + blimit + 
b2i git+ b3iPit + b4i t+ b5i ?+ uit 
A standard test for the correlation between error terms of different regions is the 
likelihood ratio Statistic ILR T(Ii InSi 2- InISI), i=I, - n, where n=8 is the number of 
regions, si is the ML estimator (=RSS/n) of the OLS standard error of the regression of 
region i and 1. ýJ is the determinant of the estimated V-C matrix from the iterative ML 
estimation (Greene [1993 p. 492]). Under the null hypothesis of a diagonal V-C matrix ILR 
distributes J with n(n - 1)/2 = 28 degrees of freedom (i. e. the number of covariances 
restricted to be zero). From our e5timations we calculate Ii Insi 2= -36.90, InISI = -64.85, 
SO ! LR= 307.4-5, with a p-value less than 10-". The significance of this test suggests that 
the covariances jointly are different from zero and, therefore, SUR is the appropriate 
model to estimate. 
From the literature, neither FGLS nor ML methods are known to have a general 
advantage in the estimation of SUR, and the answer seems to depend on the specific 
nature of the data set (Greene [1993 p. 493]). A more detailed implementation of this 
issue requires Monte Carlo experiments, raising statistical issues beyond the scope of this 
study. According to Judge et al [1985 p. 493], however, in the case of small sample size 
with a large number of equations simulation results have indicated that FGLS model 
could provide better finite sample properties. To allow for actual comparison of the 
results, in this study we estimated (11) with all three methods. 
In practice, the iterative ML estimation converged after a single iteration and the 
differences between FGLS and ML estimates appeared rather unimportant. The ML 
estimates, however, had considerably smaller standard errors and stronger tests, result not 
unexpected since the former method uses maximum likelihood whereas the latter uses 
unbiased estimators of V-C matrix. With 11 annual observations and estimating 6 
coefficients (including intercept and trends) the estimation has 5 degrees of freedom, so 
the two estimates of V-C differ by a factor of 2.2 (= 11/5). FGLS is expected to provide 
better asymptotic properties than ML method, especially in our case of a small sample. 
Note that the latter method gave stronger statistical results with smaller estimated errors, 
apparently as a result of small sample bias in the estimation of V-C. 
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5.5 Regional estimates of the demand for imported arms 
Table 5.4 presents the estimated elasticities and statistics from the SUR estimation of 
(12) by a two-step FGLS method, using with an unbiased estimator of variance- 
covariance matrix for the first step. The estimates of the effects of the time trends are not 
reported in this section but in Table 6 of Section 5 that follows. The general look of these 
results appears encouraging and on line with those from the cross-sectional estimations of 
LMS. Most of the regions have positive budget (military expenditure) and negative price 
elasticities, with strong statistical support. All five statistically significant price elasticities 
are negative. The only significant negative budget elasticity is this of Middle East. Except 
this coefficient, the two remaining income and two price elasticities with incorrect sig. ns, 
are insignificant. All remaining regressions have at least one significant slope coefficient 
and the first 6 regressions have significant F-tests. 
Table 5.4 FGLS estimates of a model with a quadratic trend 
Region Intercept Mil. Exp. P-C GNP Price F? 2 DW 
1. Africa . 7-79 (2.46) 2.12(l. 24) -0.66 (0.17) -0.19 (0.03) 0.997 3.32 
2. N. America 27.8(23.3) 0.30(0.92) -2.49 (2.58) -1.01 (0.13) 0.873 2.26 
3. C. America 31.6(15.4) 2.30(l. 12) -5.74 (2.01) -0.68 (0.31) 0.893 2.45 
4. S. America -23.1 (5.78) 2.22(0.20) 1.73(0.78) -0.88 (0.03) 0.99 3.04 
5. Asia 35.4(21.6) 1.28(0.57) -5.63 (3.60) 0.15(0.28) 0.876 2.39 
6. Europe 12.8(14.4) -0.03 (0.21) -0.26 (1.79) -0.96 (0.28) 0.94 2.95 
7. Mid. East -11.1 (8.08) -2.85 (1.27) 6.20(2.40) 0.14(0.18) 0.695 1.20 
8. Oceania -180(27.2) -0.039 (0.34) -20.4 (3.05) -0.65 (0.11) 0.811 3.17 
Note- Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates significant at 5% are in bold-italics-, 
significant at 1% are also underlined. The significance of Rý is tested from the F-test of 
the regression. DW stands for Durbin-Watson statistic. 
According to the statistical tests, Africa has the strongest estimates, with all 
coefficients significant at 1%. Next follow South and Central Americas with all their 
coefficients significant at either 5% or 1%. Europe and North America also have strong 
equations, both showing elastic responses to military expenditure and inelastic to price. 
Furthermore, most regions show either elastic responses to military expenditure and 
inelastic to price or vice versa. Exceptions are South and Central Americas, which appear 
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relatively elastic to both of these effects. Mddle East diverts ftom the rule, showing the 
lowest fit and inverted signs of income and price elasticities and is the only region that 
Durbin-Watson statistic indicates for positive serial correlation of the error term. Reasons 
behind this divergence could be the special nature of security in this region, the 
occurrence of Golf War during the examined historical period and possibly omitted 
dynamics. 
More developed areas as N. America, Europe and Oceania tend to appear less elastic 
to military expenditure and more elastic to price than other regions. Less developed areas 
as Africa and Asia have these effects inverted, whereas areas of intermediate level of 
development, as Central and Sopth Americas, appear relatively more elastic in both 
eftects. NEddle East shows a clearly negative response to military expenditure. If this 
effect is interpreted as an income elasticity the negative sign implies that in this case 
imported arms are an inferior input. Taking in account the indication for positive auto- 
correlation, the low level of this elasticity could be an indication for downsizing of stocks, 
apparently an adjustment of their arsenals to the new desirable levels. Indeed, this region 
presents far the highest positive response to per-capita GNP. If this coefficient is 
interpreted as a cross-price elasticity between arms imports and armed forces the estimate 
indicates for high substitution between these two inputs. Except NEddle East, South 
America is the only other region with a positive elasticity to per-capita GNP. All other 
regions have this elasticity negative, with sizes that vary from close to zero in the case of 
Europe up to -20 in the case of Oceania. 
5.6 Time effects 
Although the tests for variation in section 5.3 clearly indicate in favour of variable 
intercept fixed effects over time the available degrees of freedom do not allow the 
estimation of independent time effects for each region. As a second best alternative we 
may estimate fixed effects over time in the context of a variable coefficient model by 
restricting them to be equal across all regions. Figure 5.1 presents the estimated by OLS 
fixed effects over time from H7, relative to year 1983, and their standard errors as the 
radius of the bubbles. The diameter of the bubbles defines an about 68% confidence 
interval on the vertical axis. 
The sequence of the estimated time effects appears to form a relatively smooth and 
well-shaped double-trended pattern. It is an average trend for the whole world, increasing 
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until 1987 and decreasing from 1988 onwards. A comparison of this plot with the similar 
but raw appearance of the arms trade In the figures of chapter 3 reveals that the 
undertaken parametric examination of the data allowed the isolation of a smooth time 
trend, which consistently follows the changes in intensity of the Cold War. From a careful 
observation of the declining part of the estimated trend appears slightly convex, 
corresponding to the logical expectation that this drastic decline cannot be permanent. 
Figure 5.1 Estimated fixed effects over t1me from the two-way model 
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Note- Fixed effects relative to 1993. Width of bubbles give estimated standard errors 
The alternative estimation of the underlined time effects of section 5.4 relaxes the 
restriction of imposing the same fixed effects to all regions by allowing for a different 
time trend for each region in exchange for being restricted to a parabolic shape. This 
alternation of restrictions is dictated by the limited degrees of freedom. Table 5.5 reports 
the remaining results from the FGLS estimation of the previous section. It presents the 
estimates of the parabolic time trend for the eight regions, including the estimated 
coefficients of t and ý, their standard errors and the year of the predicted turning point. 
The turning point of the inverted U shaped double trended patterns can be calculated by 
a the first order condition for maximum from (12) setting c9QI& =0 which gives ti' x 
b4il2b5i. The value of t increases from unit in 1983 to II in 1993. 
All regions have negative quadratic coefficient, which corresponds to a time trend of a 
concave shape. Not surprisingly, the estimated peak appears at about the time that Cold 
War ended for most of the regions. From the 7 regions Africa, North America, South 
America, Asia and Nfiddle East show estimated trends with high statistical sign1ficance. 
These regions have their turning points estimated between 1986 and 1989 except Asia 
that has a delayed turning point in 1992. Central America and Europe have their estimates 
insignificant, both having relatively early turning points and a purely declining time trend 
for the estimated time period. Oceania has a significant, declining and almost linear trend. 
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The OLS estimate of the whole world gave coefficients 0.0573 and -0.113 for the linear 
and quadratic terms respectively, with a turning point predicted in 1986, both with low 
significance from zero. 
Table 5.5 Estimated quadrat1c time trend for the eight regions 
Region: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Coeff. of t . 158 . 253 -. 064 . 217 . 511 -. 045 . 136 -. 222 
Standard Error 
. 
029 
. 
110 
. 
148 
. 
073 . 
160 
. 
253 
. 
072 
. 112 
Coeff. of -. 030 -. 021 -. 0046 -. 019 -. 027 -. 0067 -. 027 -. 0049 
Staa. r, d -, ',: -Enn -or . 
0025 
. 
0076 
. 
0123 0073 00 65 0 . 
0173 
. 
0092 
. 
0086 
Maximad 1986 1989 1976 1989 1992 1982 1986 1961 
Notes: Code numbers of regions are available in Table 5. Estimates significant at 5% are 
in bold-italics; significant at 1% are also underlined. Coefficient of t for region 7 has a p- 
value 0.057. Maximads are rounded to the nearest year. 
5.7 Conclusions 
It is an encouraging indication when the result of technically complicated work comes 
out clearly and free of internal contradictions. Panel data techniques are technically 
demanding, produce large volume of statistical output and it is often difficult to 
distinguish the underling message and support it with clarity. In this study, the results 
came up in a relatively clear way, without confusing contradictions. In line with the 
results of chapter 4, this examination showed that the demand for arms imports generally 
follows standard patterns with positive responses to the budget and negative responses to 
the price, both of reasonable strength. The demand for imported arms was found to vary 
across different regions of the world. Over time, the demand appears to follow a double 
trended pattern, first increasing and then decreasing. The responses to the explanatory 
variables (slope coefficients), and therefore the structure of the model, were found to be 
constant over time. The variations of the structure over regions appear to be of the fixed 
rather than the random, possibly indicating that the variations are endogenous in the 
process. 
Despite the limited sample size, the estimated regional demand functions enjoy 
considerable statistical support, quite strong in some of the cases. Most regions have 
elastic response to military expenditure and negative price elasticities with estimated 
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values near unity. Since this result is in line with those of chapter 4, the results of the two 
studies contribute in support of each other. Middle East appears to diverge from this rule, 
having the signs of the two elasticities inverted and indications of possible underlying 
dynamics. Relatively less developed areas like Africa, Asia and the Middle East showed 
more elastic responses to military expenditure and more inelastic responses to price. 
More developed areas, as North America, Europe and Oceania have elastic responses to 
prices and inelastic to military expenditure. Central and South Americas had both of these 
effects relatively more elastic. The estimated effect of per-capita GNP on the demand for 
arms imports varied, taking a positive value in the case of Middle East and South 
America and negative in all other qases. 
Over time, the demand for imported arms seems to have increased until 1987, 
succeeded by a relatively steep and steady decline until the end of the examined time 
period. The two underlining trends have smooth and approximately linear shape. The 
declining part shows a week tendency for stabilisation (convexity) in the most recent 
years. When the time effect is estimated independently for each region, with the use of a 
quadratic trend, all regions turn out to follow the twin pattern of increases followed by 
decreases. Most regions had a turning point between roughly after the end of the Cold 
War, i. e. between 1986 and 1989. All these results are supported by considerable 
statistical evidence. The estimated independence of the slope coefficients from the strong 
trend-related variations of the imported arms is quite an interesting and possibly a 
meaningful result. Providing that the limited sample siZe does not allow for any confident 
conclusions, it is possible that this independence indicates that there is a separation 
between the arms imports related to the Cold War and those required for the national 
security of the country, at regional level. On the other hand, this could simply be the 
result of particular characteristics of the production process. For a further examination of 
this issue we need a more realistic and flexible analytical background. 
A weakness of this study is the relatively simplistic form of the estimated demand 
equation, a result of limitations in the availability of data and the sample size. Another one 
is the simplistic form of the model used in this examination. These limitations indicate 
possible directions that this research may continue. A more detailed empirical 
examination requires more data. Using the latest ACDA and SIPRI releases we may 
extend our data set across time. An extension of this examination from aggregate- 
regional to country level needs to overcome the difficulty of several zero observations, 
due to missing information. This could be possible with the use of techniques appropriate 
for this type of measurement errors, as some type of Tobit model with measurement 
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errors. Moreover, this examination requires a more powerful analytical model, the 
development of which is attempted in the following chapter 6. 
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6. Differentiated types of arms and substitution 
of inputs in defence' 
6.1 Introduction 
In the context of national defeqce policy, governments consider the possibility of 
having a domestic industry of arm s. If such an industry does not exist and they decide 
that producing arms domestically is beneficial for national defence and the general 
public welfare of their country, they proceed with the installation. Otherwise, they avoid 
this generally costly establishment and rely for their national defence entirely on 
imported arms and labour. This chapter develops a small country model to examine the 
optimal allocation of resources in defence, allowing for the option to include a domestic 
arms industry or not. The three inputs in the production of military capability - imported, 
domestic arms and labour - are considered as imperfect substitutes in this production. 
Some minimal quantities of the first two inputs are completely necessary for the 
production, whereas domestically produced arms are not. 
Based on empirical evidence, chapter 4 we have seen that the demand for arms 
imports follows standard patterns instead of the opposite, which has often been asserted 
in the literature. Based on cross-sectional estimations of demand functions and a data set 
that covers 38 countries, our examination came to the conclusion that the demand for 
imports follows negative responses to the price of arms and positive responses to the size 
of the military budget. Furthermore, there is evidence for non-linear logarithmic 
components in the demand function, implying responses of a concave shape to military 
expenditure and to per-capita income of the countries. 
For an explanation of the hump-shaped estimates of the demand for arms chapter 4 
suggested that at low levels of military expenditure, countries do not consider the 
establishment of a domestic industry. Instead, they mainly rely on imported arms, so that 
1 Early results of this work have been presented in the meeting on 10th of July 1997 of the group working 
on arms trade. I am grateful to the participants of this meeting for helpful comments and critic'sm- 
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the demand for them appears elastic to the size of the budget. At high levels of military 
turnover., although, countries tend to produce their own arms, partly substituting 
imported arms and possibly exporting too. Concluding, chapter 4 outlined the need for 
deeper theoretical explanation of the empirical findings. The study of panel data in 
chapter 5 added further evidence and increased the confidence in these results. It verified 
the systematic changes of the demand pattern with the size and the development of 
countries. It also provided evidence that despite the large variations of the arms trade the 
Cold War the underlining demand pattern does not change in time. 
In this chapter we develop a small country model that focuses on the entry of 
countries to domestic production of arms as well as on the demand for the three main 
factors used in defence. imported, domestic arms and armed forces. It is a partial 
equilibrium model because it ignores the impact of allocations in defence on national 
factor prices, assuming that defence sector is small enough so that these effects are 
negligible. It is a small country model in the sense that it ignores the impact of each 
country's demand for arms imports on the world market price, which is assumed fixed. 
As a payoff for these simplifying assumptions the model provides a relatively simple 
and clear analytical tool, suitable for the needs of econometric studies. 
The material included in the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 looks into 
empirical evidence and outlines the requirements from an analytical set-up. Section 6.3 
presents the model. Section 6.4 examines the properties of the new model and compares 
them with previous empirical results. For a further assessment of the applicability of the 
developed theory section 6.5 presents results of an econometric estimation of this model. 
Finally, appendix A. 6 provides statistical results from the econometric application. 
6.2 The role of domestically produced arms in defence 
Observation of available data shows that the vast majority of countries import arms 
(ACDA [1995]), but only few large countries have a well-developed domestic arms 
industry. From the 166 countries included in ACDA tables, there are only eight countries 
and the ex-Soviet republics with zero figures of imports for the covered historical period 
(Bhutan, Central African Republic, Fiji, Malta, Swaziland and Trinidad and Tobago). 
All eight countries are very small both in terms of economic size and, with the exception 
of Malta, in terms of economic development. There are reasons that suggest, however, 
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of Switzerland to 0.12 in the case of labour intensive Morocco (1990-1991 averages of 
SEPRI volumetric arms imports in constant 1990 million dollars divided by ACDA 
military forces in thousand persons - see section A. 6.1). Note that we may not simply 
attribute the large difference in the composition of inputs between these two cases to the 
availability of domestic arms, Since Switzerland is an established producer of arms, 
whereas Morocco is not. The large variability of this index across different countries 
indicates that in reality defence technology allows for a variety of different mixes of the 
three inputs under discussion. In other words, the empirical evidence appears to support 
the assumption of considerable substitution among inputs in defence. 
For analytical purposes, we may'simplify the variety of arms into two a gregated and 9 
homogenous categories: imported and domestically produced. There are three inputs 
altogether in the production of military capability, the two categories of arms and labour. 
The two categories of arms (domestic and imported) are assumed to be imperfect 
substitutes in the production of military capability, since countries can defend 
themselves using imported arms, without having to establish a domestic industry. 
Imported arms and armed forces, moreover, differ from domestic arms by having the 
characteristics of 'necessity, ' whereas domestic arms rather have the characteristics of a 
'luxury'. This distinction is based on the fact that the smaller defence budget is the more 
defence tends to rely on the former two inputs, whereas when military expenditure 
grows larger countries tend to use domestic arms. 
Searching the literature, it has not been possible to detect an analytical framework 
that captures the required characteristics, together with relative analytical simplicity. It 
appears, moreover, that the desired features can be provided by an extension of Stone- 
Geary production function, discussed in detail in appendix B. In its standard form Stone- 
Geary function allows for some minimal (positive) quantities of the inputs, called 
'subsistence quantities, ' to be absolutely necessary for any output to exist. Appendix B 
examines an extension of Stone-Geary fanction in which the subsistence quantity of one 
only input can be negative, representing a minimum amount of the input always 
available as a free good. Furthermore, Appendix B introduces fixed costs to the use of 
this input, which can be avoided if the input is not used. The result of this alteration 
apparently provided the desirable characteristics, including the entry of domestic 
production, when the budget rises enough. 
A simplifying assumption in this work is to consider the budget of defence as 
prefixed, reflecting government's perception of country's needs for security. Moving 
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first, the central government defines the level of budget. Then the military sector 
allocates resources maximising output. This implies that central government is not 
informed about the returns to scale of the defence industry, neglecting any 
disproportional effects of the budget to the produced output. The assumption that 
governments face restrictions in the availability of information about the returns of their 
own defence industries appears more realistic if we take in account the general state of 
secrecy that usually covers the internal organisation of national defence sectors. Central 
governments often face limitations of information needed to assess the performance of 
their own defence industry. Such an assessment requires a detailed comparative study of 
the characteristics of the production with those of a wide sample of other countries, 
which is generally not available. As a consequence, governments' assessments mainly 
rely on the information they receive from their own defence industry. But even the 
information that originates from this main source might face limitations in quality, for 
reasons related to the bureaucratic character of military structure. Thus, without 
thorough implementation from available comparative studies, governments first roughly 
assess the cost curve of security, and decide about the desirable level of defence 
expenditure. This fixed amount of resources is then made available to the management 
of defence sector, which is expected to allocate resources efficiently. 
6.3 The model 
Assume that the only output of countries I military sector is military capability K, 
which finally creates national security. Also, assume that the government of our 
representative country has fixed preferences in terms of allocating resources between 
national defence and other expenditures. According to this assumption, central 
government moves first and defines the budget of defence, whic h is then fixed. With this 
budget fixed, the planner of defence allocates it to the factors of production with the 
purpose of maximising the output of military capability. Inputs to the production are 
domestic arms, imported arms and armed forces (labour). We assume a static setting 
where inputs and output are subject to full depreciation in each time period. 
The planner of defence may consider the establishment of a domestic arms industry. 
The set-up costs for the establishment of such an industry are generally large and they 
mainly consist of expenditure in R&D. There are mainly two reasons why we 
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differentiate domestically produced from imported arms. One is that domestically 
produced arms provide higher security of supply, especially in the case of a war, when 
they are most needed. The other reason originates from the abstraction process of 
aggregating numerous different kinds of arms in a single homogenous good. Both 
categories of imported and domestically produced arms are essentially bundles of a 
variety of different kinds of arms. If the domestic sector is established, the quality and 
composition of the bundle of domestic arms could be adapted to the specific needs of the 
country, better than those imported. In this context, it seems reasonable that the 
availability of a domestic industry of arms can raise the returns to scale of the defence 
sector. 
In terms of substitution between inputs we assume that the two categories of arms 
are imperfect substitutes in this production. Imported arms and labour are imperfect 
complements and a minimum quantity of them, the subsistence quantity, is nec essary for 
any production to exist. Beyond this quantity they are imperfect substitutes. Domestic 
arms are gross substitutes in the production with imported arms and labour; and they 
may fully be substituted by the other two inputs. In this set-up, the option to export 
domestically produced arms is not taken into consideration. 
Let the production function for military capability be 
K= (D 
)'CD )*, CL 
; IC (1) -rD 
(M-rmYm(L-rL 
'ýCD +1M +'ýCL 
D KM E=- 
(0,1). 
where K is military capability, icD, KL and iqm are coefficients that 7c ,, ICL 
Variable M> vm 0 stands for imported arms and rm is the subsistence quantity of them. 
Variable L> YL 0 is military forces and rL is their subsistence quantity. L excludes 
labour employed in domestic arms industry. Domestically produced arms D ý! 0 have a 
. D< 
0. The price of labour is w and of imported arms is negative subsistence quantity r 
pm, both assumed fixed. When the domestic production is not established D is simply set 
to zero 
KD becomes a fixed coefficient in (1) and, as A2 shows, returns to scale are ) rD 
lower. 
For the domestic industry of arms we assume a Leontief production function with 
constant returns to scale. If we adjust the measurement units of D to be equal to the 
average product of labour we may write the production function as 
(2) D =LD 
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where LD is the labour employed in this industry. The production of D requires total 
capital YD, which consists of fixed capital F ý: 0 and variable capital hLD in a constant 
proportion b with labour 
(3) YD= bLD+F 
The price of labour is w and the price of capital is normalised to unity. Then, the total 
cost function of DIS CD == WL. D +YD= (w + b)D + F. Dividing this expression through 
by D we obtain 
(4) pn =: (w + b) + FID 
where pD is the average and (w + b) is the marginal cost of domestically produced arms. 
Also, pDis the break-even price at Which the profits of this industry vanish. According to 
(4), when the set-up costs are not zero, the average cost diminishes with output. We also 
assume that factor prices are fixed, remaining unaffected by the demand for capital and 
labour. 
In the analysis that follows we examine two cases: when the domestic arms industry 
is established and when it is not. Following to A2, we may use the binary (dummy) 
variable E to denote the two cases, that is set E=I when the industry is established set E 
=0 when it is not. In terms of notation, we distinguish between the two cases using a 
tilde (-) to distinguish the variables that refer to the case without domestic production. If 
G is the total defence budget G- EF is the disposable budget, net of set-up costs for the 
domestic industry. Without domestic sector E= EF =0 and the disposable budget is G. 
When domestic industry is established EF =F and the disposable budget is G-F. Under 
these assumptions, the budget constraint for the production of military capability is 
(5) G ý! (w + b)ED +pmM+ -wL + EF 
Of course, E=0 implies that D=0 too in which case (5) reduces to G ý! pmM + -wL. 
If the planner of national defence has the objective to maximise (1) subject to the 
constraint (5) we may solve this problem using the Langrangian method. Solving this 
problem, when the domestic industry is established the demand for imported arms is 
(6) M =, Ym + 
Km [G 
-F- 
(w + bý, ) - pmvm - wvj PM 
the demand for armed forces is 
L -:::: YL + [G -F- (w + býD - PMIVM WIVL 
and the demand for domestically produced arms is 
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(8) D:::: rD +- 
'CD [G-F-(w+býD -Pmrm -WrL] 
w+b 
When the domestic industry is not established D=0 and the demands for the two 
remaining inputs are 
(9) 
ýff = YM + 
Km G-p, ym -WrL 
1- 'CD PM 
and 
KL G-p,, v, -W 7L L =7D + 
'-KD w 
The two systems of demand equations have different characteristics dependent on the 
establishment of the domestic industry. Apparently, an advantage of this set-up is the 
algebraic simplicity of the solutions. 
A standard requirement of Stone-Geary function is that the budget should necessarily 
cover the cost of subsistence quantities of the inputs, i. e. G> iýjL where 
(11) GL - PMIVM + WYL 
When the domestic industry is established the non-negativity constraint of input D 
requires from (8) that G> GL where 
(12) GL =F+pmym +W/VL (w + b)yD KD 
Otherwise, if G<G. domestic production is never established. When the budget 
exceeds this critical level the planner chooses the kind of production that gives higher 
output. A2 has shown that in the range [GL, oo) there is a critical level of the budget G* 
that the two cases give equal output. When the budget is lower than this critical level 
producing K without a domestic sector of arms gives higher output than producing it 
with an established domestic sector. When G> G* output with the use of domestic arms 
dominates. 
Setting the indirect utility functions for the two cases equal, with some algebra we 
obtain the necessary and sufficient condition for indifference to the establishment of 
domestic industry of arms 
(13)G- 
(- PD IVD 
YCD 
KD )'-"ýD 
KD 
(1 
- 'CD 
p,, Y, -W 1VL 
)'-'CD 
- 
[F + (w + bý, ) + PMrM + WrL 
I -:::: 
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Appendix A2 proves that G* always exists and it is unique, providing that prices and 
parameters take values from their valid ranges. As a real polynomial of G, expression 
(13) does not take a general algebraic solution. Since a single real solution does exist, 
however, we may overcome this problem by solving for G* with the use of numerical 
methods. 
Summarising, we have determined three critical levels of the budget, following order 
of magnitude 
(14) GL :! ý GL <G 
Comparison of G with these values determines the establishment of the domestic 
industry 
0 G<G* 
E=jl G>G* 
undefined G=G* 
When G= G* either cases give equal output, the planner is indifferent and the solution 
undefined. This is the reason why we may not write condition (15) in a necessary and 
sufficient form. In inverted form the necessary conditions for the establishment are 
(16) =0=: > G< G* 
E=I=: >G>G* 
6.4 Properties of the demand for imported arms 
One of the targets set out for this study is to provide some theoretical explanation to 
the results of the cross-sectional study of chapter 4, i. e. the estimated equation 
InM = -21.64 - 0.5 61npm + 1.5 21nG - 0.06(InG) 
2+4.741nw 
- 0.29(InW)2 
Only the price elasticity is estimated as constant, independent of the level of pm. Income 
elasticity . 6G decreases when G grows but stays always positive, nearing zero in the case 
of the largest observation, this of the U. S. The elasticity of imports to per-capita income 
cw changes from positive to negative when w grows and so do the estimated responses of 
the demand, with a turning point just below the sample mean of w. Analysis for the 
impact of measurement errors indicated possible underestimation of &-, and c,,,. 
From the demand -functions for imported arms (6) and (9) we may calculate the own 
price elasticities for the two cases 
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(17) 
PM -ICM 
F- (w + b), YD -WrL 
P, M 
Similarly, the income elasticities are 
0 and Wp, 
K, G- wy, 
<0 
- 'CD PMM 
CG =KM 
G>0 
and cG =-G ý- C, G> Pmm '-KD PMM 
and the elasticities of imports with respect to the average national wage 
W(7D + 1VL). 6= --KM 
WrL W 6W - -ICM PMM 
and W1- fiCD PMM 
W<O; 6W>6w 
Since YD< 0 and vm <0 the elasticity of arms imports to labour costs with the domestic 
sector established c., can either be negative or positive, dependent on the relative 
magnitude of the two subsistence quantities. When the domestic sector is not established 
this elasticity is limited to be negative. This might well be the case in the cross-sectional 
study of chapter 4 where this elasticity was estimated to change from negative to 
positive when w rises from lower to higher levels. 
In either cases, own price elasticity is negative and might either increase, decrease 
with or remain unaffected from the establishment of the domestic sector, depending on 
parameter values. Notice that if F> -(w + b)rDthe demand for M is always more elastic 
without the domestic sector established. This encouraging result appears in line with the 
constant price elasticity estimated in chapter 4 or, at least, not contradictory. Income 
elasticity cG is positive, depends on G and decreases when the domestic sector is 
established. Since the establishment of domestic sector depends on G as well, when G 
increases beyond G* the domestic sector gets established and imports M and elasticity &, - 
jump discontinuously to lower levels. Without domestic sector, the elasticity of imported 
arms to labour costs is negative. When the domestic sector is established elasticity 6" has 
a higher value than when it is not and it is positive iff -, vD > 7L. 
The two diagrams of Figure 6.1 plot the reaction of countriesM (dashed curve), as it 
was estimated in the cross-sectional study of chapter 4, as well as examples of reactions 
predicted by the modelfi and M Diagram A presents the demand for arms as a function 
of the budget G and diagram B as a function of labour costs (w). A comparison of the 
predicted by the theory with the estimated reactions shows that the two are in line or, at 
least, they are not contradictory. Diagram B gives an example of the predicted response 
to changes of economic development of the country, which mainly include the impact of 
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labour costs. Again, the set of two linear reactions provides a possible explanation to the 
estimated parabolic response. 
Figure 6.1 The demand for imported arms: Model prediction and 
empirical estimates 
A 
mi 
m 
GL G* G 
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6.5 Estimation of the demand imported arms 
The model we presented above can provide analytical means for an empirical 
examination of the demand for AI, providing the availability of data. Following the 
approach of chapter 4, we may consider quantities G, w, M, pm and L as observable, i. e. 
military expenditure, average national wage, price of imported arms and armed forces 
respectively. Data series for the domestic production of arms D are not directly available 
in an appropriate for our requirement form. Nevertheless, some sources do provide some 
information on domestic production (e. g. SIPRI, HSS) and construction of such a series 
could be a possibility. Any attempt, however, to approximate a series of domestic 
production, which would unavoidably raise questions about the quality of the 
constructed data series. Alternatively, as the following analysis demonstrates, we may 
avoid the quantitative measurement of countries' domestic production of arms and 
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estimate the model only with the use of information about variable E, i. e. if countries 
have a domestic industry of arms or not. 
Separating observable from unobservable quantities) we can rearrange the twin 
demand function for arms (6) and (9) as 
(20) pmM = -KM (biy D+ F)+ KmG + (I - icm ýmpm-)CM 
ýD 
+ YL 
)W; 
E=I 
KM KM 
PMM =G+ 
K' 
; K, p, - YLw; 1-KD 1 KD 1-KD 
respectively, where icL + icm + icD = 1. Let Ej be the dummy variable for the 
establishment of a domestic arms sector for country i, which equals 1 when a domestic 
industry is established and equals 6 when it is not. Also. following chapter 3. let Ai 
pmdW, ) be the ACDA measurement of the value of arms imports and pmi the implicit 
price index of imported arms. Then, equations (20) and (21) can be written jointly with 
the use of intercept and slope dummy variables as 
(22) Ai =m,, E, +m, G, +M2PMi +M3Wi +M4(EiGi)+M5(EiPMi)+M6(EiWi)+UMi 
where mj are coefficients and um, is a random term. 
Having estimated form (22) we may solve for the coefficients of (20) and (21) as 
follows. Directly from the definition of dummy variables we obtain 
(23) KM ý::::: MI + M4 
and from the coefficients of G from (20) and (2 1) we obtain 
(24) KD 
M4 
mi 
and 
(25) KL =l-KD _KM 
Continuing, we may isolate rm from the coefficient of pm in (2 1), which after 
simplifications takes the form 
(26) /VM - 
M2 
I-ml 
From (21) we have 
(27) IVL 
M3 
mi 
and from the coefficient of w in (20) we may isolate 
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(28) 
IVD :: -: 
M3 M3 + M6 
Mi MI +M4 
The coefficients b and F are not identified. For a calculation of them requires additional 
information to that provided by form (22). 
For an estimation of (22) we may use the same cross-sectional data used in chapter 4, 
which consist of 1990-1991 average annual figures of arms imports and military 
expenditure by SIEPIU, arms imports by ACDA and per-capita GDP from Penn World 
Tables (available in appendix A. 4). Arms imports and military expenditure are in 
constant 1990 million U. S. dollars and per-capita GDP is in constant 1990 U. S. dollars. 
The former three variables are transformed to U. S. dollars with the use of average annual 
exchange rates whereas per-capita GDP only is transformed with the use of Purchasing 
Power Parities. The implicit price index for imported arms is calculated by dividing the 
ACDA measurement of the value with SIPRI volumetric estimate of imported arms. 
Unlike chapter 4, however, the estimated equation is not logarithmic but the variables 
are in levels. 
Systematic measurements of countries' production of arms are not generally 
available, with adequate coverage and quality for the needs of our study. As an 
approximation we may use available figures on largest arms producing firms and, also, 
tables on arms exports, assuming that a permanently high level of arms exports indicates 
for a well developed domestic industry in the country. This information is available in 
the two tables by SIPRI Yearbook 1993 `100 Larger Arms Producing Companies' 
[pp. 470-4] and '25 Leading Suppliers of Major Conventional Weapons' from SIPRI 
Yearbook 1995 [p. 493]. From all countries in the sample 10 countries have entries in 
both tables. These are Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, UK and USA. Only in the table of 100 larger companies were India and 
Japan and only in the table of 25 larger exporters were Brazil, China, South Korea, 
Norway, Pakistan and Poland. Thus, these 18 countries were characterised as having an 
established domestic sector leaving the remaining 21 counties characterised as net 
importers. 
Table 6.1 presents the results from the estimation of (22) with OLS and, also, the 
solutions for the coefficients of the model from (23), (24), (25), (26), (27) and (28) 
including the standard errors and the p-values of the two-tailed tests for the significance 
from zero. The Rý of the regression is 0.655 and the standard tests of the residuals take 
relaxing values. In particular, White's F-test for heteroscedasticity gives a p-value 0.908 
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to the hypothesis of homoscedasticity, Ramsey's F-test for functional miss-specification 
gives a p-value 0.209 to the hypothesis of correct linear specification and the X, test for 
the hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals has a p-value of 0.209. 
Table 6.1 Estimated coefficients 
MO Ml M2 M3 M4 M4 M6 
Coeff. 524.74 0.1347 78.027 -0.1747 -0.1292 -110-00 0.0117 
St. Err. 179.70 0.0250 31.754 0.0102 0.0251 118.53 0.0153 
I 
KM 
I 
KD 
I 
.' 
KL 
I 
YM 
I 
YL 
I 
7D 
I 
Coeff. 0.0056 0.9585 0.0359 90.391 0.1296 0.8946 
St. Err. 0.0022 0.0178 0.0159 35.775 0.06371 1.9655 
p-value 0.014 0.000 0.031 0.016 0.050 0.652 
The two coefficients icm, icDand )cL have values within the acceptable range (0,1) and 
their signs are well supported by the t-tests. Assuming that KL =I- Km - icD, testing for 
the significance of this coefficient from zero is equivalent to the test for significance of 
the sum of the two other coefficients from unity. Subsistence quantities ym and yL are 
also positive with signs significant from zero at 5% level. Note that as a result of the 
normalisation of the units of labour equal to the average output of the arms industry, 
coefficient rL is measured as a proportion of the domestic procurement of the country. 
The last estimated parameter subsistence quantity yDinstead of the expected negative has 
a positive estimated value, which implies a contradiction with one of the fundamental 
assumptions of the model. Comparing the low statistical significance of YD, however, 
with the high significance of the sign of all other coefficients we may well conclude that 
the hypothesis of a negative rDis not contradicted by the data. 
The empirical results so far appear either in line or at least not contradictory to the 
hypotheses of the model. It should be clear that the scope of this econometric 
examination is not an in depth empirical study of the arms trade, but merely a test for the 
applicability of the theory. The weak aspects of these results include the over- 
identification of the estimated system, measurement errors in the variables, limited 
information about domestic procurement. Another reason might be that our model limits 
the establishment of arms industry to have the same fixed cost for all countries. 
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Apparently, this typical simplifying assumption (e. g. used in LS) contributes to the 
divergence of this theory from the empirical reality, the examination of which probably 
requires a more flexible specification. This is partly relaxed in the analysis of the 
following chapter 7, which assumes different fixed costs for large and smaller producing 
countries. 
6.6 Conclusions 
Setting up a model for the international arms trade one can hardly fail to realise that 
gle analytical attem I-- Cý 
any sin pt w, ould be far from explaining all the underlining 
mechanisms of this field of activity. I could be useful to clarify, therefore, that the 
suggested analysis is not intended to provide a stand-alone theory of the arms trade, but 
it is merely the result of an attempt to capture particular aspects of the issue that appear 
to be neglected by other work. The final form of the model developed in this chapter has 
been largely based on the technical assumption of modifying Stone-Geary function in a 
way that it provides the desired properties of substitution. As a newly introduced method 
little tested yet, however, it should be looked from a critical perspective. From the 
results, however, it appears that the performance of the developed framework 
corresponds to the initial requirements. 
In line with empirical evidence, the analysis in this chapter suggests that the 
establishment of a domestic industry of arms may have a considerable effect on the 
demand of countries for internationally traded arms. With the establishment of a 
domestic sector domestic arms substitute for imported arms and the demand for the latter 
category becomes less responsive to the military budget of the country. Also, the effect 
of economic development on this demand changes from positive to negative. The effect 
of the price of arms imports, however, appears to remain always negative and unaffected 
by the existence of a domestic industry. These results appear to provide suitable answers 
to the questions brought up by the cross-sectional examination of chapter 4. 
The econometric estimation of the developed framework with available data provided 
useful evidence for the assessment of the performance and the applicability of this 
analysis in empirical studies. The high estimated value of the weight on domestically 
produced arms indicates that the establishment of a domestic industry and the 
availability of domestic along with imported arms has a positive effect on the returns to 
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scale of defence industry. There is also evidence for considerable subsistence quantities 
of imported arms and labour, but not enough evidence to support the negative sign of the 
subsistence quantity of domestic arms. All other coefficients had strong statistical 
support of their signs and small standard errors. One possible way that this study could 
continue is the examination of a wider theoretical framework, introducing a welfare 
function of the central government. This would allow for a more realistic distribution of 
resources between defence and other sectors and the relaxation of the assumption of a 
prefixed defence budget. Another more complete approach would be to use the 
developed formulation of the demand side in a world market model. In terms of 
econometrics, the availability of. data series of arms production would enable the 
estimation of a complete version of the model. 
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A Generalized Arms Trade Game: The 
Establishment of Domestic Arms Industries 
7.1 Introduction 
Economic reality is usually far too complicated to be adequately explained by any 
single analytical set-up. Theoretical models require abstraction, so that they can 
isolate specific mechanisms and analyse a few at a time. The development of some 
new and more powerful theory usually stimulates a critical attitude and an appetite for 
a more realistic approach that eliminates some of the weaknesses of previous theory. 
The contents of this chapter are the result of an attempt to upgrade the existing 
economic analysis of the international world market by introducing a more powerful 
analytical tool that captures includes a domestic sector of arms as an optional input in 
defence industry. More specifically, this chapter generalises the Levine & Smith 
[1997] (LS) model of the international arms trade, by introducing a decision 
mechanism for entry of countries to domestic production. 
There are two main reasons that make LS theory an appropriate platform for 
further analytical developments. First, it examines the equilibrium of the international 
market of arms, taking account of the special nature of both demand and supply sides. 
Second, the formulation of national security it employs for the supply side is adapted 
to the post-Cold War era. Instead of the previously established bipolar antagonism of 
alliances, large arms producing countries are not involved in arms races but instead 
they collaborate for the purposes of regional security. On the empirical side, the 
econometric examination of the demand for imported arms in chapters 4 and 5 
revealed some new aspects of empirical reality, requiring theoretical explanation. 
In LS the world is divided into two groups of identical countries- One group 
consists of a small number of supplying industrialised countries (ICs), which produce 
arms for the needs of domestic procurement and for exports. Producer countries are 
self-sufficient in the sense that domestically produced arms are the only arms these 
countries use to produce military capability. These countries are not involved in arms 
races and they are concerned with regional peacekeeping. For that purpose these 
countries prepare for military intervention, in case that one or more pairs of countries 
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in the other group get engaged in conflict. The other group consists of a larger number 
of arms-buying countries. The economies of these countries are of considerably 
smaller size and of lower level of development and their defence relies on imported 
arms (LDCs). 
The objective of this work is the relaxation of two basic simplifying assumptions 
of LS theory- the assumption that all of these countries have the same economic size 
and the assumption that LDCs do not have the option to produce arms domestically. A 
direct result of the first extension is that the income, consumption, military capability, 
procurement and demand for arms of recipient countries varies rather than being 
identical for all the countries in the group. A result of the second extension is that 
LDCs consider the establishment of'a domestic industry of arms, dependent on cost 
factors, their economic size and the price of international traded arms. The 
combination of these two extensions to LS model determines the number of LDCs' 
that enter to domestic production of arms, leaving the remaining countries of this 
group as net importers. The result is a generalisation of LS model, which includes an 
endogenous solution of the number of countries on the demand and supply side of the 
market. 
The presentation of this chapter is organised in four sections. Section 7.2 looks in 
more detail into LS theory, providing a brief review of its characteristics and an 
outline of its strengths and weaknesses. Section 7.3 presents analytically the 
developed model. First it presents the LS set-up of supply side followed by the 
description of the demand side and a description of the overall equilibrium. Section 
7.4 examines in more detail the analytical properties of the developed model, attempts 
an analytical comparison with LS results and prepares for the numerical examination 
that follows. Finally, section 7.5 discusses the performance and the predictions of the 
model based on the results of numerical simulations. 
7.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the Levine- Smith approach 
The LS model assumes that the world is separated into two groups -a small 
number of large, industriallsed and identical countries on the supply side and a large 
number of small less developed and also identical countries on the demand side. Arms 
production of supplier countries is regulated and subsidised by their governments. The 
barrier that inhibits new entrants into the market is the generally large R&D costs of 
this production. In the post-Cold War era, arms producing countries do not directly 
rom each other and so they can be seen as not involved in perceive military threat f 
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arms races. They have concerns about regional security, however, which depends 
(inversely) on the amount of weapons held by the LDCs, and they are jointly 
preparing for intervention in case of one or more conflicts between them (i. e. they 
anticipate a role for international policing). Supplier countries increase their security 
when either their own military capability or the regional security increase, or both. 
Security and private consumption are the two types of expenditure that absorb 
industrialised countries' national income, which is exogenous and remains unaffected, 
and are the two inputs to national welfare. The final allocation of resources is such 
that the opportunity cost of the two inputs is equal. 
The demand side consists of a large number of net arms importing countries, which 
are all involved in conflict in pairs. 'They are all identical having the same income, 
which is predefined but is considerably lower than that of ICs. These countries are 
involved in arms races in the sense that the security of each recipient country depends 
on their on procurement and inversely on their opponents. ' As for ICs they optimise 
their public welfare controlling expenditure in defence. Putting together the demand 
and supply side, LS solve for the equilibrium of the market for the case that the ICs 
co-operate in their defence policies and for the case they do not. 
Several characteristics of the LS model received criticism, which helpfully was 
reported in the publication following the paper [pp. 362-367]. Of course, the referees 
of the paper and other critics had access to a more complete version of the paper in 
terms of analysis than was finally released. An expected target of critics was that the 
model is static not distinguishing between stocks and flows of arms, suggesting the 
need to introduce dynamics. Another suggestion, typical for this topic, is that since 
recipient countries are not aggressive (i. e. they do not derive utility from attacking 
neighbours) a number of minor alterations to assumptions result in an equilibrium 
with zero level of armament. David Begg replied to this criticism by arguing that the 
equilibrium with no procurement is unstable and does not derive feelings of security 
to the members of public. The need for defence emerges from the uncertainty of 
possible aggressive behaviour of a neighbour country, a concern that is historically 
well justified. 
Directly related with the work of this paper are the comments LS paper received 
about the option of countries to establish their own production of arms if arms 
produced cost less than the imported arms. Lucrezia Reichlin [p. 363], Patrick Rey [p. 
365] and Ron Smith (in his reply [p. 367]) point out the need to consider this 
alternative to imports and endogenise this entry. The decision to establish of a 
domestic industry was suggested to be dependent on the cost factors of this 
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production and the level of international price of traded arms. This is the main 
objective of this study. Furthermore, chapter 4 estimated that the reaction of 
countries' demand for imported arms to the military I budget has a positive slope but 
convex shape. It is elastic at low levels of military expenditure (and income) but tends 
to become completely inelastic when we reach the largest expenditure levels (that of 
US). The same convex relationship appears between the demand for imported arms 
and exports. According to LMS this effect is primarily created by substitution of 
imported with domestic arms, the unitary price of which falls when output level rises. 
The two diagrams in figure 4.3 of help demonstrating this relationship. 
7.3 The model 
Any attempt to generalise an existing theory implies that the new and wider 
structure encompasses the preceding one as well as including other additional 
components. In this sense the model we build in this section includes the entire LS 
model, as well as a number of new components. There are few changes of notational 
conventions, from those of LS. In LS the two exogenously defined country groups are 
called 'suppliers' and 'buyers, ' noted by indices 's' and 'b. ' In our model Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) are not necessarily importers or 'buyers' and always 
producing 'Industrialised Countries' (ICs) may not be the only exporters. Keeping the 
same notation for the two groups, indices s and b now denote ICs and LDCs 
respectiVely. Only when we need to distinguish between importing and producing 
LDCs we use indices W and 'p' respectively. 
7.3.1 Industrialised countries 
All n, countries in the group of suppliers are assumed to be identical and the 
following description applies to any of them. As a result of this we use indices to 
denote a specific supplier country only when necessary. If g, is national procurement 
and x, is exports of each supplier country y=g, + x, is the total production of arms. 
For purposes of simplicity we may assume a linear cost function for the production of 
arms identical for each producer 
(1) C, (y) = D, + c.,, v+ dy 
where A is the fixed cost, required for the establishment of this industry and cs is the 
marginal cost of this production. 
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Let P be the price of internationally traded arms and p, be the procurement price 
that government buys domestically produced arms. The profits of supplier country's 
arms industry per period are 
17s : -- p, g, + pxs - Cs (y) = 7rs (ps, P) - Ds 
where ; T, (p,, P) denotes the operating profits, dependent on the two prices. The 
participation constraint for this industry requires H, ý! 0, whereas by controlling the 
procurement price p,, government makes sure that the industry breaks even,, taxing all 
profits or subsidising all los-ses. Thus, 17, =0 and applying (2) in (1) we obtain 
(3) PS =: 
C, (Y) - PX, =p+ 
Ds - zs (P, P) 
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where w. the national wage. 
The production of military capability of supplier countries uses two inputs, 
assumed perfect complements and employed in a fixed proportion. If L, is labour 
employed in national defence, with the use of Leontief production function and 
appropriate adjustment of measurement units L, = g,. As a result of that, the 
expenditure of defence sector becomes wL, + pg, = (w, + p, )g,. Let B, ' = (Ws + Pb)M be 
the budget of defence of IC. National governments of supplier countries make 
decisions for the distribution of national income Y, between defence expenditure B', ' 
and other spending, say consumption C, facing a resource constraint 
(4) C, + (w, P, )g, 
Assuming an adequately small military sector we may ignore any effects of resource 
allocations in defence to national income and factor prices. Thus, we define Y, and w, 
as fixed quantities, exogenous to the model. 
The social welfare of ICs follows a Cobb-Douglas welfare function 
(5) W, SI-0)i -0 usCss 
where C, is consumption and S, is security and co, is a coefficient. Supplier countries 
have a security function with two components 
= (a., Y, +, B, g, )'-'S' -p c= [0, I) (6) SS 
The first term (in parenthesis) is the domestic component of security, where aY, and 
P, g, capture the fixed and variable benefits of defence respectively and a is a 
coefficient. This domestic security function does not contain an arms race component 
implying that supplier countries do not perceive a direct military threat. 
The second component of (6) is regional security and, as in LS, it is defined as 
(7) Sr = Gs - r)t3r 
Kr 
nb 
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Where GS g,,, is the aggregate procurement of all ICs. Similarly to LS, 
parameter r captures the number of regional conflicts that producer countries can 
successfully intervene at a time and 8, is a coefficient similar to 8. K, represents the 
aggregate military capability of all LDCs and KInb the average. In the simpler case of 
LS, all recipient countries are identical and the average military capability of 
recipients depends only on the arms exported by ICs. In our case, the armaments of 
LDCs include their own output, which varies from one country to another and can 
either be retained as procurement or exported to other LDCs. Thus,, we may define 
regional security as 
(8) 
, K, =M+Gb 
where M is the aggregate imports and Gb is the aggregate procurement of importing 
and self sufficient LDCs respectively. 
The governments of supplier countries control g, and x, with an objective to 
maximise social welfare. Let gj, x, j and p, j be procurement, exports and procurement 
price of supplier country i. The first order conditions for the maximisation of (5) are 
(9) 
ausi 
- -O)S 9si 
aP, 
+P 
(1 
- Ct), 
) aSr 
=0 asi Y, - 
(W'v + P. )g' ki Sr asi 
and 
ws +P,, +gi 
CPli 
C 
57 
-fos +(I-Cos 
Cs, 
C"', 911 Y, 
- 
(ws + P, )g, a, Y. +, Bs gn S, q-g. 
Let X. 
n., 
I Xsi be the aggregate exports of the whole group of ICs. If Xb are the i= 
total arms exports of LDCs let X=X, + Xb be the total world exports. In a non- 
cooperative Nash settlement aX1c'xi = a(xi + Et#ixj + Xb)l&, i =I and c9G, /c9gi = c9(gi 
+ Z,,, g#)/c9g,, = 1. If producer countries cooperate in a common defence policy, taking 
an equal share of the world exports market they set xsi xs and gsi = gs. Then they 
perceive X, = nsxs and G, = ngs so c9X/&, i n, and aG1c9gsj = ns. Following the neat 
notation of LS we may define 0 as 
(11) 0= c9x c-Gs 
G; lx s ags 
that is 0= ns and (P =I in the cases with and without coordination respectively. 
From (3) we obtain 
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(12) 
and 
(13) 
c+ 2d(gi + xj -P- xsi 
c9p 
cpsi 
si 
CýXsi 9si 
C99sl 
+ 2d(g + x. ) - p. 
9, i 
and with the use of (11) 
(14) 
ap ÜP 
(3x 
üx, (3x O-, x, 
P, (X)O =01 x 
where X= UW. The solution for the allocations of ICs will be completed at the end 
of this SeCtio. "AA, after the discussion about LDCs. 
7.3.2 LDCs involved in conflict 
The general profile of recipient countries in this model has two mainly differences 
form LS. First, still organised in pairs of identical countries, the national income of 
countries across different pairs is not limited to be equal but is allowed to vary. 
Second, the countries in this group face the option to establish their own production 
and fully substitute imported arms, providing they can face the set-up cost of this 
industry. In total there are nbpairs of recipient countries. Each country in the i-th pair 
has income Ybi, which takes a value in the range [YL, YH]. For the purposes of 
simplicity in this paper we will assume that Ybi follows a uniform distribution. Let (YL 
+ YH)12 be the mean of the distribution and A= (YH- YL)12 be the deviation of the 
extremes from the mean (implying that YL = Yb -A and YH= Yb+ A). Furthermore, 
assume that countries are ordered according to their income, i. e. that i >j <:: > Ybi > Ybj. 
Govemment's objective is the maximisation of social welfare 
(15) =C O)b S 
1-ob Ubi 
bi bi 
whereCbi IS consumption and Sbi is securlty. As in LS, the security function of each 
country has the form 
(16) Sbi : -- abybi + )ObMi - Mi 
* 
where mi* is the imports of the opponent country ab> 0 and 8b ý! I are coefficients 
similar to a, and 8,, capturing the fixed and variable benefits of defence respectively. 
Each country in the pair imports quantity mi of arms. The same expression holds for 
both rivals. All recipients are assumed to face the same price P of internationally 
traded arms. Using the same Leontief production function of military capability as for 
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producer countries, each unit of arms requires a unit of labour. Let B"' -"ý (Ws +Pb)m be 
the defence budget of importing LDCs. The government of each country in pair i 
allocates income between consumption Cbj and military spending B,, facing the 
national resource constraint 
(17) Ybi: --: Cbi + (Wbi + P)Mi 
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium countries maximise (15) with respect to Mi under 
the constraint (17) and, as in LS, from the first order condition we can solve for the 
demand for imports 
(18) 
where 
Mi = M(ybi) = 
Ayb 
i 
ýl 0- Ct) Ct) I +P) OA(P) (19) A= A(P) b 
)pb b C(b kWb 
and A'- 
Ct)b h8b 
(fib 
- Ct)b 
XWb + P) ap (flb -Cob 
XWb + p)2 
Factor A and its derivative of A'have been determined for purposes of simplicity as 
they are often used in the analysis that follows. 
7.3.3 Arms producing LDCs 
Coming to the essence of the extension of this work beyond the LS model, an LDC 
has the option to establish a domestic industry of arms and produce for the needs of 
domestic procurement, as well as export. Following the assumptions of supply side, 
we assume linear technology with a cost function 
(20) Cb(qi) = Db + Cbqi 
whereCb(qi) is the total cost for the first country of pair i, Db is the fixed costs for the 
establishment of this industry andCb is marginal cost. Notice that the existence of set- 
up cost causes diminishing average cost in this production. 
Domestic and imported arms are assumed as perfect substitutes in countries' 
procurement and the production of military capability. In order to make a decision 
about the establishment of a domestic arms industry LDCs 'Compare the total cost of 
the output with that of importing the same quantity of arms. If the unitary cost of 
domestic arms exceeds the price of imports, i. e. Pmi <Cb(7ni), the government cancel 
the establishment of domestic production and the country remains a net recipient of 
arms. Otherwise, if PMi ýý' Cb(Mi) instead of importing arms they produce them 
domestically and possibly export as well. In this setting, however, we rule out the 
option of LDCs to export for reasons we discuss later. When Cb(qi) -= Pmi, countries 
are indifferent between the two options. Setting qj = mi, with the use of (20) we may 
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solve for the critical level of imports m* = Dbl(P - Cb). Furthermore, with the use of 
(18) and (19) we may solve for the critical for the establishment level of income 
(21) y 
Db 
A(P- Cb 
Since (18) defines a monotonic transformation of Yb to mi, Y* takes a unique 
solution from (21). According to this setting, if this critical level falls within the range 
of income of LDCs, i. e. if Y* e [YL, YH], it separates their population in two groups: 
2n,, countries with income less than Y* that merely import arms and 2(nb - nm) 
countries that produce and export. If Y* < YL all LDCs are recipients and if Y* > YH 
they are all producers. Generally, country i produces arms iff Yj > Y*. Thus, under the 
fk S+*-; TNIý+ r yL, F t' %JLL L'A'L L Lk 
4-1- 
- -er of import-r- a sa, u nn 
i at Av, di ibuk-'s un. 1jul. 1-111y in L 
YLH] Lhe niurn1b L. I J1 Q33 
given by 2nn where 
n b 2y* ýýy Tr 
y* -y nD (22) nm Lnbby YI-1 
- 
YL b= YH 
- 
YL 
'/'(p - Cb 
YL 
L< 
y* < YI-r 
,0 ;y*< 
YL 
providing that that 0 :! ý YL :! ý YH. Notice that the necessary condition for the 
intermediate case implies that YH- YL > 0, i. e. a non-trivial distribution of Ybi. 
In a similar way as for industrialised supplier countries, instead of (16) the security 
function of producer LDCs becomes 
(23) Sbi ý--: abybi + )6bgbi - gbi 
* 
where gbi and gbi* are domestic procurements of the country and its opponent 
respectively. Thus, instead of (17), the resource constraint of producing LDCs 
becomes 
(24) Ybi "ýý Cbi + (Wb +Pbi)gbi 
In this examination we consider only ICs having access to the international market 
whereas LDCs do not face this option but produce only for the needs of their domestic 
procurement. The reason for this discrimination is that if we allow LDCs to freely 
compete with the ICs, the model predicts that they take over the largest part of the 
market. This contradicts the empirical evidence, apparently because the world market 
is not price competitive. This interesting result is further discussed later in this paper. 
The working assumption in this set-up is Xb = Xb= 0 and the profits of LDC's arms 
industry are 
(25) l7bi =: Pbi gbi - Cb (q, )= 7rb (Pbi I 
P) 
- 
Db 
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where 7rb(Pb, P) -": -- (Psi - cs)gi are the operating profits and qi = gbi. The profits of the 
industry vanish if the government offers to the firm the procurement price 
Cb (q, ) Db - 2Tb (P7 P) 
+D (26) Pbi - =P+. =Cb _ýb 
gbi gbi gbi 
For a welfare maximising government, the FOC for optimal allocation of 
procurement is 
Wb + Pbi + gbi 
cpbi 
(27) 
allbi 
b 
agbi 
+ 
O)b 
)18b 
=0 
C7bi Yb 
(Wbi 
+ Pbi 
F9bl 
abybi +Pbgbi -9bi 
From (26) we solve for or Pbi in (27) from CPbi /C99bi 
(Pbi 
- Cb 
)19bi 
. 
SubstitutIng f 
(26) ancl applying symmetry (9bi .= 9bi), after simpilfications LDCs procurement takes 
the form 
(28) gbi (y Y +A(wb + cb)Db ; nn < n, gbi ' bi) ":: -Ap bi 
where 
-C 
(29) 4p = 
A(Cb 
Cob 
), 8b ob ab 
(WI, 
+ Cb 
(8b 
- Cob 
XWb + Cb 
) 
Finally, providing the solution for gbi we may eliminate it from (26) and complete 
solution for procurement price (see summary of the model at the end of this section). 
7.3.4 Market equilibrium 
Having set out the profiles of the agents involved in our arms trade game, in this 
section we put demand and supply together and determine the complete form of our 
and A' - 
c9A(c') 
-- 
(I 
- Cob 
)18b 
p &b (Lqb 
-Cob 
XWb + CZ) 
)2 
model. First, we examine the aggregates of demand side under the assumption that 
income of importing LDCs follows a uniform distribution. In the case that Y*<YL the 
group of importers has no members. If YL < Y* :! ý YHwe may express the average 
national income of importing LDCs as Y,, = (YL + Y)12. Using the wider definition of 
n? n we may substitute for Y* after solving from it from (21) and express Y. as 
(30) 
n,, 
YM 71, Ybi = Yb 
nm i=l 
nb -n 'A ; nM>O 
nb 
if M= 2y n, M is the aggregate imports of LDCs with the use of (18) and (3 1) the , i=l i 
average imports of LDCs m= M12nm take the form 
(31) m(Y. ) = Alý. 
The producing group of LDCs has average income 
98 
nb 
n (32) I: Y,, =y +-n A ; nm <n yp 
nb - nn i=nn+l 
b 
nb 
b 
total procurement Gb - 21] 
n. 
9b, and average procurement "=nb+l 
(33) =gb, (Yb, )=A A' 
(w +c ; n, <n 9b pyp +pb b)Db b 
Summing up the aggregate exports of ICs and under the assumption that producing 
LDCs do not export we can put the demand supply together and define equilibrium in 
this market 
(34) nsxs =M = 2nmm 
Assuming that both groups of producing countries are fully informed about the 
j"nv-1, -rx+ S+lrnir-+i rp 41p py"e-ýý+q ^4: ' "., tu Vk Ile%, L1.1 LIL IL L& L LAI. %., %, ue +'ý, e world price and the 
demand in two ways. One is directly through the responsiveness of the demand of the 
existing importing countries and the other is indirectly by influencing the number of 
producing LDCs and importing LDCs. If the group of producing LDCs is empty (n,,, = 
n, ) the latter effect vanishes, reducing to the LS case. Since X=M, substituting for n" 
from (22) and (21) and differentiating the RHS of (34) with respect to P the relative 
responsiveness of the aggregate demand to price takes the form 
X' W/ aP c-n .. 
IaP &nlaP 2 A' 
(35) 
X- M- nm 
+MP 
-Cb 
+A O<nm <nb 
Returning to the discussion about regional security we may now look closely at the 
LDCs' regional military capability. From the definitions of S, and K, it is clear that 
procurement of supplier countries has no direct effect on military capability of LDCs- 
Thus, differentiating (7) with the use of (11) we obtain 
(36) 
aSr, 
_. 
aSri cGs 
ags, aGs cg,, 
Likewise procurement, exports of supplier countries also have no direct effect on 
procurement and exports of LDCs, so c9K, /clx, i = c9X/&, i =0 and 
(37) 
aSn r Prd) 
G"'Xsi nb 
This completes the solution of all the'components of this model. 
The entrance of LDCs to domestic production depends on the average cost of the 
demanded quantity of arms and, finally, on the economic size of each country. If it 
exceeds the critical level Y* countries produce and vice versa. In other words , if the 
critical level for entrance lies within the income range of LDCs, i. e. Y* c= (YL, YH), it 
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separates it in two groups: the group of producers with higher income and that of 
importers with lower income. This happens if, and only if, the condition 
(38) YL < 
Db 
< Yff 
A(P-c. ) 
is satisfied. If the RHS of inequality (38) does not hold, there are no producing LDCs. 
In this case the model reduces to a case similar to LS with the additional characteristic 
that LDCs are no more limited to be identical. If LHS of (38) does not hold, all 
countries enter into domestic production, which is a rather unrealistic case. 
7.3.5 Summary of the modei, - 
Putting together the various pieces of this model we may summarise it as follows. 
i. Number of importing LDCs 
0 
(22) n= 
Db 
--(Y, -A m 2A A(P- Cb 
b 
nb 
;D 'ýý y b 
Ap 
- Cb)' b 
Yb-A<Db /A(p - Cb) <y b +A 
D b1A(P - 
Cb) ýý Yb +A 
iL ICs'proeurement price from (2 1) and (22) 
D, - (P - c, 
Xg, + x, ) + d(g, + X, 
)2 
(3) PS =: p+ 
gs 
iii. ICs' regulated exports from (7), (9), (11), (12), (14), (3 7) and the definition of p 
cs + 2d(gs + x,, ) -P-x0 X'ns Ct)s)p r 
Ct) s Ys - 
(ws + P, )gs nsgs 
r 
)t3rKr 
. nb )t3rO 
n. >0 
nb 
x -0 -n =0 
IsM 
iv. ICs'procurement from (7), (10), (11), (13) and (3 6) 
(10') 0) ,- [w, + cs + 2d(g, + x, )] - 
(1 
- co, 
XI -, u), 8s + 
(i - COS)PO 
as Y +, 8,, g, r Y, + P, )g., 1ý'g" - 8rKr nb 
v. Market equilibrium using (3 1) and (22) 
(34) nsxs =M = 2nMm 
Complementary definitions include LDCs' average demand for imports 
(3 l') m=Ayb - 
nb-nm 
nb 
the responsiveness of the demand to price 
loo 
(35) x2+ 
A' 
; O<nm <nb 
XF P 
Cb A JAIA 
; nm =nb 
the regional military capability 
(8') Kr = 2nrn m+ 2(nb - n,,, )gb 
the average procurement of producing LDCs 
n, n AP Y, +AP w (33) 9b b+ nb p( b 
+Cb)Db nn < nb 
0 
-n =n Mb 
and the definitions of A, A, Ap and Ap 
(19) A 
('-Ct)b))6b 
-O)bab(Wb +P') 
and A-- 
(1 
- Ct)b 
))6b 
(flb 
-Cob 
XWb 
+ P) (Lqb -Cob 
XWb 
+ p)2 
(29) AP 
O)b 
)18b 
- O)b ab 
(Wb 
+ Cb 
) 
and AP' 
Ob 
))6b 
2 (A 
- Ct)b 
XWb 
+ Cb 
) Ob 
- COb 
XWb 
+ Cb 
) 
The above system of 5 equations solves for 5 of the endogenous variables: nn, P, 
ps) g, and x,. It is a non non-linear system, which does not appear to take a complete 
algebraic solution. Instead, it can be solved with the use of numerical methods. 
Having calculated a solution for the price of arms P, we may then derive the 
individual solutions for each LDC. For the completeness of this summary these are 
A Importing LDCs'demand 
mi = AYj 
viL Producing LDCs'procurement 
I 
bi 
+Ap 
(w 
+c6)Db ; n,,, <nb (28') 9bi -= 
0Pb ; nm =nb 
viii. Producing LDCs'procurement price 
(26) Pbi = Cb + 
Db 
; nm < nb 
9bi 
These four additional equations provide vectors of solutions for the remaining 
variables fmij, fPbijand 
{gbij. 
In a summary, the parameters of the model are D, 
Db, Cs, Cb, d, -ws, 'Wb, O)s, O)b, as, 
ab, 8,, Bb,, 8,, A r, 0, n, nb, Ys, Yb and A (or equivalently YL and YH). It is noteworthy 
that in (22) the necessary for 0<n,,, < nb condition YH> Y* > YL implies that YH> YL, 
i. e. that the distribution of LDCs income is not trivial. This relaxes any possible 
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womes for division by zero in expressions (22), (35) and (9'). If YH= YL n,, either 
equals 0 or nb and providing that n,, is non-zero the model reduces to the LS case. 
7.4 Examination of model 
The summary of the previous section displays the set-up of our model but there is 
still need to examine its internal consistency and capacity to produce results with 
desirable properties. Since this model incorporates the complete LS model this 
examination builds upon the existing experience of LS's examination. It focuses on 
the performance of the model in the presence of the newly introduced components 
and assesses the capacity of the model to reproduce the observed stylised facts. The 
examination of the model includes two stages: an analytical followed by a numerical. 
Imposing in this examination that a number of LDCs enter the domestic arms 
production, let s= nlnb be the ratio of importing LDCs, which implies that I-s= (nb 
- nm)lnb is the ratio of the remaining arms-producing LDCs. 
In our model (as in LS) the world is divided in two parts ICs and LDCs, let 
(39) 
2nb Yb 
n, Y, 
be the ratio of the total income of LDCs to that- of ICs. - To examine the behaviour of 
the model, we may avoid the implications arising from the utility function, by 
ignoring regional security concerns and setting p=0. Solving from (9') we obtain 
(40) MCS = cS + 2d(gs + xs) =P+x0= MR, (P) X'n. 
This condition implies that under Laissez Faire (p = 0) industries export the quantity 
of arms that make marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. If the elasticity of demand 
is 6(P) = -(aM1aP)P1M= -PYIXwe can express the marginal revenue of arms industry 
as M-R, (P) =P [I -I In, 6(P)]. 
Substituting for AILR(P) in (10') we can solve for ICs' procurement level. 
(41) gs _ _(I 
- co, 
), 8, - co. a. 
[w. +MR, (P)] 
Y, 8S [wS + coSMRs (P) + (I - cos)p, 
] 
Using the definitions of defence budgets B, and B,, the income share of ICs 
expenditure in defence takes the form 
(42) 1ý = 
B, 
(w + P') 
gs 
Y, Y, 
for iCs and 
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(43) rm = 
B.. 
= (Wb +P) 
M 
Yb Yb 
for the average importing LDCs- Without any loss of generality we may further 
assume that A= Yb so that the uniform distribution of LDCs' income varies from 0 to 
2Yb. Under this simplifying assumption using (3 F) and (43) we arrive at 
(44) mlYb = r,, I('Wb + P) = SA 
The procurement price that ICs' governments purchase domestic arms includes 
either a subsidy of a tax, dependent if it is higher or lower than the international price 
P. Let the subsidy (or tax if negative) of ICs be z-, = p, - P. Given -c,, from (42) and 
(43) the income share of ICs procureýnent takes the form 
(45) 
91 1ý 
Y, ws +P+-r s 
If r,,, = PxxIB, = Pxl(w, + p, )g, is the share of exports to defence budget of the same 
group, solving with the use of (42) for the income share of exports we obtain 
(46) ss xs 
Ys P 
In the context of this examination we may also simplify the model assuming that ICs 
produce under constant marginal cost, i. e. that d=0. 
Using available information we can roughly observe quantities r, r,,,, r, subsidy z's 
and ratio s and adjust our model to meet these requirements. From these ratios we can 
calculate values for xIY, and mlYb, using (44) and (46). The market cleaning condition 
(34), then, takes the form xIY, = s6(mlYb). Based on the specified quantities we may 
further calculate the corresponding level of LDCs to ICs income ratio 
(47) 
s M/Y, 
Moving towards a complete re-parameterisation of the model, so that it can be 
brought in line with the observed stylised facts, we can determine the corresponding 
sizes of the remaining parameters. Relationships (41) and (44) hold simultaneously, 
involving a number of common parameters. If we also consider labour costs w, andwb 
and the variable benefits of defence 6, Bb and 8, as observable coefficients, limiting 
a, = ab and co, = a), we may then define appropriate values for these remaining 
parameters. Since (41) and (44) together with the definition of A in (19) consist a non- 
linear system of equations a possible solution of it requires the use of iterative 
numerical methods. The only as yet undefined coefficient of this system is LDCs 
marginal Cost Cb, which we examine later. For any given value Of Cb, however, we 
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may calculate the responsiveness of the demand side to prices XýX and, thus, the 
corresponding value of c, using the MC= MR condition (40) for ICs. This gives 
(48) CsD+x1 X'n 
s 
The last two parameters remaining for definition are the set-up costs for the two 
groups. Applying A= Yb to (22) we can determine the level of LDCs'set-up costs that 
corresponds to the desirable level of ratio s. 
(49) Dblyb= 2s(P - Cb)A 
Last, given that d=0 from the participation constraint (3) we can derive the 
corresponding cost of ICs industry as 
(50) Ds x 
-1(1+z-s)-csl' +(P-Cs)----ý YS YS YS 
This completes the construction of the model in terms of observable and unobservable 
quantities and prepares the background for the calibration and numerical examination 
that follow. 
7.5 Numerical results 
We now turn to numerical results based on a baseline calibration. Since the system 
of equations, which solves for the endogenous variables of the model, is not linear we 
must calculate solutions using Gauss-Newton iterative method, providing that 
solutions exist. In order to allow for comparison of these results with those of LS we 
use the same values of parameters, in most of the cases. The parameters have different 
values only when the differences of the two models make it necessary. The re- 
arrangement of the model in the previous section essentially prepares the baseline 
calibration of the simulations and also follows the LS method when possible. 
In our baseline calibration, where possible we used the same values with LS. This 
applies to shares r, r, r,, and rs, coefficients 8s, 8b and 8, labour costs -W, and -Vvb, 
number of interventions r, numbers of ICs and couples of LDCs ns and nb, Coefficient 
of regional concern p, coefficient d and the type of game (P. A newly introduced share 
is the ratio of importing LDCs s and a new parameter is the spread of income 
distribution of LDCs A. With these values and the method set out in the previous 
section we derive parameters cos, cob, a, ab, Ds, Db, cs and the relative income level 0. 
The only parameter as yet without a value is critical for the entry of LDCs to 
production, the marginal Cost Cb. Figure 7.1 displays the change of derived parameters 
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as a result of changingCb. Note that predefined shares are used only in the baseline 
calibration for the calculation of derived parameters, whereas these values of all 
coefficients (but not these shares) are used in the simulations. 
Figure 7.1 Calibrated coefficients as a functionOf Cb 
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Figure 7.1 contains four diagrams showing the values of some calibrated 
magnitudes for a range of valuesOf Cb- The top left diagram gives ICs marginal cost c, 
and 45' line, which shows the difference fromCb- Notice that in order to keep the 
desirable shares imply that the marginal cost of ICs' has to stay higher than that of 
LDCs, even whenCb takes a large value near this of ICs. Left bottom diagram plots 
the calibrated parameters o),, Ct)b, a, and ab, which stay close to the LS levels with a 
smooth change. The inverted responsiveness of the demand XIX', at the right bottom 
plot, changes rather drastically compared to LS case, apparently as a result of LDCs 
option of autonomy. The top right diagram gives the derived set-up costs for the two 
groups, expressed as shares of each group's average income. Table I gives the values 
of all old and new, predefined and derived baseline values of parameters for a chosen 
value 0.580f Cb. 
The LS paper provides evidence in support of the specific values of predefined 
parameters and shares. Namely, the shares correspond on average to the figures of 
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standard empirical databases, as SIPBJ and ACDA, and beta coefficients correspond 
to the folk theorem that an attacker has to achieve an at least 3: 1 superiority in 
military capability. A unitary deviation to average income ratio AlYb implies that 
LDCs' uniform distribution of income spreads from zero up to level Yb, a pattern 
which is not far from reality. The lower marginal cost of LDCs arms industry may be 
mainly attributed to lower labour costs and possibly cheaper raw materials. 
Table 7.1 Values of predefined and derived parameters 
Shares r, rxs r,, Ts s 
Value 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.3 23/24 
Predefined Parameters A, )6b, )6r WS Wb rlnb d 
Value 3 1.3 1 1/6 0.05 0 
Predefined Parameters (P n., nb Cb Alyb 
Value 1 4 12 0.58 1 
Derived Parameters COs, Ct)b as, ab CS D)Y, 
Dblyb 0 
Valu. 0.8586 0.182 0.913 0.0048 0.021 0.15 
Set-up costs mainly consist of investment in R&D, which is required for the 
technical innovations that make produced arms useful, in each time period. Note that 
the two set-up costs, which measure values, are represented as income shares of each 
group's average income. -In order to compare the absolute levels of set-up costs of the 
two groups we need to express them as proportions of the same amount, say of Y, [i. e. 
Dblys = Dblyb(Onsl2nb)]. After this transformation whenCb takes the baseline value 
0.58) Dblys takes the value 0.00053, which is about nine times lower than the 
respective ratio of ICs. The assumption that LDCs face lower R&D costs is based on 
the possibility of imitating IC's innovations from R&D. Imitation of ICs' technology 
can take place in reality, providing that the length of the single time period we 
examine is long enough for copying process. Notice that the derived relationship of 
set-up costs becomes more extreme whenCb rises beyond its baseline value. Thus, 
keeping the LS calibration, the set-up cost relationship is more realistic for relatively 
lower valuesOf Cb- 
Solving the model for a range of different values of a specific parameter we can 
examine the impact to the endogenous magnitudes and the overall equilibrium of the 
market. The simulation illustrated in figure 7.2 uses the baseline parameter values of 
table 7.1, for a range of values of LDCsI marginal cost. Of course, the shares of table 
7.1 do not necessarily hold any more but they vary with Cb- 
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Figure 7.2 Trade, procurement, prices, security and welfare as a 
function of LDCs' marginal cost 
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Diagram A plots the procurement and exports of ICs. Diagram B plots the average 
imports and, when LDCs are producing, the average domestic procurement of LDCs. 
Diagram C plots the now endogenous number of producing LDCs. Diagram D plots 
the international price of traded arms in equilibrium and the two prices of domestic 
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procurement of the two groups of producing countries. Diagram E plots the security 
for either type of LDCs, diagram F plots welfare in logarithms for the three groups of 
countries and diagrams G and H plot regional and total security for ICs respectively. 
All magnitudes that refer to any of LDCs' groups are group averages. As diagram C 
shows when Cb is higher than a critical level of about 0.6, the number of arms 
producing LDCs reaches zero and LDCs do not produce but merely import arms. 
Passing from this critical level some of the endogenous variables of the model change 
discontinuously. When Cb is equal to this critical level LDCs are indifferent to 
entering and the solution is undefined. 
From a closer observation of these results, Cb has a negative effect on the 
equilibrium price of imported arms (P), which keeps failing when Cb rises. This 
happens because the higher theCb the lower the number of producing LDCs the higher 
the number of importing. More aggregate imports imply more exports and therefore 
less unitary cost. This happens until Cb reaches the level that LDCs are not producing 
arms any more, when the demand for traded arms suddenly becomes more inelastic 
and the price discontinuously jumps to a higher level. The exports of ICs and the 
imports of the increasing number of LDCs increase withCb but they fall when LDCs 
move out of production, apparently as a result of the price increase. With the implied 
reduction of LDCs procurement it is an expected result that regional security rises 
together withCb, following to the decrease of LDCs total procurement. The reduction 
of ICs welfare is a result of the opportunity cost of the increased arms exports. I-Egher 
Cb causes both increases in the unitary subsidy and in the amount of exports, which 
result in a stronger rise of the total subsidy. This together with the decrease of 
domestic procurement offset the benefits in regional security with a final result the 
slight reduction of national security. 
Figure 7.3 illustrates the results of a simulation that solves the model for changing 
values of the weight of regional security in the ICs assessment of security, i. e. p. As 
diagram C indirectly shows, when p increases the number of arms producing 
countries first increases and then decreases. When p exceeds some critical level, 
shown in the diagrams, there no producing LDCs in equilibrium but they are all net 
importers. Whilst u increases from an initially low level, ICs increase their 
procurement so that they can have increase capability of intervention in possible 
regional conflicts. Using procurement prices as an instrument to control arms exports 
they lower it, reducing the subsidy they provide to their domestic industry. As a result 
of this policy the market price of arms increases with the resulting reduced impact on 
LDCS' imports. This reduction is accelerated from the implied relaxation of the 
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intensity of arms races. The increase of the price of arms first encourages the entry of 
the largest LDCs to domestic production. When the price increases more, however, 
the further decrease of the demand for military capability discourages the entry of 
LDCs into production. This is a direct result of the assumptions of this model that 
LDCs establish their domestic arms industry when the total cost of their imports is 
equal or higher with that of producing the same quantity domestically. When U 
increases enough and LDCs do not produce arms the price of arms and the trade 
(imports - exports) jump discontinuously at higher and lower levels respectively. 
Figure 7.3 Trade, procurement, prices and number of producers as a 
function of ICs' weight on regional security 
r. t) 
. 1.6 
0.9 
02 
9's 
xs 
12 
11,825[ 
11.65 L 
0 0.1 0.2 
1.05 
9b 
0.1 0.2 
D 
B 
Pb 
0.8 L 
0 0.1 
ýt 
0.2 
The case illustrated in figure 7.3 allows the comparison of the predictions of this 
model with those of LS. LS have shown that cooperation between large arms 
producing countries may cause Pareto improvements, increasing the welfare of the 
two country groups. In each model the benefits of ICs originate from the elimination 
of market failures that originate from the oligopolistic nature of the market of arms. 
Furthermore, the non co-operative behaviour of ICs implies additional negative 
externalities. One of them is the free rider problem between ICs, caused by the public 
good nature of regional security. Another is the lack of collaboration over R&D cost 
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of each country's arms industry. In LS the welfare improvements of LDCs are a result 
of the reduction of arms races due to the increase of the price of imported arms. In our 
model, however we have seen that the entry of countries to domestic industry can 
either be encouraged or discouraged by an increase of the price. 
7.6 Conclusions 
An analytical model becomes useful in practice when it helps to understand 
phenomena as yet unexplained, uncovering their generating mechanisms so that this 
knowledge can be used to make predictions. Another purpose of theoretical structuresl 
independent of predictabiiity, is to provide a rational basis for the implementation of 
policy decisions. In this context, the main target of the type of models we discuss in 
this chapter is to penetrate under the noisy surface of the arms trade figures and reach 
the essential principals that motivate the agents involved in their actions. 
The model, as it appears in this paper, took its final form following the realisation. 
that the assumption of price competitiveness in the world market of arms did not 
allow a realistic calibration of the model. This version excludes the exports of arms 
producing LDCs from the supply side of the market. In fact, under competitive entry 
of producers to the supply side of the world market and using the calibration lines 
followed by both Levine-Smith and this work, LDCs dominate the world market. 
Since the model reproduces the remaining observable stylised facts only when the 
marginal cost of LDCs is considerably smaller than that of industrialised countries, if 
they were to compete in price with ICs they would earn a vast share of exports leaving 
ICs with exports near zero. This possibly indicates that the small market share of 
LDCs on the supply side is not a result of competition in price with ICs. 
This chapter has mainly covered an introductory analytical examination of the 
developed theory, leaving space for further, more in depth examination of the 
predictions of this analysis, though new numerical experiments. These could examine 
the impact of changing various parameters of the model as well as the type of game 
(common defence policy of ICs). These results must carefully selected so that they 
can be brought in line and compared with the results of LS model. Having understood 
in more depth'the predictions of this theory we need to provide links with reality and 
specific policy recommendations. The strength of this study is that it provides a 
generalised theory of the arms trade. Research on these directions continues. 
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8. Conclusions 
It is a fortunate event when some encouraging results come out from an early stage of 
a study. The results of the cross-sectional examination stimulated the interest, motivated 
for a deeper study of the subject and raised a number of challenging questions. 
According to the results of chapter 4, the demand for imported arms generally follows 
patterns that are in line with the theoretical expectations. These results show that the 
price of imported arms has a negative effect and the level of countries' expenditure in 
defence has a positive effect on demand. The effect of military expenditure, however, 
seems to be stronger in the case of smaller countries, with respectively smaller budgets, 
but gets weaker when military expenditure is relatively large. In a similar way) when the 
level of economic development rises the demand of countries appears to get weaker, 
possibly because of the substitution of imported by domestically produced arms. 
Supporting that countries' demand for imported arms generally follows standard 
patterns, directly implies that policies for the arms trade may consider using tools 
commonly used in trade policies. Our results appear to suggest that the price of 
internationally traded arms can be an effective policy tool for the control of this market. 
This contradicts the previous belief that the demand for arms mostly depends in non- 
price factors and that information about the actual prices that countries pay for the arms 
they import is unobtainable. In chapter 4, however, the estimated demand pattern is not 
directly associated with the theory but there is a loose connection between the two. Also, 
the theoretical examination developed in this chapter leaves several issues open making 
it inappropriate for the needs of empirical work. Therefore, we needed to develop both 
the empirical and theoretical aspects of this particular approach, attempting to bridge the 
gap between the two. This was the target of chapters 6 and 7, which developed 
theoretical structures that better accord with the empirical facts. 
There are some other useful conclusions we may draw from the outcome of chapters 
3 and 4. The theoretically acceptable properties and the statistical confidence of the 
responses to the calculated price index give useful feedback about the whole idea of 
using this index. In particular, it shows that SIPRI and ACDA series of arms imports in 
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fact indicate volume and value respectively. It is interesting that the analysis of 
measurement errors enforces the argument of responsive relationships and the 
correspondence of the estimations with the theory, instead of blurring the clarity of our 
results. Another useful indication came from our preference to be very selective about 
the quality of data, monitoring closely their contents. Being selective about qualitative 
proper-ties of data has greatly contributed to the satisfactory results. Putting this vice 
versa, we can draw an interesting qualitative conclusion regarding the data, ex post from 
their satisfactory performance. It should be clear, though, that this does not imply that 
data on the arms trade are free of problems but merely that they are not bad enough to be 
useless (e. g see Sandler & Hartleyf1995], p. 254). 
The study of regional panel data gave some relatively clear results, free of important 
contradictions. From the outcome of this study we can isolate the following four results. 
First, the results are in line with those from the cross-sectional one (chapter 4)- the 
essence of these is that the demand for imported arms generally follows standard 
patterns with positive responses to the budget and negative responses to the price, both 
of reasonable strength. A second selected result is that the structure of the demand is 
found to vary across different regions of the world. The form of this variation appears to 
be of the fixed rather than the random type, in both cases. This is an indication of the 
endogeneity of the- variations to the process. Third, over time demand appears to follow 
a double trend, first increasing and then decreasing. Fourth, the structure of demand 
appears to be constant over time. In the following paragraphs we refer to these results 
more analytically. 
Despite the limited sample size, the pattern of the estimated regional demands is 
generally well supported by the data. In some cases this support is quite strong. Most 
regions have a positive response to military expenditure and a negative response to price 
with elasticities estimated near unity. The Middle East appears to divert from this rule, 
having the direction of these two responses inverted and indications of possible 
underlying dynamics. Relatively less developed areas like Africa, Asia and Middle East 
showed stronger responses to military expenditure and weaker responses to price. On the 
contrary, more developed areas, such as North America, Europe and Oceania generally 
showed elastic responses to prices and inelastic responses to military expenditure. 
Central and South Americas had both of these effects relatively more elastic. The effect 
of per-capita GNP on the demand for arms imports varied, taking a positive value in the 
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case of Middle East and South America and negative in all other cases. Providing that 
the structure of countries' demand for arms varies across different regions of the world, 
we can expect the outcome of price related Policy measures to vary accordingly. This 
means that the effectiveness of demand-oriented policies will depend on what degree 
these variations are understood and taken into account. 
Over time, the demand for imported arms seems to increase until 1987, succeeded by 
a relatively steep and steady decline until the end of the examined time period. Each part 
of this twin trend has a smooth and approximately linear shape. The declining part 
shows a tendency to stabilise (convexity), in the most recent years. From our results, 
however, this trend appears to be'the only variation of the demand over time, whereas 
we have significant evidence that the underlying structure of the generating mechanism 
of this demand remains unchanged. Since the change in the level (trend) follows closely 
the evolution of the intensity of the Cold War we may well attribute the trend component 
of the demand. If this is true, we have isolated the impact of the Cold War from the 
endogenous processes of this demand and we have demonstrated that the two are 
separable. When the time effect is estimated independently for each region, with the use 
of a quadratic trend, all regions turn out to follow the same twin pattern, with a small 
variation of their turning points. 
An important determinant of the quality of empirical work is the close 
correspondence of the applied methodology with an underlining theoretical framework. 
This points towards one of the main weaknesses of our empirical studies in chapters 4 
and 5, the use of an ad hoc simple analytical framework rather than an explicitly 
specified one. The theory discussed in the context of the cross-sectional estimation is 
linked but not directly connected with the estimated demand functions. There is also no 
direct link between the results of the panel data study and some particular model of the 
arms trade. Having obtained a considerable amount of empirical information, the natural 
progress is to aim at theoretical developments that will bridge this gap and develop a 
close link between theory and practice. The analysis in chapter 6, therefore, is the result 
of an attempt to introduce a number of characteristics into the preliminary analytical 
approach of chapters 4 and 5 that brings it closer to the actual empirical results. 
A critical for our analysis characteristicc of the suggested production function is the 
concavity of the response of imported arms to both military expenditure and per-capita 
income of countries. In practice, this implies that when countries are either larger or 
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richer (more developed - higher per capita GDP) they tend to produce their own arms so 
they are less dependent on imports. In other words, we need to introduce into our models 
an endogenous process for the entry of countries into domestic production as well as 
differentiated categories of arms in the analysis of the arms trade, characteristics not 
provided by other works. Such a differentiation could also be used to resolve the 
commonly mentioned need to distinguish between major and minor categories of arms. 
Following to these requirements, the final form of our model in chapter 6 has been based 
largely on the use of a modified form of the Stone-Geary function, which is further 
discussed in appendix B and provides the desired properties of substitution. It should be 
mentioned that it has not been possible to detect an analvsis of the r)articular i)roDerties 
of this framework in the literature. From the results of our examination, however, it 
appears that the performance of the framework employed corresponds to the 
expectations. 
According to the predictions of the model developed in chapter 6 the establishment of 
a domestic industry of arms has a considerable effect on the demand of countries for 
internationally traded arms. When the domestic industry becomes established, domestic 
arms directly substitute for part of the initially imported arms and the demand for the 
latter category becomes less responsive to the military budget of the country. Also, the 
effect of economic development on this demand decreases, possibly changing from 
positive to negative. The effect of the price of arms imports, however, appears to remain 
always negative and unaffected by the state of establishment , in 
line with the empirical 
results of chapter 4. The attempt to apply this theory in an empirical also yielded some 
interesting results. The estimated parameters have significant and theoretically correct 
signs. These results, however, do not provide estimates for all the parameters of the 
model, a complete evaluation of which requires additional data. 
The material included in chapter 7 is the result of an effort to incorporate some of the 
findings of the previous work into the contemporary international arms trade, which 
considers both the demand and supply side of this market. It is an attempt to generalise 
the Levine-Smith quasi-general equilibrium, world market model by introducing the 
optional entry of countries to domestic production and bring the theory of the arms trade 
nearer to the empirical facts. An initial attempt to incorporate both the mechanism of 
entry and the differentiated categories of arms showed that this could possible but 
requires an examination the scale of which exceeds the limits this thesis. Chapter 7, thus, 
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attempts to endogenise the entry of countries to domestic production, always assuming a 
single, non-differentiated category of arms that can either be imported or domestically 
produced. 
The examination of the model developed in chapter 7 predicts that an increase of the 
price of traded arms encourages countries to produce their own arms, passing from the 
reliance on imports to self-sufficiency. In an interesting way, it shows that the opposite 
may also happen. Under appropriate conditions the raising of price might prevent arms 
races and encourage countries to avoid arms production and spend more on peaceful 
activities, rather than on security. It gives encouraging evidence that if large arms- 
producing industrialised countries ýecome adequately concerned about regional security, 
other countries might prefer to keep out of major arms producing activities. Another 
interesting result from this study is that it is impossible to allow for price 
competitiveness in the world market of arms and keep the market shares as we observe 
them in the real world. In fact, under competitive entry of producers to the supply side of 
the world market and using the calibration lines followed by both Levine-Smith this 
model predicts that LDCs would dominate the world market. The contradiction of this 
result with the observed reality possibly indicates that an assumption of price 
competitiveness in the international market of arms is unrealistic. It should be clear that 
chapter 7 is a very technical study, which requires further examination. 
There are several ways that the research developed in the context of this thesis may 
continue. For a further development of the empirical research we need to extend our data 
set, both in terms of quality and quantity. Regarding the expansion of our data set using 
the latest releases of ACDA and SIPRI, we may increase the number of observations of 
our set over time. An extension of this examination from aggregate-regional to country 
level needs to overcome the difficulty of several zero observations, due to missing 
information. Such an attempt could be possible with the use of econometric techniques 
appropriate for this type of measurement errors, such as a form of Tobit type model. 
A possible way to continue the study. of the small-country model could be an 
examination of a wider theoretical framework, introducing a welfare function of the 
central government and move towards general equilibrium models. This would allow for 
a more realistic distribution of resources between defence and other sectors of the 
economy. The empirical part of chapter 6 is a preliminary examination rather than a 
complete estimation of the model. A complete identification of the model requires 
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additional information, such as data on countries' arms production. We may attempt to 
put together data series on countries' domestic production either in a direct or indirect 
way. Alternatively, we may employ the assumption of the panel data study that the 
countries of each geographical region have equal income shares of military expenditure 
and attempt to bring the two studies together, identifying a complete and more powerful 
model. 
An attractive way to further develop the model of chapter 6 would be to incorporate 
its useful characteristics in a much more powerful model, such as that of chapter 7. 
Although chapter 7 reproduces the effect of entry to domestic production of arms, the 
formulation of the decision of this entry is more simplistic than in the small country 
model. It also allows for only a single category of arms, without differentiation between 
domestic and imported ones. If the production framework of chapter 6 were incorporated 
into the world model of chapter 7 the result would possibly avoid the limitations of each. 
Research in these directions continues, always motivated by the hope that a clearer 
understanding of international security processes will contribute towards less abuse of 
military power. 
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A. Appendices of the chapters 
A-3 Appendix of c-hapter 3: the cross-sectional data set 
Nr Country 
SIPRI 
Arms Imports Mil-Exp 
ACDA 
Arms Imports Mil-Exp 
PWT 
PC-GDP 
1 Algeria 472.50 935.32 218.61 783-68 2976.62 
2 Australia 345.00 5947.31 316.68 5772.23 17384.29 
3 Bangladesh 143.50 327.05 39.41 294.68 1709.23 
4 Belgium 224.00 4611.70 256.19 4469.75 16495.20 
5 Brazil 183.00 1655.29 238.77 7253-44 4814.75 
6 Bulgaria 515.50 432-52 339.14 2647.57 7019.78 
7 Canada 584.50 10979.87 201.19 9633.36 20235.01 
8 Chile 144.00 544.29 69.20 1008.71 5366.31 
9 China 138.00 6319.95 192.03 48629.70 1609.11 
10 Egypt 994.50 1758.00 615-03 1469.29 2196.04 
11 Finland 99.00 2281.21 24.75 1503.21 16434.05 
12 France 513.00 42731.91 266.27 40646.20 16955.64 
13 Germany, FR 1044.50 40767.89 703-94 39188.82 18047.36 
14 Greece 894.50 3763.07 236.94 3706.23 8326.74 
15 Hungary 31.50 732.04 15.58 1245.19 6130.10 
16 India 1546.50 8322.20 1314-85 6107.24 1506.00 
17 Indonesia 220.00 1361.16 145.28 1686.53 2350.72 
18 Iran 475.50 10733.04 1919.34 6115.49 3863.31 
19 Israel 701.00 6288.36 542.62 5555.45 11426.26 
20 Italy 97.50 23540.90 227.31 19115.49 15496.40 
21 Japan 2329.00 28629.04 1182.86 36475.71 17898.68 
22 Korea, South 540.50 9809.47 792.39 5522.46 8591.13 
23 Morocco 100.00 973.73 109.99 1159.95 2675.06 
24 Netherlands 254.00 7291.03 429.42 6828-14 15756.59 
25 Norway 313.50 3343.87 336.85 2807.97 16023.98 
26 Pakistan 674.00 2719.71 410.63 2593.95 1673.26 
27 Poland 371.50 1331.66 114.57 7917.51 4545.56 
28 Portugal 602.00 1899.91 453.71 2100-82 9276.98 
29 Singapore 358.50 1833.27 250.69 1962.42 14833.93 
30 Spain 462.50 8914.02 292.85 7758.02 12019.78 
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31 Switzerland 276.50 8275.47 522-91 4455.55 20495.80 
32 Syria 83-00 2164.35 791-02 4432.63 4758.99 
33 Taiwan 710-00 8191.53 626.95 9207.1S 9845.32 
34 Thailand 533-50 2285.69 374.43 2370.76 4383.69 
35 Turkey 879.00 5389.27 1086.16 4253.90 4459.83 
36 UK 475.50 40431.24 856.55 35696.61 15640.29 
37 USA 323.50 293231.00 1822.64 287946.84 21356-12 
38 Venezuela 143.00 632.14 181.94 1402.84 7242.21 
Note: All series are averages of the years 1990 and 1991 and are measured in constant 
1990 million U. S. dollars. Exception is ACDA imports for Hungary which is average of 
the years 19 8) 97 and 11.992. 
A. 4 Appendices of chapter 4 
A. 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
List of Variables and their Descriptions 
LACIM LOGof ACDAArm Imports AV9091 in m. (1990) U. S. $ 
LACME LOG of ACDA Milit. Expenditure AV90-91 in m. (1990) U. S. $ 
LARPI LOG of LACIM - LSIIM 
LGDPT LOG of PWT pc-GDP corr. for T. of Tr. AV9091 in (1990) U. S. $ 
LSI1M LOG of SIPRI Arm Imports AV90-91 in m. (1990) U. S. $ 
LSIME LOG of SIPRI Military Expenditure AV90-91 in m. (1990) U. S. $ 
POP Population in m. people 
Statistics 
Sample period 1 to 38 
Variable(s) LSIIM LSIME LACIN4 LACME LARPI LGDPT POP 
Maximum 7.7532 12.5887 7.5597 12.5705 2.2545 9.9691 1141.6 
Minimum 3.4500 5.7901 2.7460 5.6859 -1.3864 7.3172 2.7340 
Mean 5.8534 8.3561 5.7385 8.5232 -. 11490 8.8979 99.6469 
Std. Deviation . 
89646 1.4658 1.0775 1.3630 
. 
80123 
. 
84435 224.054 
Skewness . -. 
39012 
. 
55299 
. 
76479 
. 
70501 
. 
87693 -. 45206 3.7946 
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Kurtosis -3:. 058752 . 
32892 . 
74001 
. 
76347 1.0095 -1.0857 -1.0857 
Coef of Variation: . 
15315 
. 
17542 . 
18776 
. 
15992 6.9732 
. 
094893 
. 
094893 
Estimated Correlation Matrix of Variables 
LSIIM LSIME LACIM LACME LARPI LGDPT 
LSIME 
. 
39201 
LACIM 
. 
68464 
. 
62211 
LACME 
. 
29134 
. 
89911 
. 
54485 
LARPI -. 19819 . 
39798 57874 
. 
40672 
LGEUPT 
. 
074196 
. 
54273 
. 
13899 
. 
44979 
. 10389 
POP 
. 
051832 
. 
16729 
. 
13053 
. 
32919 
. 
11754 -. 45644 
List of Variables and their Descriptions 
LSHSIDvE\4E LOG of Al to ME share from SIPRI 
LSHACEýME LOG of Al to ME share from ACDA 
LTOTGDPT LOG of total GDP from PWT (corrected for the terms of trade) in 
million constant (1990) U. S. dollars. 
LTOTGDPT2 := LTOTGDPT 2 
Statistics 
Sample period :I to 38 
Variable(s) LSHSIIMME LSACD"E 
Maximum 0.17552 -0.87086 
Minimum -6.8095 -5.5344 
Mean -2.5027 -2.7847 
Std. Deviation 1.3864 1.1910 
Estimated Correlation Matrix of Variables 
LSAC 
LTOTGDPT 
LSHSBAB4E 
0.67780 
-0.62431 
LSACIMME 
-0.52707 
LTOTGDPT 
15.4976 
10.6104 
12.4331 
1.2170 
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A. 4.2 Leverage Values and Residuals 
Estimation of (27) Estimation of (29) Estimation of (31) 
Nr Countrv Residual Leverage Residual Leverage Residual Leverage 
1 Algeria 0.380 0.073 0.423 0.083 0.432 0.106 
2 Australia 0.105 0.059 0.126 0.107 0.114 0.098 
3 Bangladesh -0.774 0.158 -0.095 0.385 0.077 0.514 
4 Belgium -0.118 0.066 -0.096 0.113 -0.235 0.122 
5 Brazil -0.153 0.055 -0.314 0.076 -0.338 0.089 
6 Bulgaria 1.231 0.121 1.477 0.197 1.406 0.141 
7 Canada -0.096 0.122 -0.039 0.162 0.373 0.292 
8 Chile -0.383 0.086 -0.258 0.146 -0.163 0.136 
9 China -1.305 0.173 -1.257 0.237 -1.046 0.354 
10 Egypt 0.908 0.087 0.928 0.092 0.864 0.106 
11 Finland -1.402 0 ., 135 -1.339 
0.156 -0.659 0.469 
19 Prnnce . -n 
rrr, . 0.148- -n. r, 4n ýý w n1 ri W. 1-ý -n.. qn, ) n. 279 
13 G ermany, FIR 0.218 0.121 0.292 0.127 0.208 0.211 
14 Greece 0.414 0.097 0.083 0.173 0.094 0.184 
15 Hungary -1.980 0.074 -1.951 0.112 -1.878 0.116 
16 India 0.720 0.215 0.776 0.274 0.364 0.441 
17 Indonesia -0.436 0.077 -0.384 0.079 -0.353 0.100 
18 Iran 0.493 0.153 0.170 0.211 0.731 0.395 
19 Israel 0.582 0.035 0.353 0.061 0.291 0.060 
20 Italy -1.321 0.085 -1.349 0.087 -1.450 
0.123 
21 Japan 1.029 0.121 1.045 0.121 1.042 0.218 
22 Korea, South 0.372 0.040 0.041 0.105 -0.083 0.118 
23 Morocco -0.779 0.080 -0.669 0.086 -0.459 
0.196 
24 Netherlands -0.007 0.068 -0.040 0.102 -0.255 
0.133 
25 Norway 0.320 0.074 0.364 0.118 0.208 0.137 
26 Pakistan 0.241 0.137 0.336 0.187 0.107 0.213 
27 Poland -0.103 0.079 -0.269 0.126 -0.295 
0.169 
28 Portugal 0.884 0.048 0.754 0.058 0.693 0.068 
29 Singapore 0.477 0.086 0.568 0.111 0.573 0.156 
30 Spain -0.075 0.048 -0.312 0.077 -0.366 
0.074 
31 Switzerland 0.155 0.096 0.306 0.226 0.039 0.274 
32 Syria -0.04.9 0.350 -0.180 0,360 
0.010 0.550 
33 Taiwan 0.504 0.033 0.202 0.084 0.071 0.093 
34 Thailand 0.431 0.038 0.182 0.083 0.095 0.091 
35 Turkey 0.847 0.046 0.492 0.121 0.433 0.122 
36 UK -0.104 0.093 -0.083 0.100 -0.169 
0.115 
37 USA -0.689 0,295 0,087 0.740 
0.399 0.792 
38 Venesuela 0.128 0.128 0.269 0.154 -0.069 0.146 
Mean (=k1n; n= 38): 0.105 (k 4) 0.158 (k 6) 0.210 (k--8) 
Mean x 2: 0.210 0.316 0.421 
Note: Observations with leverage values higher than double of the mean are 
characterised as influential and their figures are in italics and underlined 
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A. 5 Appendices of chapter 5 
A-5.1 Region Codes 
The II aggregates are coded as follows: 
0: World aggregate 
I -. Africa 
2 - North America 
Central America 
4 South America 
5 , %. sia 
6 Europe 
7. Nliddle East 
8: Oceania 
9: NATO 
10: OECD 
11: OPEC 
A. 5.2 The da ta 
YEAR REGION PRICE INDEX SIPRI Al ACDA ME ACDA GNP ACDA P-C GNP 
83 0 0.374188642 10.69253565 13.90622725 16.77958283 8.416201239 
84 0 0.495807759 10.66279694 13.92077024 16.81718299 8.436926223 
85 0 0.419213388 10.58943387 13.93859574 16.84901711 8.451855122 
86 0 0.30548878 10.69462314 13.95841584 16.87901284 8.464393538 
87 0 0.384885319 10.74455893 13.95960693 16.91187173 8.479715365 
88 0 0.468458712 10.56061888 13.94787261 16.95486294 8.505295219 
89 0 0.342298281 10.54001147 13.91439737 16.98420203 8.517385963 
90 0 0.384817042 10.33822016 13.88584686 16.99988413 8.515998459 
91 0 0.132320353 10.14749199 13.79915387 17.00367201 8.50361845 
92 0 -0.08976213 10.11763072 13.67996063 16.97762688 8.461882947 
93 0 -0.19630028 10.10618347 13.58731301 16.99302957 8.461385836 
83 1 0.79429 8.322637097 9.677130778 12.5983129 6.550492273 
84 1 0.76540 8.393216012 9.705461285 12.60755795 6.530706477 
85 1 0.42192 8.343791732 9.593249294 12.6347911 6.52870566 
86 1 0.44885 8.206310726 9.599479844 12.6347911 6.499706447 
87 1 0.86079 8.077447149 9.541956 12.65547131 6.376267404 
88 1 1.01546 7.803026644 9.555028082 12.67286305 6.477877945 
89 1 0.89232 7.570443252 9.561500596 12.70398296 6.480795819 
90 1 0.36697 7.43838353 9.528710773 12.72874351 6.476008154 
121 
91 1 0.38025 6.74051936 9.423350258 12.75024972 6.468642789 
92 1 -0.36313 6.439350371 9.38560993 12.7475866 6.437251775 
93 1 -0.21121 5.758901774 9.263007608 12.7475866 6.408678402 
83 2 0.54782 6.999422468 12.58459697 15.43950742 9.719661557 
84 2 0.73643 7.030857476 12.62790176 15.49690669 9.765700472 
85 2 0.59863 7.158513997 12.67830797 15.52698541 9.784252538 
86 2 0.81148 7.007600614 12.73524407 15.55086617 9.796447504 
87 2 0.77613 7.222566019 12.73064388 15.58111362 9.81485708 
88 2 1.28785 6.811244379 12.70953853 15.62017147 9.84193191 
89 2 0.95315 6.65415252 12.70231025 15.64651424 9.855873167 
90 2 1.53214 6.102558595 12.66767721 15.65993726 9.856493341 
91 2 0.39445 7.259116128 12.54391882 15.65485189 9.837948076 
92 2 0.62084 6.914730893 12.60047773 15,67461167 9.844157516 
93 2 0.28111 7.021976423 12.55594171 15.70332986 9.859772163 
83 3 -0.37001 8.137688li5 9.722082166 13.50025976 8.035946471 
84 3 -0.24992 8.190631681 9.765099551 13.5052723 8.020212974 
85 3 -0.11617 7.215975003 9.642039459 13.53118368 8.026545418 
86 3 -0.14189 7.042286172 9.770348907 13.62194361 8.097371128 
87 3 -0.30277 7.438971592 9.688559474 13.66013701 8.116019935 
88 3 0.34018 6.628041376 9.688559474 13.65584516 8.092558167 
89 3 -0.14586 7.153833802 9.677130778 13.64503424 8.062937919 
90 3 -0.05703 6.747586527 9.671367074 13.63630056 8.036758953 
91 3 -0.14241 6.683360946 9.567931486 13.67817463 8.061820256 
92 3 -0.42587 6.411818268 9.555028082 13.70923303 8.076671915 
93 3 -0.62028 5.97126184 9.515287753 13.76378299 8.11559656 
83 4 0.61881 7.063048163 7.983811382 11.23950118 7.426645463 
84 4 1.29102 6.514712691 7.983811382 11.22737982 7.396469449 
85 4 1.46853 6.677083461 7.919272861 11.27500787 7.422464403 
86 4 1.30486 6.618738984 7.885371309 11.29799739 7.426185502 
87 4 2.12880 5.81711116 7.850279989 11.33152008 7.438933132 
88 4 2.45359 5.442417711 7.776172017 11.32047024 7.409364248 
89 4 1.51242 5.953243334 7.776172017 11.32047024 7.387584802 
90 4 1.26475 6.09356977 7.653569695 11.29799739 7.343796752 
91 4 1.52234 4.976733742 7.462514458 11.21510973 7,24003877 
92 4 0.65288 4.290459441 6.915970752 11.19010842 7.19628159 
93 4 3.82493 1.098612289 6.820660572 11.1773694 7.163475001 
83 5 0.15389 8.96162257 11.62631962 15.2269222 7.453291875 
84 5 0.27124 8.949494953 11.63040292 15.28824326 7.497296319 
85 5 0.22446 9.123692565 11.68202216 15.35883217 7.550565361 
86 5 0.06218 9.377040548 11.70042759 15.40176709 7.575926173 
87 5 0.20226 9.352707613 11.61917468 15.46148632 7.617260338 
88 5 0.25675 9.339436945 11.72593535 15.53539229 7.673042573 
89 5 0.09653 9.531481398 11.74718936 15.58440129 7.704562501 
90 5 0.07474 9.271811694 11.79116808 15.63290859 7.735915422 
91 5 -0.21067 9.091331585 11.77648763 15.68512463 7.771635125 
92 5 -0.56081 8.929037906 11.82661828 15.73070633 7.80121915 
93 5 -0.79297 8.776784384 11.84913578 15.77287767 7.827514803 
83 6 0.55194 9.608042089 11.35433476 13.11960982 8.203429586 
84 6 0.72737 9.567735057 11.32490484 13.07448938 8.124631488 
85 6 0.59562 9.404755176 11.25147737 13.03126065 8.048194083 
86 6 0.48450 9.458527694 11.1773694 12.93212791 7.905429232 
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87 6 0.46834 9.641473227 11.05766143 12.94752976 7.890041196 
88 6 0.78312 9.109303828 10.94940656 12.94971078 7.860655756 
89 6 0.96705 8.660600655 10.87937796 12.98607843 7.86642296 
90 6 0.94357 8.747828608 11.21757582 13,03926069 7.887257392 
91 6 0.72907 8.533066541 11.34027287 13.04323684 7.872315477 
92 6 0.67486 8.576781983 11.20767475 13.10665867 7.904476752 
93 6 0.10838 8.948728305 10.71248087 13.12510937 7.896538077 
83 7 0.17767 9.278466201 13.24309552 15.94315285 9.331856209 
84 7 0.18652 9.233861567 13.24973468 15.96240085 9.344591129 
85 7 0.15320 9.244645176 13.26335996 15.98044422 9.356285269 
86 7 0.10496 9.389155789 13.27207841 16.00936864 9.378779582 
87 7 0.11706 9.411647229 13.29192436 16.02949982 9.392641899 
88 7 -0-09578 9.469005495 13.28975584 16.06443572 9.421347998 
89 7 -0.03146 9.47968025 13.23099991 16.08832601 9.43821654 
90 7 -0.06304 9.216819338 13.14412308 16.08548913 9.428642442 
91 7 -0.44166 8.991313336 13.02380319 16.06055975 9.397254985 
92 7 -1.05939 9.120743838 12.70481827 15.91086514 9.329223471 
93 7 -0.68818 9.027258526 12.58647844 15.89035861 9.304155353 
83 8 -0.79833 6.72982407 8.661210206 12.34212149 9.315700888 
84 8 0.25173 6.502790046 8.707730221 12.3813422 9.341676374 
85 8 1.08023 5.998936562 8.752181984 12.41537195 9.362634041 
86 8 0.33141 6.790097236 8.737583184 12.44106144 9.371155724 
87 8 0.37811 6.398594935 8.80853492 12.48014279 9.397551914 
88 8 0.48211 6.774223886 8.722768099 12.51439271 9.415134785 
89 8 -0.03762 6.64509097 9.113195329 12.53108759 9.415435853 
90 8 -0.02920 6.115892125 8.752181984 12.53108759 9.403314493 
91 8 -0.05688 5.786897381 8.794741598 12.54097235 9.39726266 
92 8 -0.61233 6.284134161 8.835563593 12.57640279 9.417006501 
93 8 -0.88059 6.679599186 8.924794726 12.62277895 9.44793834 
83 9 0.277265333 8.611775834 13.02743809 16.05569356 9.698657007 
84 9 0.221677632 8.688622307 13.05644291 16.09678868 9.733255004 
85 9 0.464535558 8.33062262 13.09259374 16.12540162 9.755098924 
86 9 0.351386836 8.454679286 13.13039702 16.15321858 9.776036555 
87 9 0.514511748 8.646992629 13.13529498 16.18200382 9.797989471 
88 9 0.395131462 8.805075244 13.11518829 16.2216213 9.83005277 
89 9 0.318503389 8.925188429 13.11334021 16.25093936 9.850654513 
90 9 0.381026072 8.603187385 13.09316015 16.27001784 9.860337561 
91 9 -0.226050022 8.994048296 13.01588196 16.28253757 9.83992151 
92 9 -0.574826476 9.105313134 13.03426817 16.29720398 9.846014161 
93 9 -0.5216433 8.882391706 12.99486326 16.31014669 9.850742967 
83 10 0.061079714 9.087833697 13.12052851 16.37032625 9.775813738 
84 10 0.182862072 9.068776808 13.14966821 16.41149007 9.810479156 
85 10 0.34874511 8.867990898 13.1864435 16.44377263 9.836181521 
86 10 0.211657589 8.997765772 13.04224428 16.47118949 9.856938268 
87 10 0.390727015 9.03705784 13.23083545 16.50287782 9.882010548 
88 10 0.28442262 9.179571838 13.21458572 16.54681411 9.918889132 
89 10 0.269771753 9.253591414 13.21492 16.58027775 9.944381721 
90 10 0.187018162 9.064620718 13.20044407 16.60480137 9.96040076 
91 10 -0.274150448 9.318028177 13.13420862 16.62377515 9.952078732 
92 10 -0.590333484 9.388402872 13.15127235 16.63750032 9.957942587 
93 10 -0.628877085 9.206533134 13.11795404 16.64780689 9.960677712 
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83 11 0.698561813 9.204925739 11.1837592 13.27113099 7.474903313 
84 11 0.930284951 9.277812087 11.14611686 13.23902551 7.417765575 
85 11 0.630992383 9.235618179 11.06054744 13.20753989 7.360004988 
86 11 0.651404217 9.21473072 11.01485047 13.13239538 7.25668225 
87 11 0.312422077 9.505469645 10.90326988 13.14501953 7.243904987 
88 11 0.233956861 9.520028525 10.80220964 13.14859736 7.221976907 
89 11 -0.053675315 9.534595425 10.71858465 13.18713102 7.235162201 
90 11 0.311853223 9.256078264 11.07910615 13.24390754 7.266984503 
91 11 -0.002485818 9.15334665 11.25266714 13.26479183 7,269211109 
92 11 -0.185323586 9.222466552 11.09593684 13.31894272 7.298346612 
93 11 -0.295869026 9.122055457 10.54394145 13.33833185 7.29463494 
Sources: 1) ACDA WMEAT 1994' and 2) SIPRI Yearbook 1992 (years 1983-84) 
and Yearbook 1995 (years 1985-93-j. 
Notes: 
1. All figures are in logarithms. Observations 1983-84 of SIPRI imports originate 
from ST-PRI yearbook 1992 and observations 1985-93 from-Yearbook 1995. All other 
variables originate from ACDA. The implicit price index ARPI is calculated by dividing 
SPRI imports by ACDA. Therefore in logarithms ACDA observation of imported arms 
can be calculated by adding up the SIPRI observation with the implicit price index. 
2. Per-capita GNP is measured in US $ and other values in constant (1990) million 
U. S. & 
3. The unavailable SIPRI observation for C. America 1992 has been replaced by 
linear interpolation of neighbouring observations '91 and 92. 
4. The base year of ACDA values is changed from 1993 constant US dollars to 1990, 
using the IMS deflator (=1.091). 
A. 6 Appendix of chapter 6: Statistical results 
Estimation of form (25) 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is ACIM 
38 observations used for estimation from 1 to 38 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
DOM 524.7431 179.6998 2.9201(. 0061 
SIME . 13479 . 025019 5.3876[. 000] 
ARPI 78.2073 31.7539 2.4629[. 020] 
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GDPC -. 017471 . 010237 -1 .7 067 ( . 098 ] 
SIMEDOM -. 12920 . 02S112 -5.1450[. 000] 
ARPIDOM -110.0035 118.5281 -. 92808[. 361] 
GDPCDOM 
. 011749 . 
01S285 
. 76866[. 4481 
R-Squared 
. 65461 R-Bar-Squared . 58776 
S. E. of Regression 294.7857 F-stat. F(6,31) 9.7 922 [. 000 ] 
Mean of Dependent Variable 487.3606 S. D. of Dependent Variable 459.1245 
Residual Sum of Squares 26938S7 Equation Log-likelihood -266.1287 
Akaike Info. Criterion -273.1287 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion -278.8603 
DW-statistic 2.2607 
Diagnostic Tests 
Test Statistics LM Vý-_ersion F Version 
" B: Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= . 24619[. 620]*F( 1,30)= . 19562 [ . 6611 
" C: Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 3.1270[. 2091* Not applicable 
" D: Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= . 013244[. 908]*F( 1,36)= . 012551[. 9111 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Analysis of Function(s) of Parameter(s) 
Based on OLS regression of ACIM on: 
DOM SIME ARPI GDPC SIMEDOM 
ARPIDOM GDPCDOM 
38 observations used for estimation from 1 to 38 
Coefficients Al to A7 are assigned to the above regressors respectively. 
List of specified functional relationship(s): 
kappaM=a2+aS kappaD=-aS/a2 ; kappaL=1-(a2+aS)+a5/a2 ; gammaM=a3/(l-a2) g 
mmaL=-a4/a2 gammaD=a4/a2-(a4+a7)/(a2+a5) 
Function Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
kappaM . 0055870 . 
0021627 2.5833[. 01S] 
kappaD . 95855 . 
017794 53.8679[. 0001 
kappaL . 035863 . 
01S872 2.259S[. 0311 
gammaM 90.3910 35.7746 2.52 
67 [. 017 ] 
gammaL . 12962 . 
063713 2.03 45[. 05 01 
gammaD . 89463 1.9655 . 
45517[. 6521 
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Appendix B. The emergence of a new input: An 
extension of Stone-Geary function 
B. 1 Introduction 
An important consideration regarding the use of a utility or a production function is 
L lhat it pro-, addes has to UO With Lhe type and degree of substitution between inputs. 
Ranking from one extreme of perfect substitutes to the other extreme of perfect 
complements the extent of substitutability among the inputs of a transformation process is 
a critical concern in the selection of the appropriate analytical tool. Whilst the 
contemporary literature on transformation functions seems to focus on the development 
of less restrictive and more powerful analytical frameworks, it is little informative on the 
issue of the complete substitution of an input by the others. This paper examines an 
extension of Stone-Geary function, which appears to provide the desirable properties. It 
also examines the case that the substitutable input requires a fixed cost, if it is used. 
This work has been motivated from an attempt to provide theoretical explanation to 
the results of chapter 4. Using cross-sectional data chapter 4 estimated the responses of 
the demand for internationally traded arms to the military budget of the countries and to 
per-capita GDP having concave shapes. The explanation proposed for the hump- shaped 
response of the demand for imported arms to the military budget has as follows. When 
the budget increases countries tend to substitute imported arms with an alternative input, 
domestically produced arms, for two mainly reasons. First, the two aggregated inputs are 
differentiated but substitutes in the production of military capability. Second, the 
production of domestic arms requires considerable set up costs, so the opportunity price 
of this input falls when the demand for it rises. A similar explanation was suggested for 
the concave response to the level of development, measured by per-capita GDP. 
In order to examine the previously stated theoretical hypotheses, we need an analytical 
tool capable to describe the state of transition from the type of production that includes 
to the type that excludes the substitutable input. In other words, we examine the decision 
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for vertical expansion of the production process. The element that requires special 
treatment, from analytical point of view, is the binary nature of a 'yes' or 'no' to the 
vertical expansion. In technical terms, we need to incorporate a binary and not continuous 
variable to standard neo-classical analysis of transformation (which implies continuity). 
In terms of geometry, we focus on the property of production functions that iso- 
product curves intersect the axes when the inputs are substitutes. The popular Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution function (CES), with flexible properties of substitution, was 
found inappropriate for our requirements, revealing some peculiar properties. Even 
though iso-output curves of CES appear to intersect the axes when the inputs are 
substitutes, this intersection is merely asymptotic since CES function is not defined at 
zero quantities of its inputs. Using Chung [1994] for a contemporary review on 
transformation functions, the examination of generalised forms of CES showed a similar 
weakness to capture the complete substitution of an input. 
The need for this study rose from the poor results of our literature review in detecting 
a transformation function (either titled as production or utility functions) with the 
desirable properties. Therefore, this paper discusses a modification of Stone-Geary (SG) 
function, which appears to provide the requested properties with the additional benefit of 
relative analytical simplicity. The modification applied to SG essentially extents the 
standard range of the parameters, allowing one - and only one - of the subsistence 
quantities to be negative. This alteration provides the desirable properties of substitution 
between a particular input and the others, and allows for production with and without 
that input. 
The following pages present the set up of the suggested functional framework, an 
examination of its properties and an assessment of its validity. In its general form, this 
framework allows for fixed costs in the use of the input in question. The presentation 
includes three sections. First, we discuss the properties of SG and other functional forms. 
Section two stresses out the new framework and the last section examines the properties, 
assesses the performance and looks to the suitability of this analysis. 
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B-2 The choice of production function 
As a starting point we may briefly look at ways that elasticity of substitution affects 
the geometry of production functions. In the case of a function with unitary elasticity of 
substitution (CD is a typical example), all iso-quants (iso-product curves, surfaces, 
volumes or hyper-planes in the cases of two, three, four or more inputs respectively) have 
the axes of the inputs as asymptotes (e. g. see Heathfield & Wibe [1987], pp. 90-104). A 
more general function, with parental relationship to CD, is the CES function. When 
inputs are complements the asymptote of every isoquant is located at some positive 
quantity of the input, denoting the lowest possible quantity required for any level of 
output, called suhsistence level. When the elasticity of substitution is higher than unit the 
isoquants are expected to intersect the axes of the inputs, allowing for complete 
substitution of one input by the others. Of course, the range of the function is set 
accordingly to rule out negative values of the inputs. 
A closer examination of CES, however, shows that this function is not defined for zero 
levels of any of the inputs and the iso-output curves have asymptotical intersects with the 
axes of output map. While the use of CES, however, tends to produce complicated 
algebra it carries the unnecessary for this study characteristic of restricting to an equal 
elasticity of substitution between all inputs. This limitation could be avoided by the less 
restricted Generalised CES which, likewise CES, rules out zero levels of inputs and it is 
even more complicated (e. g. see Chung [ 1994] pp. 126-3 0). 
Stone-Geary function (e. g. Chung [1994] pp. 23-3 1) has mainly been used as a utility 
function in the well-known Linear Expenditure System and, like CES, can be considered 
as a generalisation of CD. In logarithmic form, we can define SG function as follows 
n 
In U Ki ln(qi - ri) 
where 0< ici < 1) Exi =IIU is output (utility or product), qj are quantities of the inputs, 
, vi are subsistence quantities so that qj > vi > 0. 
It is non-homothetic but strictly monotonic 
and convex, thus well defined as a utility or production function. Assuming constant 
prices the budget constraint is G=1, pi qj where pi is the price of input i. Solving for 
the standard consumer's (or producer's) optimisation problem the demand for the inputs 
of this process is given by 
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(2) + iýcj j 
pjvj 
pi 
(i 
Looking closer into this function the own price elasticities of demands are 
(3) c9q, p, 
c'p, q, 
pj), -j 
pti 
p, q, 
<0 
Examination of (3) easily reveals that using SG implies that demand is always inelastic 
(16ii I< 1). The cross-price elasticities are 
(4) = 
aqj Pj 
<0 
CP; q P; q, 
i _. -I-ý 
which limit inputs to be gross complements. The income elasticity is 
(5) CGi - c9qi 
GG 
aG qi p, q, 
which restricts inferior goods. The Allen-Uzawa cross-partial elasticities of substitution 
are 
lJhPhrh. 
p, pjq, qj 
limiting the inputs to gross complements, as the cross-price elasticities also show. From 
the previous description SG function does not seem to accomplish the requirements of 
ti-iis study, since it would not allow the elasticity of substitution to be higher than unit 
between any pair of inputs. 
B. 3 Complete substitution in transformation 
The properties of SG in the standard form are designed to model consumer behaviour, 
where the name subsistence levels of y coefficients has its origin. In its standard form 
inputs are imperfect complements and subsistence quantities are restricted to be positive. 
There is a modification in the assumptions, however, that enables SG to provide the 
desirable properties. This is to allow subsistence quantity of one only input to be 
negative. The second modification of this setting, from standard SG set-up, is to allow for 
fixed costs in the use of the input in question. The impact of this alteration can either be 
seen as causing a diminishing price of the input or as reducing the budget by a fixed 
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amount (of set-up cost) but leaving the price of that input fixed, equal to marginal cost. 
This convenient trick prevents algebraic implications and allows for a neat solution. 
Assume that all assumptions hold as in usual SG set-up except one- the subsistence 
level of only one input, say inputf is negative. The subsistence quantities of all other 
inputs remains positive as usual, or 
(7) In U K, In (q, -, v, 
) 
where 0< ýcj < 1,1, Ki = 1, q,, f > vj, ýf >0 and yf <0:: -ý qf . 
The negative subsistence 
level rf allows inputf to be a gross sýbstitute instead of being limited to a net complement 
: 4.1,11 
WILI, all 
Other 
inputs. 
--Lqow, input fcan be fully subStitUted by "tie othler inputs, in wl LL III 
case (7) takes the form 
(8) In CT=K In(-yf)+Y,, Kfln(qi-ri) 
, _f f 
Note that (8) is just a special case of (7) where qf is set to zero. As a conventiori, we 
distinguish the type of transformation that excludes inputf from the case that includes it 
by noting the related variables with a tilde (-). 
The second alteration we introduce to SG is that only when input qf is excluded the 
disposable budget is G, whereas whenf is included it reduces to G-F, because of fixed 
costs F in the use off. The fixed amount of set-up costs F has to be spent when any qf > 
0 is used in production. As a result of the restriction qj < Vj, in either types of 
transformation the necessary condition for any output to exist (U > 0) is that the budget 
can cover at least the expenditure for subsistence quantities of all other thanf inputs 
(9) G>G, piri 
When qf is included in the transformation, the budget in addition to G, has to cover fixed 
costs F. Thus, a necessary but not sufficient condition for using qf is 
(10) G>G =C +F L 
ýL 
Including input f in the process, the demand functions for inputs are essentially as in 
the general cases (2) with the budget reduced by the fixed costs 
(11) + ic, 
G-F-. p1y1 
pi 
(i E=- qf 
Under (8), however, the returns to scale are decreasing compared to (7) and the demand 
equations for inputs take the form 
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Ici G- 
Ej,, 
f prj (i e j), qf =0 
- lcf A 
Solving the problem of output maximisation, we may first look into restrictions (9) and 
(10). When GL >G> dL the use of input f in the production is impossible and we can 
directly detect the demand for other inputs using (12), without any implication. To 
determine the optimal allocation when G> GL, where either types of production are 
possible, we must ensure that both output is maximised and also that the non-negativity 
of inputs is satisfied. While the non-negativity of other thanf inputs is not problematic, 
following the standard SG case, we, must ensure that the demand for qf is positive. Thus, 
applying the restriction qf > 0, with the use of (11) we obtain 
(13) qf >0=: >G>GH 
where G. = GL - Pf 7f - Notice that under the assumptions that vf 
<0 and F ý! 0 
Kf 
we always have G. > GL Thus, condition (13) fully replaces condition (10). 
Having detected the necessary conditions and solutions for the allocation of resources 
in each of the two types of production, we need a sufficient condition that defmes the 
optimum type of production in the general case. We can do this using the indirect utility 
functions for each case. Substituting from the demands for inputs (11) and (12) in the 
production functions for the two cases, after simplifications the two indirect utility 
functions become 
(14) u= 
(G 
-F-1, pi7i 
Ki 
qf >0 
A 
and 
7f 'Ci 
(15) U 
ýf (G-j,, 
fpjvj)-fjj ; qf 
0 (I 
- IC f 
)I-Kf 
A 
From the definition of maximallity, the condition for the inclusion of g in the production 
is 
(16) qf u> ii 
Substituting from (14) and (15) to the right hand side of (16) and rearranging we obtain 
(17) 
where 
qf >0<: >z>O 
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ý4 I-Kf Pfyf 
Kf 
-I z=z(G)=G-a -T (G a= f 
(G 
- ý7"L) L +Pf7f) lcf 
Kf Y 
Variable z is proportional to the output surplus from the inclusion of inputf Note that it 
is impossible to obtain a general solution for the inverse function of z(G). Therefore, we 
can only solve for values of G that correspond to given values of z with the use of 
numerical methods. 
Differentiating z with respect to G once we get dzIdG =I- a(l - Kf 
XG 
-k 
Y'cf 
and 
twice we get d2 ZIdG2 = aicf 
(1 
- Kf 
XG 
- Gý, 
Y'-'cf 
>0 showing convexity of z to G. 
. 3olvingfrom the first order condition u'zl'ag = 0" for the globai minimad or z we obtain the 
neat result that z get its minimum at GH. Thus, z(G) is strictly increasing in its range [GH, 
oc). The domain of z is bounded downwards, by the global minimum z(GH) but not 
upwards, since HmG,. z= oo. We can also show that z(GH) is always negative. 
Substituting fo r GH in (18) we obtain 
z(G. )= -a[F - 
(1 
- Kf 
)pf 
vf lKf 
]1-'f 
- pf yf 1, icf and after substitution for a and some 
Kf 
algebraic manipulation we obtain z(G, ) <0F 
pf; Vf 1-Kf 
> 0, QED. Thus, 
- ICf Kf 
he have shown the initial hypothesis that z is never higher than zero. 
Summarising, we have shown that in its range z(G) is continuous, strictly increasing 
and quasi-convex, with a negative lowest bound and upwards unbounded. Since 0 is 
always included in the domain of z using the mean value theorem we have shoed that 
there is always a value of G, say G*, that satisfies z(G) = 0. Thus, z has at least one root 
in its range. Furthermore, since z(G) is a strictly increasing function, using the fixed point 
theorem we have shown that this root is unique. This proof can be expressed in a more 
formal way as follows. 
Theorem 
n 
Let function U fli=l (q, map a transformation of (ql, q2, ..., 
qn) into R where 
neN., 0< Ici < 1) Zilci = 1, qi,, f > ri;,, f > 0, qf ý! 0, rf <0 and pi, ici and ri are fixed If 
132 
1, p, q, + F; qf >0 G= 
0 where 
F 0, then there exists one and only one piqj; qf 
c- (G. . oo) , where 
G H=GL +F-- 
lcf 
pf y and G, p,, v, , such that the f 
constrained maximisation of U under G implies that: 
GL <G<G* q, +- 
ýci 
1 -)Cf 
qf 0 
G>G*q =7±K1 
Yj PjVj 
pi 
G-F'ý-Yjpjyj 
pi 
E: -: 
and 
I'. .\ 
EJ) 
Note that by definition, when G=C either previous solutions give equal output. 
An interpretation of the previous result can be as follows. At the lowest boundary of 
the budget that both types of transformation are possible (i. e. when G= GH) 
transformation with input f excluded always gives equal or higher output than with f 
included. Thus, at GHthe output of transformation without inputf weakly dominates the 
output of transformation with input f, whereas if F>0 the later type strictly dominates 
the former. When G fises, excludingf keeps dominating until G reaches the critical level 
G* > GH. When G exceeds G* production withf included dominates in terms of output. 
When G= G* the two types of transfon-nation give equal output and the dominant type is 
undefined. The critical level of transition G* is unique. 
B. 4 Examination of the new system 
We may illustrate the performance of the presented modification of SG function using 
a simple example with two inputs: f with a negative subsistence level vf, and q with a 
. usual positive subsistence level rq. Input q can represent a combination of a number of 
other inputs. Figure B. 1 presents a case without fixed costs in the use of qf, i. e. F=0, and 
a non zero subsistence quantity vf. Diagram A of Figure B. I plots the iso-output map and 
the solution of the constraint maximisation problem. All iso-quant curves have two 
asymptotes, one in each axis, determined by quantities rf and rq. 
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When the budget is G, the producer maximises output at ul using q, = Gilp, quantity 
of input q and excludes inputf (=O). Notice that the budget constraint has a smaller slope 
than the slope of ul isoquant at the intersection with the axis of q. When the budget is G2 
= GHinputf is still marginally excluded from the transformation, although an infinitesimal 
increment of G implies the entry off in the process. If G3 > GHmaximisation of output 
requires quantities q3 andfi of the two inputs. The double diagram B of Figure B. I plots 
the demand for the two inputs (Engel's curves) and output (u), all as functions of G. 
Curve u gives the output with inputf included and curve ii (dashed line) gives the output 
with f excluded. Maximum output is given by ii when G lies between GL and GHand 
switches to u when G> Gv. 
Figure B. I Equilibrium without fixed costs 
A B 
fg 
U 
0 
GL 
G 
U 
JL GH G 
Figure B. 2 illustrates the case that F>0 and Diagram A plots the indifference map of 
this case. From technical point of view, the specific distinction of this case from the 
previous is that the budget constraint is non-continuous at the intersect with the axis of q. 
Whenf >0 the budget constraint is represented by the usual straight line with slope -PýPq 
but at f : ': 0 (i. e. at the intersection with the axis of q) it does not include the usual 
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endpoint at g= Glp,. Instead, it includes a point which is detached from the rest of the 
curve, shifted upwards by amount Flpq. This shift represents the release of resources from 
fixed costs F when input f is not used, measured in units of q. If, for example, the budget 
is G, and input f is included in the process maximum output is ul. When input f is 
excluded, though, output reaches level W, > ul using quantity 4, of input q. When the 
budget is G2= G* allocation (q2,0) and allocation (4, ý2) yield exactly the same output 
U2 = W2 , which 
is a case of indifference. If the budget grows higher than G*, as in the case 
of G3, output levelU3 that requires q3 andfi quantities of the inputs dominates output "3 * 
In a similar way as in the preyious example, Diagrams B present the output and 
demands for inputs as a function of G, when F>0. The difference between the previous 
and this case is that the demand for input q is non continuous any more but consists of 
two line fragments detached at G*. Output is still a continuous function of G but not 
differentiable, changing discontinuously slope at G*. 
Figure B. 2 Equilibrium when input f requires fixed costs 
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The transition from the type of transformation that includes f to the type that excludes 
it, and vice versa, depends on the relative prices of inputs, the budget and the other 
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parameters of the production. Under the new definition, simple observation of the 
elasticities from (3), (4), (5) and (6) reveals that the properties of SG are affected in a 
desirable way. The own price elasticity is not any more limited below unity, for all inputs 
except the input substitute f The cross price elasticities and cross partial elasticities of 
substitution now reflect the substitutability of this input by not being limited below zero 
and unity respectively. In particular, (6) shows that inputf is a gross substitute with any 
other input since for any i E=- n, cif = of7, 
>I. 
The type of transformation that excludesf differs from the case that includes it, in that 
neither the technological coefficient 
(- 
yf 
Yf 
is unitary nor is the sum of ic coefficients, 
I 
< 1. Another clitterence between the properties of the two types is that 
transformation type that excludes input f has lower returns to scale to the type that 
includes it. Since SG is not homothetic the returns to scale are not globally equal but 
depend on the inputs. In order to compare the returns to scale of the two alternative 
methods of production we can examine the change of the ratio of the two outputs, when 
all inputs exceptf are equal and change by a factor 1, for any qf > 0. 
U (Iqf - yf 
Y-1 Fl, 
_,, f 
(Iqi -, Vi 
Ki 
Iqf - 7f 
Kf 
(15) > 
U (-, vf Qqj -, vi 
) Ki 7f 
The fact that U grows faster than 0 when inputs grow at the same proportion indicates 
for higher returns to scale of the former function. 
For an establishment of the link between the presented analytical framework and 
reality we may return to the original motivation of this work. It all started from an 
attempt to provide a coherent theoretical explanation to the empirical findings of chapter 
4 on the demand for Arms Trade. The quadratic logarithmic function specified in chapter 
4 included concave responses of the demand for one input (imported arms) to the budget. 
The working assumption of chapter 4 is that after some critical size of the budget a new 
input enters in the production: the domestically produced arms. Imported arms are 
differentiated from imported arms but they also are imperfect substitutes, so with their 
entrance they replace part of the imported and decrease the reliance on them. This has the 
result that the demand both shifts and bends downwards, giving to the curves the humped 
shape. 
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Perhaps the application of our framework to firm theory is the most apparent, the 
presented analysis, although, might find other applications in the areas of either firm or 
consumer theory. In the context of consumer theory, for instance, SG function allows for 
positive subsistence quantities of inputs that are absolutely necessary for the 
transformation. A negative subsistence quantity of a good in consumer's utility 
transformation may be the result that this good is free up to some given quantity. Further 
increase of the quantity of this good may require an considerable set-up cost and 
additional variable costs dependent on the quantity. An example could be homemade 
food. The majority of consumers can enjoy the quality of some home made food with a 
small effort and a low cost. If the consumer has strong preferences for home-made food 
would probably need to hire personnel for that purpose, set-up the appropriate 
installations, pay wages etc. 
A useful tool that helps to secure that the performance of an analytical model is indeed 
the one it appears to be and that the underline logic is not flawed is the numerical 
simulation with the help of computer. This becomes more essential especially when part 
of the analytic structure of the model cannot take a complete algebraic solution, as in our 
case. Therefore, building numerical examples of this model and comparing its predictions 
with the observed facts is not only an assessment of its usefulness but, also, an illustration 
of its performance in practice. The results of various simulations of this framework 
appear to confirm the discussed theoretical results. The examples drawn in Figures A. I 
and A. 2 are not freehand drawings but numerically simulated applications of the model. 
Appendix B. A provides the output of such a simulated example. 
B. 5 Conclusions 
The alteration of Stone-Geary function, presented in this paper, has initially been 
motivated by the needs of a particular empirical study. Our attempt to develop an 
analytical framework that provides the required properties followed the poor results of 
the literature review to detect an available alternative. The performance of the framework 
we develop here is generally satisfactory regarding the initial requirements. Using a single 
production function, technically as simple as SG, our framework allows an input either to 
be included or excluded from a transformation process, providing solutions for the 
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demand of all inputs in either cases. We also examine the case that the substitutable input 
requires a fixed cost. 
According to the standard assumptions of Stone-Geary function and those that 
originate from alterations we introduced, we can relate the entry of the input in question 
to the transformation with the size of the resource constraint. In a brief description this 
has as follows. There is a minimal required level of the fixed resource (the budged) for 
any output to exist. This is the standard in Stone-Geary framework amount that only 
examines positive only subsistence quantities of the inputs. When the budget exceeds the 
necessary for the subsistence quantities level the production first takes place without the 
substitutable input, -providing that the negative subsistence quantity of it is smaller than 
zero. When the budget grows beyond some critical level that output using the 
substitutable input equals to output without it (indifference) the input in question is the 
included in the transformation. In this work we prove that this critical level always exists 
and it is unique, and we may calculate a value for it with the use of iterative methods. 
For a confirmation of the proclaimed theoretical results the developed framework has 
been examined with the use of analytical and tested with the use of numerical methods, 
without any contradictory results. This does not imply, however, that further 
investigation and further examination for possible affinity with some existing work are not 
needed. Chapter 6 further examines of the applicability of this framework in the context 
of applied econometric work. A single empirical attempt, however, might not be adequate 
to assess the applicability of this framework. Such an evaluation rnight require a number 
of applications, both in the context of firm and consumer theory. 
B. A Appendix: A numerical simulation 
Figure B. 3 displays the outcome of a numerical simulation of an example with three 
inputs q, y and f using Matlab. The critical for the transition level of income G* is 
calculated by iteration process (Gauss-Newton method), since it is not possible to inverse 
the real expression in (18). As the output of the simulation shows, the level of budget 
varies from 20 to 60, the fixed cost of using inputf is 15 and the prices of the three inputs 
are set to unit. The subsistence levels of q and y are 3 units and the subsistence 
level off 
is -3 and the ic-coefficients 
0.3,0.3 and 0.4 respectively. GL is 21 (=15+2x3) and the low 
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bound for usingf is GH= 25.5. The level of transition G* is calculated at about 45.69. We 
conclude that the performance of the numerical simulation is in line with our 
expectations. A similar result came from all similar attempts. 
Figure B. 2 Numerical results: The d1scontinuous entry of the input 
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